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Abstract
This thesis is concerned with China's urban employment 
experience between 1949 and 1957. In Chapter Two we attempt 
to quantify this experience by a critical examination of 
existing indicators of employment change for all urban areas 
and by the analysis of new data for individual cities. In 
particular we have attempted to construct a detailed picture 
of the demand and supply of non-agricultural labour in the 
city of Shanghai.
The most striking feature of the data presented in Chapter 
Two is the evidence of the growth of open unemployment and 
also of very large employment fluctuations. In Chapter Three 
we analyse the long run trends in urban employment change, 
and in Chapter Four, we look closely at the size of employment 
fluctuations and show how these have been related both to 
unemployment and over-manning.
Chapters One to Four constitute an analysis of the enviro- 
ment relevant to the final chapters in which we trace 
chronologically, the development of Chinese thinking about 
urban employment and the evolution of the administrative 
machinery designed to control the urban labour market.
In Chapters E'ive and Six we show that during the period 
analysed, China's urban employment experience led to a
complete re-orientation of employment policy and a 
transformation in the duties and powers of the institutions 
responsible for employment control*
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Campaign to reduce the size of the 
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operativisation.
The co-operativisation of agriculture
f'V,
The socialisation of urban industry, 
handicrafts and commerce; publicat­
ion of the Twelve Year Plan for 
Agriculture.
The Wage Reform.
Mao speaks on ’’Contradictions”. 
Official beginning of rectification 
campaign to achieve more responsive­
ness in Party, Bureaucracy and 
People.
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August
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December
New movement to encourage participat­
ion in physical work and send people 
to the country (Hsia Fang).
Second Five Year Plan discussed.
The First Five Year Plan ends; the 
eve of the Great Leap Forward.
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G-lossary
an shu Literally: to settle. Settled persons
are either persons who have been found 
employment by the Labour Bureau; or 
found employment by themselves; or been 
sent to the countryside. 
hsia fang Literally: sent down. This was the name
given to a series of movements in 1955, 
1957 and 1958 whose purposes included the 
reduction of the urban population and the 
size of the bureaucracy. 
hu kfou teng chi Population registration*
•pa ohfrih chih Literally: (Job) monopoly system. A
system of employment control which left 
control in the hands of Job brokers. 
Particularly prevelant in the construct­
ion and transport sectors and also known 
as the pao kung chih, pa t’ou chih etc. 
san fan Literally: the three antis. The name
given to a campaign! in 1951-1953, to 
eliminate waste and corruption in ad­
ministration and the public sector*
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Glossary (Cont’d)
tiao p’ei fan oh’ou Literally: sphere of assignments.
that is, the range of employment controlled 
directly by the Labour Bureaux* 
t’ung yi tiao p’ei Unified assignment of labour* 
wu fan Literally: the five antis. The name given
to a political movement in 1953 designed 
to destroy the power of the urban capitalist 
class.
The positive functions of the city cannot be 
performed without creating new institutional 
arrangements, capable of coping with the vast 
energies modern man now commands: arrangements
just as bold as those that originally transformed 
the overgrown village and its stronghold into the 
nucleated, highly organized city.
Lewis Mumford 
The City in His tory
Introduction
This thesis is a study of urban employment problems 
set in the context of growth and fluctuation in the urban 
economy between 1949 and 1957. It has three main 
objectives: to explore the statistical materials available
for the measurement of urban employment change; to analyse 
the basic character of urban employment problems; and to 
trace the evolution of both Chinese thinking about employ­
ment and the institutions of labour control which had to 
reflect that thinking in day-to-day administration.
The study is concentrated on the period before 1958 
for two reasons. First, after that year data become 
increasingly scarce and their meaning increasingly obscure. 
Analysis which attempts to span pre-and post-1958 periods 
therefore involves discontinuities of method that are 
unsatisfactory to the author and probably unconvincing 
to the reader. More important, the years before 1958 
constitute a period that is significant as well as 
convenient. During these years the Chinese Communists 
extended control over the economy by means of a series 
of radical institutional transformations; so that*
/
although the economic objectives of the Government 
remained basically stable, an astonishing variety of
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techniques of economic control were experimented with 
in pursuit of their achievement. During this decade the 
Government also gained some degree of understanding of 
the whole range of economic problems with which they were 
faced, and in attempting to solve them, moved through 
cycles of policies each including a point of extremism more 
radical than anything in the cycle that preceded it.
The Great Leap Forward marked the high point of this 
series and it is difficult to believe that the tidal wavs 
of utopian optimism and institutional reform which swept 
through China in the summer of 1958 will ever be exceeded.
The problems of employment policy and adminstration 
formed only a part of the economic pre-occuioations of the 
Government during these years; and for most of the 
period, employment considerations were only secondary to 
other more basic objectives. The achievement of these 
objectives however, proved more dependent on correct 
labour policies than the Chinese had expected. At the 
peaks and troughs of activity one can generally see the 
operations of the labour market with exceptional clarity, 
and one can see the way in which employment considerations 
assumed critical importance. For this reason we have 
tried to analyse labour issues in the context of the
-14-
overall management of the economy.
In putting employment policy in the context of 
overall economic management, particular emphasis has 
been laid on short term management and the actual 
workings of labour administration. Economists have 
spent much time analysing structural change and the 
development of economies over long periods of time, 
and it is proper that they should have done so; but 
there is a danger that we shall lose sight of the fact 
that in real life, the planners and administrators of 
structural change are profoundly affected by their 
working enviroment of unpredictable external shocks; 
administrative limitations; and perpetually shifting 
political constraints. Anyone who has studied China’s 
economic administration in detail becomes aware that 
even at the highest levels, a great deal of attention 
is concentrated on the problems of year to year, 
quarter to quarter and at time>, even day to day manage­
ment. Studying the problems of planning and administration 
from this perspective, enables one to understand something 
of the complex character of the relationships between 
different aspects of Chinese economic policy and to link 
these changes with the wider, political landscape. One
can also see the way in which cumulative experience 
has sometimes lead to an almost spontaneous generation 
of radical new policies; and actions that might have 
been interpreted in terms of ideological dogmatism or 
the whims^a dictator, suddenly appear as the outcome of 
logical, but scarcely visible processes.
The materials which we have used are partly materials
have
familiar to scholars who/worked on Chinese labour prob­
lems; the bulk of our data, however, have been drawn 
from Chinese materials that hitherto have not been 
subject to any systematic analysis, and for the most 
part have not even been looked at, Two sources have 
been particularly important: the Journal of the
Ministry of Labour, Lao Tung (Labour) 1950-1957; and 
the four Shanghai daily newspapers which together with 
the Shanghai journal China Chi Chou Pao (The Economic 
Weekly) 1950-1954, have enabled us to huild up a detailed 
picture of employment change and economic administration 
in Shanghai. This picture has been used to supplement 
and where possible improve upon the analysis of the 
national data, We have also used the files of the Union 
Research Institute (Hong Kong) and the holdings of the 
library of Congress to obtain local newspaper material
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for other cities, in particular Canton and the larger 
Manchurian cities.
In our view these local data are in many ways more 
satisfactory than the national data. First, because 
they are often available in detail, which enables us to 
answer more complex and economically more interesting 
questions than is possible with national statistics.
Second, because they facilitate the illustration of signifi­
cant local variations that are concealed in the national 
aggregates, and third, because there are sound reasons 
for thinking that local administrators were able to 
achieve a degree of accuracy in statistical work higher 
than that possihle for the State Statistical Bureau 
at the national level. This is particularly the case 
for Shanghai, where the city administrators had ex­
perience of data collection and analysis acquired over 
a period stretching back into the early twentieth 
century.
The availability of materials has not however 
dictated the scope of our analysis. The cities are the 
centre of our attention because the urban-rural dichotomy 
is indispensible for labour market analysis and because 
the municipality as a unit of economic planning and
administration has grown in importance through the 
years. One other attraction of the study of individual 
cities is that through them it is sometimes possible to 
bridge the pre-and post 1949 periods. National statistics 
for the pre-war period have been described by one 
authority as guesswork, and this is unfortunate for those 
who consider that evaluation of the post 1949 economic 
performance must depend in some degree on an understanding 
of the pre-war period. The data for individual cities is 
often better than guesswork. The pre-war data for 
Shanghai for example, while they often leave much to be 
desired, are certainly sufficient for us to draw some 
important and at times unexpected comparisons with the 
period 1949-1957.
Chapter I consists of a sketch of the urban economic 
enviroment during the 1950fs.
Chapter IX explores the statistical dimensions of 
urban employment change and Ghapters III and IV use this 
data for analysis of the urban employment problem. In 
the last two Chapters, we see the conclusions of the 
earlier Chapters as a setting for an historical analysis 
of the evolution of employment policy and administration.
CHAPTER ONE
THE URBAN ECONOMIC BNYTRQMENT
The Urban economy before 1949
When the transfer of power took place in 1949 the 
urban economy was in a state of collapse. The population 
of the cities was swollen by refugees; industrial 
production and most other economic activities were far 
below pre-war peaks; unemployment was high and inflation 
and food shortages which were evident, reflected both a 
collapse of administration and major structural 
dislocations in production caused by almost twenty years 
of continuous warfare^.
(1) A graphic account of the economic problems of the 
takeover in 1949 is Chen Tun, ’’Conquer financial 
difficulties; achieve price stability”, Ghieh Fang Jih 
Pao (Liberation Daily) (Shanghai) 5.12,1949 hereafter 
CFJP• also: ’’The work report of the East China Military
Government”, CFJP, 4,2.50.
Before 1949 the location, pace and character of
urban development in modern China had been determined
predominantly by external forces. The growth of
population and economic activity in the cities of the
Southern and Eastern seaboard had been stimulated by
the Western Powers who, in the nineteenth and early
twentieth century, had established the Treaty Port
system. After 1931 the growth and industrialization
of the Manchurian cities had been accelerated by the
Japanese. As a result of these stimuli, the urban
population in the pre-communist period was growing
at moderate rates, and by 1949 the urban population was
(3)more than 58,000,000, or 11 $ of the total population' . 
Thus although the rural population remained overwhelming­
ly predominant, In absolute terms China already had an 
urban population of enormous size.
(2) Shanghai, for example, grew at 4.8$ between 1890
t
and 1930; Tienjsin at 4.2$ between 1900 and 1935, see: 
Rhoads Murphy, Shanghai: Key to Modern China. (Harvard,
1953) ch. 2, and H.O.Kung, ”The growth of population of 
the six large Chinese Cities”, in: The Chinese Economic
Journal, March 1937, pp.301-314. See Table 32 in ch.3 
for additional pre-wgr population data*
“ SO"
The economic base which supported this population
was however both slight and structurally defective; for
although industrial output had been growing at an average
rate of 5p% since before the First World War, industry
remained insignificant in absolute terms and highly
dependent on external economic relations for its continued
and efficient functioning* Per capita output of such
commodities as steel, electricity and cotton are
quantitative indicators that confirm the smallness of the
industrial base. These all suggest that levels of output
in China were not only low by comparison with those of
advanced countries, but even by comparison with the
(5)
Soviet Union in 1928 *
(3) The rate of growth of output is an estimate by 
John K.Chang, fflndustrial development of mainland China 
1912-1949", The Journal of Uconomic History, Vol.XJCVII, 
March 1967. A useful survey of the absolute size of the 
Chinese industrial base in 1949 is in: W.W.Rostow, The
Prospects for Communist China, (M.I.T., 1954) ch. 12.
The most accessible aollection of data on the pre- 
1949 economy is: Yen Chung P*ing, Chung Kuo Chin Tai
Ohing Chi shih T fung Chi Tzu Liao Hsuan Chi, (Selected
— 21«*
Industrial backwardness was also reflected in the 
pre-1949 urban employment structure. The modern 
industrial sector accounted for about one million 
persons which was probably less than 5$ of total employ­
m e n t ^ .  The rest of the urban work force was engaged 
in modern sector services or traditional handicrafts, 
service, trading and transportation sectors. We also 
know that a high proportion of the population 
participated in some form, of gainful occupation; that 
there were extreme variations in hours actually worked; 
and that unemployment was a serious social and economic
(3) (Cont*d)
Statistics of Ohinafs Modern Eieonomic History). (Peking, 
1955)• A survey of Ghinese economic development before 
1949 is: Alexander Eckstein, "The economic heritage",
in Alexander Eckstein, Walter G-alensoaand Ta-Ghung Liu, 
Economics Trends in Communist China. (Edinburgh, 1968)#
(4) See Table 21 and discussion in ch.2 and Table 2% 
in ch.3#
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problem^ ^  *
Hence, the economic base on which the new cities 
of socialist China were to be built was clearly inade­
quate for the requirements of the new leadership. For 
this should be emphasized: although the rural roots
of the Chinese Communist Party were too deep for it 
ever to share the classical Marxist contempt for the 
"idiocy11 of rural life", in 1949 the Party shifted its 
centre of interest decisively to the urban areas, and 
expected that these would provide the material, 
technological and organisational means not only for 
their own economic and soGial transformation, but for 
the socialisation of the countryside also. Thus whereas 
in Western Furope and America the urbanisation of society
(5) The quality of pre-war materials on the urban work
force is not high, but some usable information is available*
See for example the Chinese Year Book, particularly those 
for 1931, 1936, and 1938. Statistical information on the
Shanghai labour force in the 1930Ts is contained In: 
Statistics of Shanghai» (Shanghai 1933) and a characteristic
survey article on Shanghai labour topics is: Fang lu An,
"Shanghai Labour", Parts 1 and £, Chinese Bconomic Journal,
August and September, 1930.
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had been accomplished by the bourgoise, in China (as in 
Russia), this work was to become part of the historic
(ad­
mission of the proletariat •
Economic growth and fluctuation 1949-1957
Let us now consider some of the main indicators
of economic growth and fluctuation in the urban economy
in our period. Tables I to 10 and diagrams I to 4 V. '
present data on population,industrial output, employment,
retail sales and the construction and private industrial
sector’s. (See pages 56-62)*
All the indicators suggest rapid development.
Industrial production grew at rates between 20*4% p.a.
and 23*8% p#a. (according to one’s choice of index) and
industrial employment grev* at 12*6% p*a. Population
also increased rapidly in this period averaging 7*1% p.a.,
so that by 1957, the urban population had increased to 15%
(6) Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the 
Communist Party in, Selected Works Yol*l* page 38 (Moscow, 
J962) and Hua Kang, !,A discussion of the law of the 
development of relations between town and country”, Hsin 
Hua Ghou Pao (New Qhina Weekly) Yol.4, No.6, 14.1.1950, 
pp. 8-9*
24—
of total population and included 14 cities with more than 
a million inhabitants, a greater number than in any other 
country. The absolute size of the industrial economy had 
also grown significantly although industrial employment
was still small in relation to total population and work
(7)force'
The other interesting feature of these tables is the 
fluctuations which they reveal* Fluctuations are apparent 
in the aggregate industrial production and employment data, 
but a degree of a sectoral and geographical disaggregation 
adds extremely interesting dimensions to the picture* The 
crucial sectoral data are those for private industrial out­
put and total construction activity (using employment data 
as an indicator of the latter)* These are shown in tables 
4 and 9, A geographical disaggregation is provided by 
total and private industrial output data for Shanghai in 
Tables 2 and 6,
Several conclusions can be drawn from these data 
taken together with additional qualitative evidence.
(7) See Table 29 Chapter 3#
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First, the peaks of activity were 1951, 1953 and
1956, while the accelerations which lead to these peaks
{8 J
"began in mid-1950, Autumn 1952 and Spring 1956 •
Second, the private sector and the construction industry 
played important roles in these fluctuations. For not 
only did activity in these sectors usually fluctuate in 
the same direction as the aggregate data, but the inten­
sity of fluctuation tended to be much greater*
The peaks of activity and the relationship of them 
to struotual fluctuations can be identified not only by 
statistical indicators, but also by abundant qualitative
(8) The upturn in Autumn 1950 followed the collapse of 
the urban economy in the spring of that year under the 
impact of draconian fiscal measures introduced to stabilise 
prices. See, Ch’ien Hua et. al. Chapter 2. Also, 
’•Shanghai’s industry’s stabilisation, recovery and 
development”, Ohing Chi Chou Pao (The Economic Weekly) 
Ser.13, No.23, 6.12.1951, hereafter GOOF. The upturn 
in 1952 followed a second economic crisis in the urban 
areas associated with the ftFive Antis Campaign” (a 
political movement directed against the power of the 
capitalist class). The 1956 upturn was related both to 
the stimulation of rural demand following the co- 
operativisation movement and the massive construction 
plan for 1956.
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evidence of bottlenecks, and by the prevalence of certain 
types of economic behaviour which tended to be in evidence 
whenever economic activity was at high levels* Basically 
this latter may be described as behaviour prejudicial to 
the maintainence of control* We shall examine the 
implications of this in some detail shortly; the main 
point is that at the peaks, planners control over prices 
and resource use in particular in the labour market and 
private sectors - was weakened, and that the desire to 
reassert control over the economy during the boom periods 
reinforced the importance of purely physical constraints 
on activity as a motive for dampening the level of 
activity. In practice this involved the reimposition of 
strict controls over the private and traditional sector - 
almost irrespective of the effects of this on total 
output and employment
(9) In late 1951 full capacity limits were being reported 
as reached in a wide variety of industrial sectors. See 
"Vice Premier Chen Yun reports on economic and financial 
work", GFJP 26.10*1951 and "In the last year commodity 
prices in our country have been basically stable",
(9) (Conti*a)
CFJP 24#9.1951. In 1953, the pressure on the 
construction sector was the main destabilising factor 
and this lead to an early and drastic revision of the 
annual plan. See, "The Bast China Bureau of the 
Chinese Communist Party call* a Meeting to discuss 
industrial production policy for the whole area",
CFJF 14.3.1953. For 1956 the best account is Po I 
Po, "The out-turns of the 1956 National economic plan 
and the draft plan for 1957", Hsin S-ua Pan Yueh K Tan 
(Hew China Semi-Monthly) 1957 No. 14 pp. 28-39, here- 
after HHFYK. The behaviour of the private seGtor 
at the peaks is discussed in note 22 and the labour 
market issues in Chapters 4, 5 and 6.
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In the context of this study the most important 
characteristic of the peaks was the behaviour of the 
labour market; and what was remarkable about this 
was the periodic labour shortages which extended a 
long way down the skill and across the industry 
structure of the urban labour market. These shortages 
(which occurred in the context of growing structural 
unemployment) were directly responsible for the loss 
of control over hiring and wages.
The significance of urban fluctuations for a whole 
range of economic management problems is so great that 
we must pause for a moment to consider why, during the 
1950Ts, they were so severe. Three reasons stand out. 
First, there was the dependence of the urban economy on 
a fluctuating rural sector which supplied it with 
important inputs and was also a source of demand part­
icularly for the output of the small scale urban sector. 
Dependence of this type is common in developing countries 
but its importance was accentuated in China during the 
1950fs by a new degree and type of economic isolation 
from the outside world. For, whereas in the pre-war 
period, imports could be obtained to counteract temporary 
shortfalls of the inputs normally supplied by domestic
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agriculture, and necessary for the functioning of 
the urban economy, after 1949, the imposition of 
stringent exchange control and the commitment to a 
long term programme of capital goods imports precluded this 
form of stabilisation. Therefore in years when 
agricultural output and income was low those sectors of 
the urban economy dependent on domestic agriculture for 
demand or inputs felt the full weight of readjustment 
implied by rural fluctuations.
The second factor contributing to the sharpness of 
fluctuations in the urban economy, was the size of the 
private sector and its diminishing sensitivity to 
conventional economic controls. In considering the 
size of the private sector it has to be remembered that 
it included both capitalist enterprises in the oiodern 
sector and small scale production and trading activities 
of a traditional character. In terms of output it 
remained very important up to the end of 1953, and even 
up to 1957 it remained of some significance. In 1953, 
the private sector still accounted for 48.6$ of total 
industrial and handicraft output and in some cities it 
was still preponderant. In Shanghai and Canton for 
example the private sector accounted for 63$ and 65$
-30-
of industrial output a l o n e f u r t h e r m o r e  it has 
to he appreciated that the private sector included the 
most labour intensive forms of activity in the urban 
sector (particularly in commerce) so that fluctuations 
in priv ate sector output and sales lead to disproport­
ionately large fluctuations in employment*
The basic explanation for the violence of prir ate 
sector fluctuations was the increasing crudity of the 
instruments used for controlling it. Throughout the 
whole period the Government *s attitude to capitalism 
and traditional forms of economic activity fluctuated 
sharply - being conditioned at any point in time by 
the degree to whieh these sectors were currently 
frustrating control of the economy and their importance 
in maintaining output and employment. The response 
particularly of the capitalists to these changing 
attitudes was correspondingly exaggerated. Thus when 
the Government was on the attack, the capitalists,
(10) 1954 Mein Ghuan Kuo Ke f*i Shou Kung Yeh fiao
Oh*a Tau Liao (1954 National Individual Handicraft Survey: 
Materials). The handicraft output inoludes output in 
rural areas, Private industry*s share of total industrial 
output in 1953 was 36*8$, Ten Great Years, page 38.
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foreseeing imminent extinction, closed their enterprises, 
and often, if the opportunity was open to them, migrated 
to Hong Kong. But when (as periodically happened), the 
capitalists became convinced of the Government’s good 
intentions towards them, they reacted with the wild 
optimism of men entering a golden age. The problem was 
that as time passed and the reversals in Government 
policy multiplied, the sensitivity of the private sector 
to any stimulation or control seems to have declined.
Thus, although between 1949 and 1952 the Government had 
some success in controlling the sector by conventional means, 
after the violent anti-capitalist campaign of the Five 
Antis Movement in mid-1952, the dominating consideration 
in the minds of the capitalists was not whether marginal 
changes in budgetary, monetary or Government purchasing 
policy would ma£e adjustment of their levels of activity 
worthwhile, but whether they were to be allowed to survive 
at all, and if so, for how long. This attitude meant that 
the Government had to resort to control techniques of 
increasing crudity and consequently of increasing 
potential for destabilization.
The third contributory factor to the severity of 
fluctuations was the adoption of a target rate of economic
- 32-
performance which was probably in excess of what was
feasible in the long run (irrespective of the economic
system or policies adopted by the Chinese), combined
with a structure of incentives and sanctions that
induced a tendency to extremism in economic and indeed
(11)in all forms of activity . Hence, the economy
alternated between frantic booms in which plan targets
were overshot at the expense of prodigal waste of
resources and loss of control, and periods of relative
stagnation during which the growth rate readjusted to
its material base and the Party and planners struggled
to reimpose control over economic institutions. These
periods of stagnation were intensified by the effects
of political repression with which they were invariably
associated, and which seemed to be a necessary p  rt of
(12)the process of re-imposing control " .
(11) The implications of the gap between desired and 
practible performance are in discussed by the author in 
^Problems, performance and prospects of the Chinese 
economy**, The World Today, Vol. 23 No.12, December, 1967.
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The exceptional character of the fluctuations in 
Shanghai can he explained completely in terms of the 
three factors discussed above. The city had an abnormal 
dependence on agriculture because of the concentration 
in it of the ootton Industry; it also had an above 
average dependence on the private sector as is indicated 
in Tables 5 and 7; and finally, it was a city which, 
because of the extent of its historical association with 
foreigners, the size and excellence of its educational 
system and the size of its Bureaucraoy, was peculiarly 
vulnerable to purges and political movements of the 
type which swept Ohina in 1952, 1955 and 1957.
The changing instruments of economic control
The development of instruments of economic control 
in the cities was a gradual process. The cadres who
(12) The economic consequences of political repression 
are well known to students of the Soviet economy, and 
the present author is convinced of the importance of 
variations in the political climate as an explanatory 
faetor in the character of economic change in ohina 
during the 1950fs.
found themselves responsible for the management of the 
urban economy in 1949 had been trained in an enviroment 
dominated by the logistics of guerrilla warfare and by 
the harvest - an enviroment in which almost all calculat­
ion was in real terms. In the cities, these cadres had 
to work in the context of political and economic 
relationships, more complex and refined than any that 
they had previously encountered. In the longer run, the 
economic ambitions of the Government would require a 
whole new machinery of economic administration, but In 
1949, although the apparatus of the Soviet State was an 
ideal which could be written about and admired, it was 
largely irrelevant to immediate problems. In the short 
run, the economy had to be managed by use of existing, 
conventional instruments, often operated with the 
assistance of existing, non-communist personnel.
In the early years, the fiscal system was an 
important instrument of control. This system consisted 
of a hierarchy of geographical budgetary authorities 
(Province, Municipality, County etc), and of the 
budgetary system within each of the centrally controlled 
ministerial systems. The budgets of the geographical 
and ministerial authorit ies were combined to produce
-35-
(13)the overall, national budget' . In the psriod up 
to 1952, budgetary contxx>l was the main weapon used to 
control inflation, and its use required a tremendous 
drive to bring under control the Budgets of the G-reat 
Administrative Areas and to discipline the activities 
of finance cadres throughout the whole system who had
been accustomed to the freedoms of "guerrilla style"
, (14)finance work
(13) Good general accounts of the financial system 
are, Wang Ghing Ohih, Wo Kuo Ti Yu Suan (My Country’s 
Budget), (Peking, 1956), and Richard Diao, Chung Kung 
Kuo Min Ghing Qhi Tsai Cheng Chi Hua T*i Hsi Yu Kung 
Yeh Tsai Wu Chi Hua:,; (The Economic and Financial 
Planning System in Communist China {s National Bconomy 
and Industry) (Hong Kong, 1966).
(14) The "guerrilla style" of finance work was 
characterised by (a) autonomy from central authorities 
(b) the use of local taxes (e.g. inter-county export/ 
import charges) and (c) tax policies and collection 
methods of a highly discriminatory and political 
character. See, "Kwantung finance progresses towards 
correct procedures", Nan Pang yih Pao (the Southern Daily) 
(Canton) 8.9.1950, hereafter NFJF.
-3 (3*"»
During this period the principle was established that 
the obligations of each level of budgetary accounting 
to the level immediately superior were to take absolute 
precedence overall other claims on income. This 
principle, despite some modifications, was to have 
important repercussions until it was finally abandoned 
in 19581151.
In 1954 and 1955, the importance of budgetary work 
was again emphasized, although this time in the context 
of the acquisition of savings rather than of price 
control. The principle of the primacy of obligations 
to superior budgetary authorities was re-emphasized 
and reinforced by continuous auditing and in 1955 the 
share of the Central G-overnment in total budgetary
(15) ni\ discussion of the division of jurisdiction 
between central and local authorities in financial 
and economic workn, JMJP 26.5.1951#
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expenditure rose to a peak of 78$?
There is abundant evidence that the effect of this 
growing professionalism and centralisation of the fiscal 
system prejudiced the maintainence of high levels of 
activity and the efficient use of resources. This was 
because the combination of rigidly enforced obligations 
and unpredictable tax revenues led to extreme conservatism 
in investment and other expenditure by local planning 
authorities. The impact of this on employment was 
particularly marked because local labour intensive 
construction and small scale economic activities were 
affected by local budgetary squeezes. Similarly, 
financial conservatism within the ministerial systems
(16) The planned share of central government in total 
expenditure in 1955 was 78.44$. In the 1954/1955 budget 
speech the Finance Minister argued that an upward trend 
in the central government’s share in spending was 
necessary and desirable if the Five Year Plans were to 
be financed successfully. See, Li Hsien Mien, "Report 
on the out-turns of the 1954 budget and the estimates 
for 1955”. HHPYK 1955 Mo.8, pp. 23-32.
( 1 7  \
led to the immobilization of investment resources'
As a result of the experience of these years, the 
finance system underwent a process of decentralisation 
which started in 1956 and finished in 1958. An 
important outcome of this decentralisation, was that 
the budgetary authority of the municipal authorities 
was considerably enhanced.
Monetary policy was also of some importance in 
the period up to the end of 1952. The control."of the 
Banking system gave the authorities control over the 
supply and price of working capital and this was used 
to control the level of activity in a highly discrim­
inatory manner. For example in 1950, it was used to
(17} A particularly interesting source of information 
on this subject is a series of budget accounts for 
Kwanjfeung Province and Canton City between 1954 and 1956. 
The Provincial reports are in, NFJP 17.8.1954, NFJP 
3.12.1955, EBMP 5.8*:1956. The Canton City reports 
are in, Kwang Chou Jih Pao (Canton Daily) 7.8.1954 
hereafter KCJP, and KCJP 25.11.1956. There is also 
a report for the small Kwanjbung Municipality of Hai 
ICfou which throws very interesting light on the relation­
ship between a Provincial and a minor budgetary 
authority, see, NFJP 16.8.1956.
mitigate some of the most serious effects of the 
draconian budgetary policy then being enforced to 
control inflation^8  ^; later - for example after 
the Five Anti's in 1952 - it was again used in a 
highly selective fashion as an instrument to make 
the Government1s control of the private sector more 
effective^^ * After this period however, the 
sensitivity of the private sector to monetary policy 
declined markedly so that other techniques of control 
had to be developed.
(18) See, "The volume of loans expands every month", 
GFJF 12*5.1950 and "In all areas the phenomenum of 
closures is steadily disappearing", Shanghai Kung 
Shang Tzu Liao (Materials on Private Industry and 
Commerce in Shanghai), 19.V.1950. In this early 
period there were some quite sophisticated dis­
cussions about interest rate policy. For example, 
fB©me views on lowering interest rates", QOCF Ser.10, 
Ho* 24, 15.6.1950.
(19) "Discuss the present stage of bank work", GGGP 
Ho.26, 3.9.1952.
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Th© main source of new power over the economy in 
our period was the expansion of the public sector and 
the formal planning apparatus. This expansion is 
illustrated in Table 5 and in Table 10 below. These 
show the declining share of the private sector in 
industrial output and retail commerce. Of course 
control was not simply a function of the siae of the 
state sector, for within that sector the planners had 
to develop information systems and a structure of 
incentives and sanctions which ensured the responsive­
ness of the economic administrators at the enterprise 
level. This quest for control was never successful and 
lead to experiments in organisation in which the Party 
and Mass Organisations played important roles. Nonethe­
less, despite the existence of problems within the 
public sector, the socialisation of 1956/ marked in 
theory the point at which the authorities assumed 
complete control over all urban economic decisions, and 
it is significant that the national economic plan for 
1957 was probably the most intelligent and technically 
satisfactory annual economic plan of the whole period* 
Finally, it is important for our purposes, to
note that the changes in economic administration which 
were necessitated by the socialisation and the 
decentralisation of the finance and economic systems, 
initiated a chain of events which transformed the 
importance of the municipality as an economic planning 
unit. Before 1956, the municipality governments had 
of course performed a wide range of functions, For, 
apart from a whole array of non-economic work, 
departments of the municipal governments played an 
important role in the allocation of materials, food 
and labour and had been responsible for the operation 
of state enterprises not under direct ministerial 
control. In 1956, the municipal authorities also 
assumed responsibility for everything previously in the 
private sector, and in 1957, for those enterprises 
shed by the central ministries in the decentralization 
of that year. This acquisition of responsibility for 
production and trading enterprises had to be accompanied 
by new powers to plan and co-ordinate the supply of raw 
materials and labour. Thus by the end of our period, 
the municipality had become a planning unit of major
importance, and the municipality powers and
responsibilities greater than those of comparable
-42-
authorities in the cities of any other country in the 
world.
The unresolved problems of urban economic management
The basic problem which the managers of the urban 
economy were unable to solve in the period 1949 to 1957, 
was that of reconciling the objectives of maintaining 
very high levels of urban economic activity (and 
employment) and at the same time maintaining control 
over prices and resource use, particularly in the 
labour market#
Let us consider first the period up to 1956# In 
this period, high levels of output and employment required 
a high level of activity in the private sector. This was 
recognised in 1950, (in the context of unemployment and 
a scissors c r i s i s ; and in 1952^^, in the context 
of a renewed employment crisis and of the control figures 
for the first year of the Five Year Plan. Yet the events 
of 1951 and 1953, showed that when stimulated, the private
(20) See particularly, "Overall arrangements and concern 
for both sides is the only way", JMJP 14.6.1950 and 
"Financial and economic work in the Chinese People1s 
Republic during the past year". JMJT 1.10.1950.
(21) "State concerns in Shanghai help private firms to 
expand", NONA release, translated in Survey of the China
p 4:3**
sector rapidly want out of control and developed a 
capacity to frustrate the planned growth of the public 
sector. This jpiy be explained thus: as the level of
activity rose, so did the financial strength of the 
private sector and so consequently, did its power to 
bid up the prices of raw mat©rials and labour, to 
negotiate higher prices for Government contracts, and 
even to refuse such contracts should such a course seen 
profitable
(21) (Gont’d)
Mainland Press (Hong Kong) 395, 13*8.1952, hereafter,
SGMP,
(22) The volume and terms of state contracts became the 
most important of the conventional techniques for control­
ling the private sector after the Five Antils campaign.
For details of resistance in 1951 see, Wu Ghiang, ohung 
Kuo Tzy Pen Ghu I Kai Tsao Wen T'i. (Peking, 1958), 
(Problems of the Economic Reform of uhinese Capitalism) 
Chapter 3. Also, "A refutation of "free development" 
thought (arising out of) the improvement in industry and 
trade", HWP 24.9.1951. For 1953, see for example, 
"Heighten vigilance and resolutely struggle against
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Attempts were made to exercise detailed control 
over private firms through the activities of Union 
officials, Party members and other political 
activists within these firms, as well as through the 
working of the monetary and fiscal system, hut these
i
efforts were never successful in the long run because 
the authorities had neither the administrative nor 
political resources necessary to police the large 
number of small enterprises involved; and where 
these resources were available, it seems that they were
(22) (Con^d)
illegal activities", and "Private industrial and 
commercial circles in Shenyang begin a movement to 
implement the correct style of work in management",
Ta Kung Pao (The Impartial Daily) (Tientsin) 17.10.1953 
hereafter TKP. Useful data on profit trends in the 
private sector in Shanghai are in, "The reform 
of Shanghai’s private industry and commerce during the 
past four years", 3MJP 3*3.1954.
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(2*5)
often corruptible *
(23) The main form, of non-economic control over the 
private sector was that of quasi-demoeratic consultative 
"bodies comprising representatives of management, unions, 
the Party and workers* These were introduced very early 
and strengthened somewhat in late 1952. See, Kung Ot^ang 
Kuan Li Min Ghu Hua, (Shanghai, 1950), (The 
Democratisation of Factory Management) and, "Output and 
quality generally up; relations between labour and 
capital improved", C3KFP 8*1.1953. These early initiat­
ives do not seem to have been very successful and in 
1954 a renewed effort was made to establish control of 
the private sector through groups of political activists 
in private enterprises. In Shanghai for example, a 
special school was set up in November 1953 to train Party 
workers for "the bitter and complex" struggle in the 
private sector, see, "Train the Party backbone in private 
enterprise", QFJP 16.4r. 1954. The role of the Youth 
League in this work is discussed in, "Organise the 
youth of the city (Shanghai) to struggle to fulfill the 
Party’s general tasks during the transition period”,
TOP 14.5.1954.
The periodic growth of private economic power
which stimulation of the urban economy involved was
unacceptable politically and economically: and given
the failure to control the private sector by conventional
means, the outcome of these expansions was a repression
which involved lowering the level of activity and
employment. When activity and employment had fallen to
levels of activity which were unacceptably low, the
authorities had to initiate another acceleration which
in due time lead to further loss of control etc. Thus
we would argue that there was a policy cycle in the
urban areas which was an important factor in the overall
fluctuations of the period. Moreover this cycle was a
vicious one, for control techniques applied to the
private sector became increasingly crude and therefore
(24)
increasingly repressive in their effects ♦
(24) In 1954 for example, the private sector was the 
subject of a vicious stream of widely publicised legal 
actions against capitalists who were held to have 
contravened tax, labour and other laws. See for 
example, "Ch’iu Kao Hsi the capitalist proprietor of 
the Te Hsing factory in Shanghai is given a prison
The special problems of the private sector were 
not however the only explanation of the inability of 
the planners to reconcile control with high levels of 
activity in this period. The behaviour of administrat­
ors in the public sector was also important - particularly 
in the periodic destabilisation of the labour market*
This was notably the case in 1953 and 1956 when the 
planned construction expansion and the pressure for ful­
filment of very high physical output targets resulted in 
a complete collapse Of labour administration. An 
explanation of this is suggested in a later Chapter, but 
the combination of lack administrative resources and the 
inherent weakness of a control isystem in which power was 
distributed unequally between the horizontal (local) 
and vertical (ministerial) planning authorities was the 
basic problem.
(24) (Gont’d)
sentence*, TKP (Peking) 17.4.1954 and "The Canton 
Municipality PeopleTs Court convenes a public sentencing 
assembly and passes sentence on the illegal aotions of 
a batch of capitalists*, NffJP 12*7*1954. Legal 
intimidation was also used again in 1957, see "Stop 
capitalist counter currents", TKP (Peking) 16*8.1957.
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The socialisation of the private sector in 1956 was 
expected to resolve many of these problems. For the 
socialisation ensured that formally, all economic 
decisions fell within the prerogative of the planners; 
and in theory this implied that they could put as much 
pressure as they wished on the urban economy without 
risking loss of control. This would make possible the 
fulfillment of the very ambitious construction and out­
put plans for 1956 without recrudesence of the control 
problems of 1951 and 1953. However in practice the 
matter was more complex; for the acquisition of formal 
control over economic enterprises could only be meaning­
ful in so far as administrative and political control 
over them was really effective. Unfortunately it was 
not. In Shanghai for example, we find the municipal 
planners admitting in August 1956 that they were still 
only capable of planning directly, 23$ of the output 
for which they had been responsible for since the 
January socialisation; and in practice, the operation 
of all enterprises previously In the private sector 
depended largely on the goodwill and cooperation of
-49
the old capitalists, managers and intellectuals^.
It was precisely the necessity of securing this good­
will that lead the Government to combine the "High Tide 
of Socialism11 in the cities with an era of political 
liberalisation and subsequently a wage reform, that 
favoured possessors of technical and managerial skills*
(25) See especially K fo ChTing Shih, secretary of the 
Shanghai Bureau of the Central Committee of the Communist 
Party in QffJP 11.8.1956. The weakness of political 
control is indicated in Shanghai by the fact that there 
were onlyf49.982 Party members in Shanghai in 1956, in 
which year it was reported that there were over 26.000 
enterprises in the industrial sector alone. It seems 
certain therefore, that there must have been large 
numbers of economic enterprises in which there was not 
even a single Pai'ty member. See, HWP 8.8.1956 and 
CFJP 27.7.1956.
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It was no accident that Ghou Bn Lai,s famous speech 
on "The Problem of Intellectuals" was made on the eve 
of the last, extraordinary week of the Shanghai social-, 
isation(g^  •
(26) The Shanghai socialisation was completed in the 
third week in January (although only a few weeks 
earlier it has been expected that the socialisation 
process would take another ten years)* Ghou Bn Lai's 
speech was made on the 14th of January* See, jgheng 
Ohih Hsueh Hai (Political Study) 1956, No.2, 13.2.1956, 
Lao Tung Pao (Labour Daily) (Shanghai) 20.11.1955, 
hereafter LT?P. See also LTP 25.11.1955 and JMJP 
19-22.1.1956.
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The defects of socialisation as a strategy for 
control rapidly revealed themselves, for in Autumn 
1956 and 1957 we find yet another revival of the 
"private sector" which now consisted of handicraft 
cooperatives and small enterprises which were in the 
public sector yet in practice capable of independent 
action, and also the so called "autonomous enterprises". 
The former were mainly enterprises and handicraft shops 
which had been in the private sector before January 
1956, which had not been effectively incorporated into 
the planning system, and which exhibited strong tenden­
cies to independent action which the authorities des-
(27)cribed as "commercialism" and "capitalism" *
(27) In the public sector in Shanghai in 1957 there 
were estimated to be at least 20.000 enterprises whose 
production was not subject to direct planning - indeed 
a great many of these enterprises could not be planned, 
because they did not at that time keep any accounts*
See, OFJF 11.8.1956,
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The "aufrnomous enterprises" were illegal firms, staffed 
by peasants, unemployed workers, housewives, ex~m.em.bers 
of disintegrating co-operatives and other anxious to 
participate in the urban work force, but unable to do 
so in the public sector (or in some cases only able to 
do so at unsatisfactory levels of i n c o m e ) M o s t  
of the autonomous enterprises were initially very small, 
but they did show a surprising propensity to grow both 
in terms of turnover and geographical linkages. Thus 
the dilemma of 1951 and 1953 presented itself yet again. 
Fox* the new private sector proved to be as unmanageable 
as the old. It frustrated control over materials supply 
and pi^ices and it undermined employment and wage control 
in the puolic sector. Yet the sector was tolerated (at 
least in part) until the Great Leap Forward, and nowhere
(28) The number of autonomous enterprises in Shanghai 
in March 1957 was given as 5.000. These enterprises 
were classified under ninety different industries and 
trades and employed a total of 16.000 workers, See, 
"Strengthen the management of autonomous enterprises", 
CFJP 3.3,1957#
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in the 1950Ts is the conflict between the desire to
maintain high levels of output and employment and the
unwillingness to acquiesce in the loss of control that
this entailed, more apparent than in the handling of
the autonomous enterprises in 1957, Firm measures were
taken against "capitalist tendencies" within the public
sector; but although the autonomous enterprises were
threatened again and again, they were always reprieved
from complete extinction on the grounds that the employ-
(S9)
ment and output they provided made them indispensible
(29) The campaign to bring the public sector in Shmghai 
back under control is described in, "Supervision by the 
masses must be strengthened", CFJP 22.3*1957 and "Heads 
of small businesses in Shanghai attend the first lesson 
(in the correct style of management)", OFJP 20.10.1957. 
The campaign to control the autonomous enterprises took 
place throughout China in 1957. See for example,
"Suchow begins to punish autonomous enterprises", Hsin 
Hua Jih Pao (New China Daily) (Nanking) 23.8.1957. 
"Resolutely defeat the wild attacks of illegal autonomous 
enterprises", Chung Kuo Ch'ing Nien Pao (China Youth 
Daily) 21.8.1957. In defence of the private sector se©
54-
Apart from this, the problem of controlling the 
large enterprises in the public sector when under 
pressure had not been solved by 1957 either# For in 
1956, we find that the materials supply and labour 
management work were as chaotic as ever. To some extent 
this can be attributed to the inevitable confusion of a 
transition period: but in the longer run, events
suggest that only a decentralisation more ruthless than 
anything contemplated in 1956, combined with a greater 
degree of Party control than anything experienced in the 
early 1950*s, would give the Government the power it 
wanted#
To summarise, the main features of the urban economy 
in the 1950*s were rapid population growth; rapid but 
erratic growth of industrial output: and a transform­
ation of economic institutions and instruments of 
control which although radical, did not enable the
(29) (Cont’dJ
"Why tolerate autonomous enterprises?", HWP 11.5.1957 
and speeches at the National Handicrafts Conference in 
December 1957, TKP (Peking) 24.12.1957.
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planners to achieve a satisfactory reconciliation of 
their objectives of high levels of urban economic 
activity and employment and the maintainenee of control 
sufficient to ensure the fulfillment of the basic 
industrial targets of the First Five Year Plan*
T
a
b
l
e
!
.
 
In
de
xe
s 
of 
In
du
st
ri
al
 
Pr
od
uc
ti
on
 
(N
at
io
na
l)
 
19
49
-1
95
7
i—i
l>IQ o> HO
IQIQ
<£>
05
<o o>
G>
•H
IQ
IQ05 05to -R
o
oOIQ t—I
■H
-P
rH
o IQ
o
-p*rH
O
<M ■H
•rH
O
oLO05
o  oto •H
•H
O
OOrH
Ta
bl
es
, 
In
de
x 
of 
In
du
st
ri
al
 
Pr
od
uc
ti
on
 
fo
r 
Sh
an
gh
ai
05
10 £>
05 CO
H
50 tH
IP O
OS CO
rH
IO 05
LO 50
05 CM
1— 1
sH CM
10 CD
05 CM
rH
CO CO
LO 50o> CM
«H
CM IO
IO 05
o> rH
rH
rH O
IP 50
05 rH
iH
O CM
LO O
05 1*—I
iH
05 O
H* O
05 rH
rH
CM
GOto
LO
I
E>
V
to
to
•V
CM
¥
50
LO
+■
03
V
<D
e*o
d
©
sio
©
a3 
CD 
O
o
CO
e*o
d'H
tQOoX*o
d
*cs
d
CO
0  
ra <D 
xJ
4 3
O
a
CO
CO
d
o•H
p
CO
d
CO
t>
p
x{
E*0•H 
i—I 
CO
CD
d
CO
CD
d
©
xi
EH
do
43
O
dnq
o
dPi
d
CO
XJ 
4 0
d
CD
xt
4 3
CO
d
CO
4 3
COnzJ
O
CO 
© *H 
d  0) 
CO
4 3
do
si
CO
CO
r©©
d*H©
4 3
do
o
sio
•rH
-d
©©o
xj
4 3
nq
©
d
d
©
<d
©
d
Pi
iH©
d
©
d
©
w
d•H
©
>©
xi
H©
•rlo-H<d
q-io
© *(—i
si
p
O
E>sO
©
d
doo
©
©
si
p
©
©*H
©
dPip
©
o
p
+3
1—l 
d  o*H
•H
rd
E^ a
d
©
t>
©
4 3  > < n
©
©
&w
*HriH
r*-j 
© 
d  
na *H
>»HnO
d*H
57
EN
IO
05
P•H
50
05
*H
P
1—1
IP
P •H
•H
O •H
iH
P
50
IO
•H
*H
nq
*H ■H
4 3
P•H *H
4-3
rH •H
rMP •H
*H
■H
-58-
43
dPt
43
do
1— 1 © 
por ) c* ST
rp
*•
4 3
doo
CM
©
X*©
EH
*
Phi
ml
d
©
43
©
©
d
©si
cr­ •
ip o*
05 ip
r~I 05
* rH
CO *
• CM
00 rH
CM *
CO
CM
©
IS
© u
m l
t>a
rH •»
•H ©
© d
P ©
©
© l>s
jqn,.tr* ©
t>
*H
0 qn
©
Ph d
■H
d
© nq
©
rH
d X
•H dm O
m TO
fa
b
le
 
in
de
x 
of 
re
ta
il
 
sa
le
s 
(u
rb
an
 
an
d 
ru
ra
l 
ar
ea
s)
 
19
49
-1
95
7
IN 00
IO EN
as CM
rH
to O
10 IN
OS CM
H
IO Os
IO CM
as CM
rH
'sH CO
to CM
Os CM
H
to
to O
as CM
rH
CM CM
to <D
as rH
rH
1—1 EN
to CO
os rH
rH
O O
to O
OS 1—1
rH
os
OS
rH
CO
H-
coH
to
+
OS
<£>
CM
V
COH
o
CO
+■
0CD
d
03
-do
•to
to
rH
0)
tiQ
COPi
0d
CO(1)
|H
43
CO
0
Po
d
a)
Eh
0O
&
o
03
IN
lO05 
i-H
t
as
as
rH
{nu
-p
0
P
•S'd#r_|
0
-p
03
t>
■H
6p.
Uo
43
p
Pi«P
PO
<5hO
0
P
rH
CO
E>
0
0
oP
«iC|
*Hlo
H
0fpdM
0
rH
rQ
C3EH
£S
to03
rH
to
toOs
rH
to O
to O to
as rH I
rH
IO
asH
03
torH
to to
to os
OS H
rH
CM sit
to to
OS H
rH
rH 00
to
OS rH
rH
O IN
to O
as rH
rH
OS O
sH O
Os rH
rH
*
rH 
CO 
•
•P 
0
CO 
pKHpH
d
0
*rt
o
COp
su:
d 
0
*H 
P-f
*rl
en
-d 
0
HI
CD d
CO 
-d 
CO
"tH d
cm p
■V“ &
-59-
rl
CM
I
OS
to
V
IN
0wd
0do
+H
P
COCQ
O
Pw
O
*H
COid
d
0*H
jdo
0ap
Po
CO
do
*rf
43
CO
3
■n
0d
0
EH
0
xl
r„ 1fcH
CD
0
CiO
CO
Pi
IN
IOas
rH
EDd
•rH
M
0FM
0U
CO
0J>>
Ta
bl
e 
6
» 
An
nu
al
 
ch
an
ge
s 
in 
th
e 
le
ve
l 
of 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 
in
du
st
ri
al
 
ou
tp
ut
 
in
Hi
0
-60-
*to
ID
OiH
1
H
ID
ai—i
CO
dt£
aco
dm
EDIQ
o>
H
CVJ
IDQi
H
i—1
ID<Ji
H
H
¥
I
CD
o
*
0
ID *
Oi a
H
CO
*
d
ft P
03 & Hft a0 Fg 0
0
t>> ft 0
0 xlft 43 ft
a ft «w
o 0
0 0
ft 0
•P 0 ft
0 si0 •H
ft a a
m
0 ID
si 0> d
P H 0
■
tD
a • a
*H CD £
ft da 0d •Ha p
t>a ft O
ft a
P 0 ft k
0 ft p fta ra hr
rp d p' I
d >?«=* 0
0 ft
rH 0
0 •rH rH p
+3 0 0 ft
0 Q d 0
> 0 0
ft 0 •rH ft
ft •* ,d 0
ft 0 d
rH d
0 ft
*• O 0
•rH 0 ft ID
0 ft 1—1 COd 0 H
tiD 0 si *a d CO0 ft P» •d v-** ft 5>
CO CVJ
0 0
ft 0 a
o ft d
d r~H
d -d •H •H
ft •rH 0
o h> •rH n
ft 0
0 d si 4>?h •rH ei0 r f1
a >
0 0 -F4>
d d -d S 1Sft*• 0 COs v><;»)
0
•» 0
ft * d
O tO p
P
0
*»
O
0
d
d
ft
0
P •rH 0 0
d 0 d
ft d 0 03 0
p W P •rH
a d 0 0 P
0 0
d •H
0
rH
0
P
H CO ft d a
0 ID ft ft 0 ©
*H ID to 0 ft dft G> tD w 0 0
P H •H d d H
0 rH p •rH ft
d •H d
d P p O •H
d • d 0 P-p4 0
!>s
d 0
ID * p d d »
*rl cn d *—I 0 ,p
0 H 0 d Pi to
s i £> 0 ft d <Ji
tajG •H *H 0 0 1—1
d [ 7> P ft •
0 O P( 0 p Oi
d
0
0 d ft ft •
CO CD « a 0 0
d
ID ED d to 0 0 f t ED
<X> tQ d ID 0 p 0
•rH H 0 CT> 0 0 ft PhI
H d
ft >> * 0 d
0 W CO d d 0
p
CV3
ft * p d 0 ft
0 d 0 CD 0 ft ••0 ID CO d d p ■rH
0 o> tO 0 f t ! 0 0 d 0
H P h ID d
0 l>3 m l d cn 1—1 aO
P ft 0 H 0 a
0 0 0 0 0
t> 0 d •H d
•rH H O 0 i— [ a •rH P CO
ft ID IN 0 0ft Oi CO 0 •H 0 rH •H d
rH 0 1 -» 0 rH P •H
0 •rH d p 0 0
d t— ! 0 0 q_j P d
p •H p a 0 0
d 0 •rH P rH
ft O a 0 ft P O •H ft
0 ID ED *=53 0 a 0<3* CD sir4 r-H 0 d 0
0 rH 0 d ?30 Pft •rH *v •H a 0
0 ft d d 0 ">
d P c| 0
03 d 0 •> 0 CO
o> d a 0 ft £ ID
0 0 0 d 0 ID
_d 0> tD d A d Osf t H CO 0 •H 0 0 ft
0
CO
sio
» *
03
0
O
o
CO
0  t—i
Si
0
ft
m
0o
ft
3
OCO
- 61-
©
*•
O
o
EN 
LO 
Oi i—I
I
os
as 
i—i
+3
P
a)
o
i—ip
dcw
i"!
©
d
p
w
d
d
H
00
a)rH
d
05
EH
o IN to
IO o 4-
os as
rH •
EN
to o 03to CO CV]
OS +
rH •
IN
LO i— i
to 03
as rH
t— i •
CO
o
to £N
as DO
i— i •
to
to
IO
as
rH
0 2
IOas
t—i
CO
to03
LO
rH as
to IN
as CO
rH •
O CO
LO CO
as CO
rH %
CO
as as
to
as o
rH •
DO
rH tO 
02 rH 
rH ^
tO
o
¥
as
¥
rH
V
©
D0
dC3
-d
o
*d
d05 i—i
d
■rH
03
d
*rH
43
d
©
&
o
rH
d'pa
i—ira
©
o
o
co
d
©
CO
w
d
©
d
©
o
©
-d
,|7i
<d
o
d
CO
©
d
d
pq
CO
to
<o
Os
rH
P
d
©
I
o(—i
pa
»— i
05
d
d43
rH
d
o
•rH
dEjC
05
d
§
d
©
pq-4
©
©
d
©
td
p
rH •> •
d d CO
o o 03
•H 43 rH
d W
DC d ©
© ■rH m
d sX ©
o U) P4
Wt ©
H
d ©
o i— !
m IN d
d to ©
© as Eh
d rH
pa 1
as •
Pt H
•H as 02
rH rH *
•H O
-d S!
Ph * »
© r>
d (HS-t o
SX •H as
O jd *
t~3 o Ph
w
•*
o
o
o
o LO
IN 1— 1 CO
LO as
as •
rH i— 1 I
rH CO
CO to to
to
as
as
* ■v
■-1 03
to CO •
to CO CO
LO as 1 03
as • i— 1
EN rH rH
to ©
as DO
c— 1 ©
I o P m
as o
to 1— 1 DO M
as as • t
i— I i— i 02 ©
rH
In ,Q
d ©_jj> O IN Eh
© CO IN O
d LO rH rH **
nH CSS • 4 p
d rH 02 d
•H ©
-d
d
o o
•rH C3 CO to i— i
P to IN p.
O as o 4 d
d rH • pa
d rH
p i— !
© ra
d ho 1— 1 O o d
o to o LO p
css CD H- i— 1
© 1— 1 d
sX o
p ■rH
d
d tiO
o O O ©
to o O d
*f3 as rH o
i3 rH \
©
S
In d
o o
rH as o ©
p. "sjl o d
d as 02 ©
(53 rH d
pa
» ©
as DD * *
d ©
© © o
rH d d
d O 3
© or_«tri DO
Ta
bl
e 
I
Q
. 
Th
e 
sh
ar
e 
of 
th
e 
pr
iv
at
e 
se
ct
or
 
In 
re
ta
il
 
sa
le
s 
19
50
*1
95
7 
(% 
sh
ar
e)
-63-
E>
IO
•
HI CM
«o CM
IO •
cr>
rH
CO
to •
IO
05 rH
i— 1
50
to *
05 LO
t— t CM
CO 05
to •
05 05
rH
CM CM
•
o
to * Q)
05 D- w
1-1 LQ D
t-1 to
ft
o
CQ
Pito • as
05 to CD
rH H
o to
+»
as
a?
IHto CO Kb
05
rH d
CD
♦ •
0>o
o
to
4r*\
or* o
*

page 62.3
page 62.4
o
oooc*> o
- 63-
OHAPTFR TWO
The growth and structure of the urban labour force
This chapter is divided into four parts# In the 
first part we examine the usefulness of existing re­
constructions of employment data relevant to the study 
of the urban labour market# Second, we proceed to 
explore the Shanghai data in ail effort to quantify the 
size and character of the demand and supply for labour 
and the structure of employment in that city. In the 
third part we present a table which summarises a mass 
of other local data which gives some indication of the 
size of inter-city variations in ChinaTs urban employ­
ment and demographic experience# Finally, in part four, 
we summarise the national employment data and discuss 
the attempts that have been made to estimate urban 
unemployment#
Part One
The existing estimates of employment
Up to the present there have been only two completely 
original attempts to provide the sort of statistical 
framework relevant to our needs. The most detailed and 
comprehensive of these Is J# F, Emerson's Non-Agricultural
— 64-*
Employment in Mainland China: 1949-1958*
The other is a series of estimates presented "by T.O.Liu 
and K.C.Yeg as a part of their estimates of Chinese 
Hational Income' K
Emerson*s work is without question one of the most 
professional and painstaking pieces of research which 
has yet been done on the Chinese economy since 1949; and 
we have therefore made considerable use of his results 
throughout this thesis and in the latter part of this 
Chapter, his main results are summarised. However, in 
many ways: Emerson^ work reflects the methods and re­
quirements of demography rather than economics and we 
think it can be shown that his final data have limitations 
which justify an attempt to find alternative approaches
(1) Ta-Chung Liu and Kung-Chia Yeh, The Economy of the 
Chinese Mainland: National Income and Economic Develop­
ment, 1955-1959, (Princeton 1965}, Hereafter referred 
to as Liu and Yeh,
Emerson has also written up his material in, An Economic 
Profile of Mainland Ghina, Joint Economic Committee of 
the United States, (Washington, 1965} Yolume II Part III* 
(Hereafter referred to as The Profile},
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to the problem of quantifying China rs urban employment 
experience.
The first point to be emphasized about Emerson*s 
data is that they are principally concerned with the 
whole of the non-agricultural work force. They there­
fore Include persons resident in rural areas and engag­
ed in such occupations as construction work, water 
eonservancy, fishing, trade, services, education and 
various kinds of Government and Party work. Since such 
persons have been estimated to form a majority of all 
non-agricultural employment, it is immediately obvious 
that changes in employment in this category of the labour 
force can only have a restricted value to those concerned 
with the analysis of economio change and the labour 
market in urban a r e a s , In particular, it is difficult
(3) Liu and Yeh estimate that in 1957 the rural component 
of the non agricultural labour force was 67$ of the total. 
Liu and Yeh. pp. 103-103. It should be noted that 
estimate of the rural nonagricultural labour force involves 
ascertaining (work patterns of persons in rural areas 
engaged at different times in both agricultural and non­
agricultural sectors. We believe this to be an impossible 
task at the level of national aggregates.
to use this data in conjunction with urban demographic 
data and qualitative information to construct a coher­
ent picture of urban population and employment. It is 
true that the juxtaposition of Emerson*s data with 
material on urban areas is often very suggestive, but 
precise conclusions are precluded by def inition^ .
The second difficulty with Emerson's data are 
their admitted inaccuracy. Emerson himself is fully 
aware of this; although some of the less perceptive 
users of it do not always appear to have been so. 
Emerson's work is basically a reconstruction of 
official data and therefore reflect the inadequacies 
of such data. The official data is defective in two 
Important respects. First, the slow development of 
a centralised and effective statistical system precluded 
the collection cf comprehensive and consistently defined 
employment data, particularly in the early 1950's.
Indeed according to Emerson, right up to the end of the
(3) Emerson's analysis of his material is aiainly to be 
found in The Profile.
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First Five Year Plan it was admitted that satisfactory
(4)
estimates of employment were impossible . Information 
on the public sector was of course fairly adequate and 
there was also considerable information on persons 
classified as workers and staff who were in the private 
sector up until 1 9 5 6 ^  . Outside these categories
(4) The best general account of this is, The Statistical 
System of Communist China, Choh-Ming Li (Berkeley, 1962), 
Part One. Also see Finer son, The Profile, page 419. 
Although comprehensive statistics were poor throughout 
the period, from 1953 onwards a number of important 
specific surveys were undertaken*. Those on Private 
Industry, (1954); Handicrafts, (1954); and Private 
Trade, (1955), contained information about employment in 
these sectors. In 1955 there was also a major survey of 
employment of workers and staff in the public sector.
(5) The category of ’’workers and staff”, (Ohih-Kung) , 
includes all persons who are basically wage earners.
Such persons may work in the public or private -or public- 
sectors; in industry, trade or administration. It ex­
cludes persons whose income is variable: for example
capitalists, persons engaged in small scale production,
- 68-
(5) (Cont’d)
trade or transport (whether private or eooperativised), 
temporary construction workers etc. A succinct account 
of this classification is, "Problems in (defining) the 
scope of the numbers of our workers and staff at the 
present time”, T ’ung Phi Kung Tso (Statistical Work) 
1957 Ho.l. 14.1.1957 hereafter, TCKT. In Shanghai in 
1956 approximately 70% of those in employment were 
workers and staff. Data on total employment Table 18. 
Total workers and staff in, Wang Ke, "The livelihood 
of the city’s workers and staff has markedly improved", 
HWP 2.9.1957. (Wang Ke was the chief of the Shanghai 
Labour Bureau at that time).
-69
comprehensive information did not exist* These failings 
resulted in substantial under-reporting which is reflected 
in Emerson’s data. This deficiency and general unrelia- 
blity is made even more serious by the inclusion of data 
from rural areas where statistical organisation was most 
primitive and the problems of classification most in­
tractable.
The second major sootcq of under-reporting in the 
official data is the absolute exclusion from employment 
surveys of persons engaged in certain types of occupation.
In particular, those engaged in certain traditional 
trades and services; ncapitalistsn, (a category which 
included persons employing labour in very small scale 
economic activities); tutors, servants, persons doing 
religious work and others engaged in occupations which 
the authorities did not recognise as productive or thought 
to be positively harmful. In addition to these deliberate 
exclusions, the official figures would not have contained 
information on those engaged in illicit economic activities.
Emerson has been able to make some allowance for 
these omissions in his estimates. In particular he has 
data on persons engaged in traditional transportation. 
However, as he himself makes clear, his figures must
-70-
reflect the biases in the official data and therefore 
substantially understate actual nonagricultural employ­
ment. By using Ou Pao San’s pre-war data, Emerson has 
estimated that his figure for nonagricultural employment 
for 1949 is about 27fo below the actual figure* For 1957, 
Emerson estimates that the undercount has dropped to 11$, 
although he does not indicate how this figure was arrived 
at .
Further indication of the degree of uncertainty 
surrounded the national data is obtained by a comparison 
of Emerson’s main conclusions with those of Liu and Yeh* 
The degree of divergence between the two is illustrated 
by comparing their respective estimates of total non­
agricultural employment. Emerson’s figure for 1957 
is 59.667.000, which we may raise by 11$ (in accordance 
with his own estimate of the undercount in his data) 
thus obtaining a figure of 44.000.000. This compares
with Liu and Yeh’s estimate (for the same year), of 
(7)64*000.000 * Differences of this magnitude between
(6) Nonagricultural employment, pp.70-73*
(7) Liu and Yeh» Table II, page 69.
between competent scholars must throw some doubt on the 
feasibility of classifying and enumerating the work force 
at the national level.
Detailed examination of the two sets of estimates 
shows that Liu and Yeh's calculiions are a good deal more 
ambitious than anything to be found in Emerson and that 
their results are in a form which appear more useful 
analytically. However, usefulness must be determined by
& c. e <Vt fV< n
the reliability of the data, and the only way of/this
is by comparing the methods employed in establishing them.
Here, the contrast between the two sets of data is very
instructive, Emerson, as we have seen, departs as rarely
as possible from the official figures and as a result has
difficulty in obtaining a very satisfactory result. Liu
and Yah 0 1 1 the other hand, start with a small collection
of pre-and post 1949 data and by making a number of
critical, (and often unsubstantiated) assumptions, they
convert these data into a detailed series of estimates
(for all major categories of employment . In our view,
Liu and Yeh's results are therefore in some ways even 
less satisfying than Emerson's. For although Emerson's 
results are incomplete and difficult to analyse, they do
(8) We evaluate Lin and Yeh's assumptions in our 
discussion of unemployment estimates#
give one some positive information, Liu and Teh by 
contrast give one a brilliant, internally consistent 
account of what reality might have looked like, but 
at the end of the show one has more admiration for the 
skill of the showmen than confidence in the detailed 
accuracy of their picture*
One final point about the national manpower data 
is that one has to remember that they are an aggregate 
of significant regional variations, One would expect 
such variations in view both of the extreme differences 
between regions in their resource endowment and of the 
discriminatory development policies of the First Five 
Year Plan. The data in part three of this chapter 
indicates that the employment and demographic experience 
of China's urban areas were indeed very varied and 
although one could not say that the national data are so 
atypical as to be without meaning, One should consider 
them in full knowledge of the variations of which they 
are composed.
In view of this apparent difficulty in assembling 
national employment data which are both credible and 
analytically useful, it seemed worthwile attempting-to 
construct a statistical picture of urban employment
-73-
change using data from individual cities, since such an 
approach eliminates many of the difficulties encountered 
in estimating and handling highly aggregated data. By 
restricting oneself to individual urban areas one can 
use employment data in direct conjunction with demographic 
and production data and with the assistance of systematic 
qualitative information of the kind available for many 
cities, one can build up a coherent, if at times sketchy 
picture of the working of individual urban economies.
The population, migration and employment data available 
for some cities are more detailed and probably more 
accurate than national data on these subjects, and it 
must certainly be the case that such urban data is 
superior to data which includes, (or is derived from 
information which includes) , the experience of rural 
areas. Thus although specific urban studies are in one 
sense less ambitious than attempts to survey and analyse 
data for all urban areas, they have the advantage that in 
them one can often find an answer to more complicated 
and economically more interesting questions than is 
possible in more general surveys.
It must of course be emphasized that local studies
74-
do not remove the ambiguities and difficulties which face 
the analyst working on national data; indeed, new problems 
appear* But in general these difficulties are reduced to 
more manageable proportions and the scope for major error 
is usually smaller than is the case with national studies.
We had hoped that it might prove possible to construct 
a detailed picture for a number of cities, but this proved 
too difficult. In the event it seemed best to concentrate 
on one city - Shanghai - and to supplement this with 
incomplete data for other cities where it seemed approp­
riate to do so.
There were several reasons why Shanghai was selected. 
First there was the exceptional availability of newspapers 
and other materials from which to cull data. Second, it 
seemed probable that Shanghai data would have an accuracy 
above average even for urban areas. The Shanghai city 
administration had considerable experience in statistical 
work, since before the Anti-Japanese war the Bureau of 
Social Affairs of the Shanghai City Government undertook 
a number of pioneering surveys of the city’s industrial 
structure and the effect that industrialisation was
( 9 }having on population, employment and living standards' * 
This experience, together with the above average 
degree of literacy and general sophistication evident 
in the city, gives one considerable confidence in any 
data produced by the municipal government *
(9) The results of five industrial surveys are given in 
B.K.Liu, The Growth and Industrialization of Shanghai, 
(Shanghai, 1936)* In addition, the Bureau of Social 
Affairs produced thirteen reports and surveys of labour 
statistics between 1918 and 1935* There were also a 
number of more general statistical handbooks published 
during the 1930 * s.
(10) When the present writer visited Shanghai briefly 
in 1965 and 1966 he was struck by the number of ways in 
which western influences still lingered and by the 
evident# of competent local administration. Educational 
activity in the city is still exceptional. In 1957 over 
5$ of all middle (secondary) school pupils were in Shangha 
and in 1966 it was reported to the present writer that one 
person in four was engaged in some form of vocational 
educational activity. The writer also had some 
conversation with an official of the municipal government 
who showed an impressive grasp of the economic and
-76
The results for Shanghai are of course interesting 
in their own right. Xt is the largest city in China and 
in 1957 still accounted for 7% of China*s total urban 
population# In the First Eive Year Plan the city 
accounted for 20% of industrial output and the total 
contribution of the city to the process of China's 
economic modernisation is beyond quantification? in terms 
of skilled and professional manpower alone, it was 
enormous.
Apart from this Shanghai's experience of economic 
change in the 1950's was not abnormal: or even at the 
extreme of any of the types of urban development which 
can be identified in these years. The city was not 
one of those designated for rapid expansion as was the case 
with some of the older Manchurian cities and the new 
cities in the North Nest. But neither was it like cities
(10) (Cont fd)
administrative problems involved in his work. See, 
Christopher Howe, ”The supply and administration of 
urban housing in mainland China: the case of
Shanghai”, China Quarterly, J*anuary-March 1968, pp#73-97*
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such as Chungking, where special factors lead to 
completely untypical forms of change
Part Two, Employment in Shanghai*
In this section we present data on the growth 
of Shanghai’s population and then proceed to estimate 
the supply and demand for nonagricultural labour in 
Shanghai between 1949 and 1957; the net change in 
nonagricultural employment in that period; and finally, 
the structure of employment in 1957 and evidenc.e of 
change in this.
Population
Total population is estimated to have grown from 
5 millions to $.2 millions between late 1949 and the 
end of 1957. This represents a compound growth rate 
of 4.7% per annum. In Table II below some official 
data for intervening years a&Lalso included, but no 
effort has been made to interpolate estimates where 
official data is missing.
Of the total population increase, 53.6% is 
estimated to have been due to net migration and the
- 78-
balance of 66.4$ due to natural i n c r e a s e .
(U) This estimate of the relative shares of migration 
and the natural growth of population is slightly 
different from that implicit in another article on 
population. This article put the natural increase 
between 1950 and 1957 at 1.550.000. This would imply 
net immigration of only 650.000 which seems improbably 
low. See, "Make the Shanghai population growth rate 
fetll to 3$", WHP 23.1.1958.
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The supply of labour
The supply of job seekers in our period came from 
three sources: the natural addition to the labour force;
the migrant addition to the labour force; and the stock 
of unemployed workers which included both persons unemploy­
ed in 1949 and those who subsequently lost employment; 
this may have happened either as a result of rationalis­
ation and productivity increase, or as a result of 
failures in the private sector*
The natural addition to the labour force
The labour force is defined as persons between the 
ages of sixteen and sixty and in order to estimate the 
number of persons who entered the labour force between
1949 and 1957 it is necessary to make some assumption 
about the age structure of the population at the 
beginning of the period^1^ .  In the absence of any more 
satisfactory data it is assumed that this structure was
(IS) Throughout we have kept to Chinese usage in matters 
of age* Thus all ages given are one year older than would 
be the case in Western usage*
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the same as that of the population of Greater Shanghai 
in 1950^13 ,^ It is arguable that this assumption is 
unrealistic because the civil war and the consequent 
refugee problem would have distorted the age structure 
of population. But against this it should be remembered 
that somewhat analogous political and military conditions
(13) Data on the age structure of the population of 
Greater Shanghai is in, Statistics of Shanghai, Table IV, 
page 3^, The age groups in this table do not coincide 
exactly with our requirements. We have therefore assumed 
an even distribution of population within each age group 
and reconstructed the table to yield the information 
required. The alternative to using this age structure 
would have been to use national data from the 1953 Census. 
It seemed probable however that such data, necessarily 
dominated by the rural sector, would have been an even 
less satisfactory guide to Shanghai’s age structure in 
1950 than the age structure for 1930,
existed in the region around Shanghai in the three years
preceding 1930^14). Applying this pre-war age structure
to the 1949 population we estimate that the natural
addition to the labour force was 704*000** which represents
f 15)
an annual flow of 88.000 . To obtain the actual
flow of job seekers this figure has to be adjusted to 
allow for the effect of retentions within the educational
(14) A good account of Shanghai in the late 1920fs and 
early 1930’s is contained in, Harold B.Isaacs, The 
Tragedy of the Chinese Revolution. (Stanford, First 
Bdition 1938, revised 1951).
(15) Sung F fing in his celebrated article ,fA discussion
«
of the employment x>roblemft, Hsueh Hsi (Study) , 1957 No. 12, 
18.6.1957 hereafter HH defines the addition to the urban 
labour force as the net result of men entering and leaving 
the 16-60 age range and women entering and leaving the 
16-50 age range see !,A discussion of the employment 
problem11. Liu and Yeh use an age range of 12-64 for all 
sections of the nonagricultural labour force. In our 
view this latter is inappropriate for the urban sector.
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system. The effect of such retentions on the annual
flow of job seekers will depend on whether or not
there was a net inflow* or outflow from the educational
system of persons aged sixteen or over. This in turn
will depend on whether the student population of the
relevant age group was increasing or decreasing; for,
if the systeni was of constant size, after the first
group of students had graduated, the inflow of new
enrolments would exactly equal the outflow of graduates
so that the size of the flow of job seekers would be
unaffected. There can be no doubt that there was a
rapid increase in the size of the educational system
between 1949 and 1957 and we have estimated that the 
net off-take from the labour market amounted to
144.000 or 13.000 annually^1*^  .
*«.
(16) Strictly, the relevant parts of the educational 
system are the upper middle schools (16-18 years) and 
the higher educational system. However there is 
evidence of over-age students in the lower middle 
schools and allowance has to be made for this. Our 
estimate of the Shanghai off-take was arrived at in 
the following way. First, we assembled data of
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(16) (Cont’d)
enrolments ana graduations for all Junior and Senior 
Middle Schools and institutions of higher education#
These data were adjusted for drop-outs and for an 
estimate that one third of Junior Middle school pupils 
were of working age. An estimate of the net inflow into 
the national educational system was then made. Shanghai’s 
share in this was assumed to he proportional to its share 
of the total student population. Finally, the Shanghai 
off-take was adjusted to allow for the assumption that 
40% of the student population came from rural areas.
National data in, Ten Great Years, page 192, "Problems of 
the development plan for our country’s Junior and Middle 
schools", Ghi Hua Ching Qhi (Planned Economy) 1957 No.10, 
pp* 20-27, 9.10.1957, hereafter GHCG, and "The develop­
ment of our country’s educational activity in recent years", 
TCKT 1956 No.20, 29.10.1956. We have included in our 
calculations an allowance for the 78.000 people in 
Shanghai who in 1957 were being educated completely out­
side the formal educational system# Shanghai data in,
WHP 9.8.1956, HWP 15.8.1956, TOP 13.4.1957, TOP 16.4.1957 
and WHP 17.4.1957. Also, Leo A* Orleans, Professional 
Manpower and Education in Communist China, (Washington,
1-87-*
The migrant addition to the labour force
In Table 12 below we present a summary of 
population movements into and out of Shanghai for the 
period 1949-1957#
Table 12
A Summary of Population Movements into and out of 
Shanghai. 1949-1957.
Immigration Emigration 000* s
1.000® (To 1955)
820* (1956/1957)
Total 1.820 total 1.080°
Net immigration 
Total 740
a# ’’We must persuade peasants who have infiltrated into 
the city to return voluntarily to the countryside", CKTP 
31#7.1955.
b#e. Hsu Ghien Kuo, (Tice Mayor of Shanghai), "Mobilise 
surplus urban labour power to help construct socialist 
agriculture", TOP 7.1.195©•
(16) (Cont’d)
1960) and Chu Tuan Cheng, scientific and Engineering 
Manpower in Communist Ohina 1949-1965. (Washington,
1965).
- 88-
In order to draw any conclusions about the effect 
of these migrations on the labour force we need to know 
something about the types of people involved in these 
movements*
Let us consider immigration first. Reported 
immigration amounted to 1,820.000 persons of whom
1.000.000 migrated before April 1955 and the balance
in 1956-1957 (Table 12). It is assumed that these
migrants were from rural areas and that 50?S of them
f 17)were job seekers' , The gross addition to the 
labour force through immigration is therefore put at
910.000.
The question of emigrants is less simple. 
Emigration for the whole period was reported at
1,080.000 and this total was broken down in one 
official source as follows.
(17) This is suggested by Chang Ching Wen, nWhy 
urban population must be reduced”, ICung Jen Jih Pao 
(Workers Daily), 4.1,1958.
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Table 15. Categories of emigrants from Shanghai 1949~1957
000T s
1. Persons assigned to employment in other cities 260
2. Persons (and their families) returned to work
in rural areas 780
3. Persons sent to open new land 30
4. Unspecified balance 10
Total *.. 1.080
Source: WHP 7.1,1958.
This may be compared with totals obtained by summing the 
annual data in Table 15.
Table 14. Categories of emigrants from Shanghai 1949-1957
1. Persons assigned to employment in other cities 258
2, Persons (and their families) returned to work
in the rural areas 750
Others8 50
Total ... 1.058
Source: As table 15.
a. This includes persons sent to open new land and 
also 10.000 persons who were sent to Labour Reform in 
1950. This latter may well correspond exactly to
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category 4 in Table 13 above.
The slight discrepancy between the two totals is 
probably accounted for by the return of refugees in 1950 
which was not published at the time#
The breakdown of emigration into annual data for 
each category is presented in Table 15 below#
Table 15
Emigration from Shanghai, 1949-1957 0001 s
1949 1950 1951 1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 To- 
tal
Cat#
I 16a 24b 30° 59d 123f 6S 258
Cat#
1A# 16S 24 230 6S (69)
Cat,
t. -
h
50 5601
1
140 750
Cat,
I T 40k M
Cat.
37" 101 to
Total # * 1#058
Category 1• Persons assigned to employment in other cities.
Category 1A# Persons assigned as category one but described
as skilled workers and staff or cadres#
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Category 5* Persons sent to open new land.
Category 2. Persons returned to work in rural areas 
and their families*
Category 4. Persons sent to labour reform.
Sources: data in or derived from,
a.b* "Shanghai industry helps national construction 
WHP 27.8.1954. "A large batch of skilled workers in the 
city give in their names to participate in national key 
point construction", TOP 22*6.1954.
c# "220.000 workers sent from Shanghai to take part in 
construction in various places", NONA, Shanghai, 16.9.1957. 
Sung Li Wen, "Report on the implementation of the Shanghai 
National Economic Plan in 1956 and on the Plan for 1957", 
HWP 28.8.1957.
d* Sung Li Wen, op.cit in c.
e. To March 1956. "(The Shanghai Municipality Communist 
Party) decides that in future Shanghai industry will be 
fully and rationally developed", CPJF 27.7.1956.
f. loc.cit. note c. NONA, (Shanghai) 16.9.1957.
g. These were all cadres. See, "A new high tide of 
cadres being sent down (to the country side) from 
Shanghai", TOP 3.1.&958.
-9 2 * *
h. "Almost 50.000 refugees have been organised and 
returned (to their homes in the countryside)",
CPJP 21.8.1949.
i. Ghang Jui, "Some views on Shanghai?s population and 
area", TOP 11.2.1957.
j. "Almost 140.000 returned to rural production,
TOP 20.12.1957.
1c. "The Kansu consolation organisation holds a consol­
ation conference", OffJP 13.2.1957. This article refers 
to the activities of an organisation responsible for 
keeping in touch with the Shanghaiese working in Kansu 
Province.
1, "More than 10.000 men just off to open waste land", 
CffJF 7.5.1950.
We can now estimate the effect of emigration on 
the labour force. It is assumed that categories I, 3 
and 4 were all members of the labour force. Since those 
in category 2 were nearly all peasants being returned to 
their homes, it is assumed that 50$ of them were members 
of the labour force. Thus the total loss to the labour 
force from emigration amounted to 690.000. This may be 
deducted from the immigrant addition to the labour force
to leave a net gain of 220.000.
The total number of .job seekers
We now have estimates for the addition to the 
labour force due to natural growth and migration. To
obtain the total number of job seekers we must now add
the total number estimated to have been unemployed in 
1949 and the number who lost employment between that 
year and the end of 1957. The combined total for these 
classes of person is 671.000^^. From this however we 
must deduct something for the number of these latter 
persons who would have reached the age of 60 by 1957, and 
who may therefore be considered as having "retired".
(18) Data on unemployment in 1949 and the total generated 
after that are in "The number in employment rises by 
630.000", GFIP 16.8.1957, of the unemployment total
245.000 were persons who became unemployed after 1949. 
Approximate confirmation of the number unemployed in 
late 1949 Is in, Ohlang Chiang Jih Pao (The Yangtse
River Daily) 20.1.1950, It should be noted that
official data on the numbers of registered unemployed 
in this early period are of little value. The reasons 
for this are discussed in Chapter 5.
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Using the pre-war age structure again, this is put at
176,000.
The demand for labour
We now require a figure for the gross supply of 
jobs between 1949 and 1957. The official figure for 
the number of jobs created in Shanghai up to the end 
of 1956, is 530.000. We can make an adjustment to 
this to allow for additional employment of all kinds 
found in 1957. The final total is 6 4 0 .0 0 0 U 9'.
(19) The figure of 530.000 is in, "One person in three 
has employment", 3MJP 19,8.1957. The additional 110.000 
for 1957 is an estimate based on data in the following, 
"The Shanghai Labour Bureau1s method of settling the 
unemployed is a good one", JMFP 7.10.1957. "The cityTs 
unemployed find work", HWP 24,6.1957. "Shanghai thorough­
ly cleans up and reorganises autonomous enterprises",
%
TKF 19,8,1957. "The cityfs small traders must continue 
to advance along the socialist road", HWP 18.1.1957* 
"Concerning the reform of private commerce and supply 
work", CFJP 17.8.1956. "The numbers of peripatetic 
peddlers is ever increasing", HWP 27.5.1957.
The total of 530.000 for gross employment up 
to 1956 compares with a figure of 519.000 which is 
obtained by summing data for annual gross additions 
to employment up to the year set out in Table 16 
below.
Table 16
Annual additions (gross), to numbers employed in 
Shanghai, 1949-1957. 00 0
1949 1950 1951 1952 1955 1954 1955 1956 1957 
,74a 4013 70° 30a 66e 5f 0s 334h 1101
a-e. In or derived from data in, "250.000 workers and 
staff find employment", CFJP 23.9.1952* "The striking 
achievements in employment work during the last there 
years", JMJP 13.9.1952. "Illegal hiring of workers", 
QFJP 19.1.1951. Hsin Wen Tsu, "Correctly understand 
the new employment policy", WHP 28.6.1954. "The nat­
ional tinemployment situation during the past four years 
HHPYK 1954 No.5. pp.157-158.
f. Derived from, "The great achievements of last years 
employment work", CFJP 9.1.1955.
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g. There is no figure known to us for additional 
employment in 1955. One would not expect there to 
be any increase in a year in which industrial output 
fell in Shanghai and small scale activities were 
reported as depressed#
h. Sung Li Wen, "Report on the implementation of the 
1956 national plan in Shanghai and the plan for 1957, 
HWP £8.8.1957#
i. See note 18#
In using the data in the articles cited above, 
care has to be taken to ensure that where necessary, 
deductions are made to eliminate persons introduced 
to employment outside of Shanghai, i.e. persons in 
Category I, in Table 15. We can incorporate all the 
above data into a balance sheet of demand and supply 
for labour as below in Table 17. It will be seen 
that we are left with a balance of 635.000, which, it 
is suggested may be considered an estimate of unemploy­
ment in 1957.
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Table 17. The supply of job seekers and the supply of 
nonagricultural employment in Shanghai 1949-1957.
Job seekers
The natural addition to the labour 
force (net of the educational 
retention).
The net migrant addition to the 
labour force
Unemployment carried over from 
before 1949 and generated between 
1949 and 1957 
(net of "retirements")
Tot al
The Supply of employment 
Tot al
Total unemployment
560 (43.9%)
220 (17.3%)
495 (38.8%)
1#275 (100%)
640
640
635
000* s
The estimate of unemployment in the above Table 
has to be regarded as speculative in view on the un­
certainty which surrounds some of the labour supply 
data. The figure for unemployment carried over and 
created in particular cannot be too heavily depended
000 *s
upon, even though it is confirmed by two quite different 
sources separated in time by seven years. The data 
for the natural and migrant labour supply and the supply 
of employment all seem to be fairly reliably based..,It 
should be noted that we have no data which enable us to 
estimate variation in hours worked or the pattern of 
employment in seasonal trades and occupations. If such 
data were available it is probable that seasonal un­
employment and the casual nature of employment in the 
traditional sector would make the total situation look 
even worse than that indicated by the numbers of those 
unemployed.
The net change in nonagricultural employment 1949-1957 
We can now try to estimate the net change in nbn- 
agricultural employment between 1949 and 1957. We do 
this by deducting an estimate of the net increase in 
nonagricultural employment from the estimate of total 
nonagricultural employment for 1957. Total employment 
in that year is put at 2.418.000^^. Net additional
(20) The number in employment at the end of 1956 was 
reported as 2.390.000. NONA. 17.8.1957. We then
*■» 9 9*»
(20) (Cont’d }
add 110.000 for additional eniployment in 1957 and 
deduct 82.000 for jobs estimated to have been lost in 
that year. The latter is mad© up of; (a) an estimated 
halving of the basic construction work: force which in 
1957 was only 50.000. (b) 6*000 jobs which disappeared
when cadres were sent to the countryside and (c) 46.000 
jobs estimated to have been lost on the assumption that 
one third of the peasants returned to the oountryside 
had some sort of employment before being returned.
employment since 1949 is obtained by subtracting from
640.000, (as Table 17) estimates of (a) the number of
(SI)
persons who retired in the period ; (b) the number
(21) The labour insurance regulations in force up to 
the end of 1957 specified general retirement for men at 
60 and women at 50 or 55 years of age. The regulations 
only applied by law to enterprises employing 100 employees 
or more. Thus although most employees in the modern 
industrial sector would be covered, in Shanghai, one
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(21) (GontTd)
report suggested that only 30$ of all those in employ­
ment in the eity were entitled to retirement benefits. 
For those covered there were provisions for pensions 
but these were not high#when considered in the light 
of the fact that even at full wages, many workers were 
not far from subsistence in the mid-1950ts# Moreover 
there was a built in incentive to stay on in employment 
if possible since the regulations provided that if an 
employee was kept on after he was due to retire, then 
in addition to his wage he should receive a pension 
amounting to another 10$ to 20$. It is not therefore 
surprising to find that the act of retirement was a 
rare one. One survey of Shanghai cigarette factories 
found that the refusal rate averaged 57$. Subsequent 
to this survey there was a campaign to encourage re­
tirement and of course we have to tallow for deaths. 
Taking these factors into' account we have assumed that 
55$ of the labour force eligible to retire in our period 
did so or died. The retirement rules under the 1951 
and 1953 insurance regulations are in, Labour Insurance 
Regulations of the People's Republic of China> (Peking, 
1952) . The 1953 revision of these is in, 1f Important 
Labour Laws and Regulations of the People*s Republic of
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of jobs reported to have been "lost11; and (e) the 
number of jobs which were transferred to other cities,
i.e. the number of assigned persons (Category I in 
Table 13), who were actually in employment when they 
were assigned^22^• Using these estimates, we reacfe 
a figure of 2.195.000 for total employment in 1949^S3^#
(21) (Gont’d)
China. (Peking, 1961)* The 1955 regulations on retire­
ment for employees in Government organs are in Chung Hua 
Jen Min Kung Ho Kuo Fa Kuei Hui Pien 1955 No. 2 (Laws and 
Regulations of the Chinese People's Republic) (Peking, 
1956)• Data on the coverage of the insurance regulat­
ions in Shanghai is in, "Go to the small factories”,
GPJF 12.4.1957 and "The livelihood of the city’s workers 
and staff makes further improvement", QFJP 28.9.1956.
The cigarette factory survey is in, "The key to fulfill­
ing the 1957 labour plan", LT 1957 No.3.
(22) It is probable that a high proportion of those 
assigned to work outside Shanghai were unemployed - 
otherwise the Labour Bureau would not have been so 
willing to let them go. One report suggested that out 
of 60.000 workers sent to Lanchow, Sian and Shenyang,
—10 2—
The structure of employment in Shanghai
In Tables 18-21 below we present data on the 
structure of employment in Shanghai in 1957 and contrast 
these with data for earlier years. The estimate for 
1957 involves a number of assumptions which are somewhat 
hazardous but the main features of the table are not in 
doubt. The suspect figures are easily identifiable and 
there are numerous cross checks on credibility. The main 
conclusions to be drawn from these tables are discussed 
in our general conclusions on growth and structural 
change in the Shanghai labour force,
(22) (Gont’d)
30.000 had been suffering long term unemployment and
18.000 were persons of 18-25 years of age who had com­
pleted study but not found work. We have therefore 
used this proportion to estimate that only 52.000 were 
employed at the time of assignment. See, "In the first 
half of the year 110.000 get employment", CFJP 21.7.1956. 
We add to the 52.000, the 6.000 cadres sent to rural 
areas in 1957.
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(23) The approximate correctness of this figure is 
confirmed in Gh’ang Chiang Jih Pao 20.1.1950 where a 
total labour force of slightly over 2 millions is 
alluded to#
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Table 18
The Structure of 'Employment in Shanghai, 1957. 000Ts
Total employment 2.418a
Industry, total 89910
of which: modern factory (770)
: workshop (129)
Handicrafts, total 258c
Of which: peripatetic and household (58)
-? i
: workshops employing less than ten men. (*61-)
: individual handicraftsmen and others (149)
Other small scale production 30^
Construct ion 30e
fTransport, total 177
of which: the old (pre 1956), public system (57)
: pedicabs (40)
: carts (80)
Stevedores 33^
Commerce, total 535*1
of which: old private sector stores (221)
: peddlers (240)
: old public sector commerce system (72)
Food and Services 501
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Table 18 (Cont'd) 000’s
Food and Services
Oto
Education 723
Health aok
Banking 125x
Government, Mass Organisations and other, (residual) 28l m
Souroes
a. See note 19, This figure represents an increase of 
about Vfo on the figure for 1956. This is almost exactly 
identical with ‘Emerson’s estimate of the increase in all 
nonagricultural employment in the same period. We have 
assumed that employment in the agricultural suburbs of 
Shanghai is not included in the data presented here.
The total agricultural population in 1957 was reported 
as 400.000. See, Chang Jui, ”Some views on Shanghai’s 
population and area”, WHP 33L 2.1957.
b. The total number of workers and staff in workshops 
and factories at the end of 1957 was given as 970.000.
Of these 200.000 were in workshops. We know also that
in 1954 there were 71.000 workers in handicraft workshops 
in the private sector employing less than ten persons. 
This latter number has been deducted from total factory
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and workshop employment. The use of the 1954 survey as 
an indication of employment at the end of 1957 is open 
to question since it is known that employment in this 
sector suffered some decline in the mid 1950fs. Against 
this however, we would argue that the upsurge of 1956 
and the continuing high level of small scale production, 
(licit and illicit), in 1957, probably justify our 
assumption of a recovery of employment in this sector to 
slightly above them 1954 levels, (the national data 
also support this view of men handicraft employment, see 
Emerson The Profile, page 450). The most difficult 
problem in estimating employment in the traditional 
sector is that of trying to sort out changing organis­
ational forms. This is discussed further in note e.
Data in, ”Total output doubled in five years”, HWF
28.12,1957. ”The ranks of the Shanghai workers and 
intellectuals grows strong”, TOP 10.1.1958. 1954 Ch’uan
Kuo Ke T1 Shou Kung Yeh Tiao Qhga Tzu Liao (Materials 
from the 1954 National Survey of the Individual Handi­
craft Industry) (Peking, 1957), Chapter on Shanghai,
pp. 11-22.
c. See, Materials from the 1954 National Survey of the 
Individual Handicraft Industry. This survey was wider
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in scope than its title indicates. The main breakdown 
is indicated in the Table. The third subdivision in­
cludes 20.000 handicraftsmen already in cooperatives.
The evolution of the forms of small scale and handi­
craft production was a complex one which it difficult, 
if not impossible, to unravel with confidence. In 
general it appears that in the socialisation of late 
1955 and 1956, individual handicraftsmen were put into 
conventional cooperatives and the small workshops became 
public-private enterprises. However these distinctions 
were not always clear cut and thousands of workers moved 
in and out of handicraft organisations according to the 
dictates of the economic situation and the prevailing 
political atmosphere.
d. In addition to individual and cooperative handicraft 
production we know that there were substantial numbers 
engaged in small scale production and services as part 
of unemployment relief work and also in illicit product­
ion. Both of these kinds of employment increased sharp­
ly in 19 57 but it is impossible to judge the extent to 
which this was at the expense of employment in official 
cooperatives, if at all. It may have simply been a
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substitute for household handicraft employment which 
could not be incorporated in the ordinary cooperatives. 
The maximum figure for employment in relief groups 
and illicit organisations in 1957/1958, was 40.000. We 
have reduced this to 30.000 to allow for some double 
counting. Data in, "Shanghai thoroughly cleans up and 
reorganises autonomous enterprises”, TKF 19.8.1957. 
"Shanghai eliminates the phenomenon of unemployment”, 
JMJF 16,7.1958. "The Labour Bureau reforms its work”, 
HWF 3.8.1957.
e. The numbers employed in construction probably 
fluctuated very sharply as they did at the national 
level. Throughout the 1950’s the average figure however 
seems to have been fairly constant. We have a figure of
33.000 for 1950; in 1954 construction employment 
contracted sharply and at least 10.000 construction 
workers were transferred to other employment; in 1956 
employment in construction must have expanded fairly 
sharply but in 1957 the number reported in construction 
work was back to 30.000. Data in, "Summary report 
concerning the problems of unemployment relief and 
production", TKF (Hong Kong), 4.5.1950. The figure
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in this article is almost exactly confirmed in,
Shanghai Ghieh Fang I Nien, (A Year of Shanghai’s 
Liberation) (Shanghai, 1950), page 80. "Shanghai 
industry helps national construction", TOP 27.8.1954.
”700 construction sites busy", HWP 28.9.1957.
f. The national survey of workers and staff in 1955 
gave a figure of 72.000 for employment in public sector 
transportation. The number of pedieab men is a figure 
for 1958 while the number for employment in other non­
mechanized transportation is for 1957. The latter 
two figures have to be treated with some caution al­
though there is no reason to think them over-estimates.
On the contrary, it was reported that many of the peasants 
returned to the countryside in 1957 had illicitly engaged 
in pedieab and transport work so that the figures may be 
understatements. During the 1950fs the process of convert 
ing rickshaw men to pedieab men, was completed. It is 
interesting to compare the figure of 40.000 pedieab men 
with a figure of 50.000 for the number of rickshawmen in 
Shanghai in the late 1920Ts. Although the total number 
of pedieab men declined in the 1950Ts, we know that they 
were still very important in urban areas. A survey in
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Canton reported that they undertook 150.000 passenger 
journeys per day, equal to 2/3 rds of the work done by 
the public bus system. Data in, "National (Survey) of 
the numbers, structure and distribution of workers and 
staff in 1955", TCKT No.23, 14.12.1956, pp. 28-30. 
"40,000 pedieab men participate in rectification",
OFJF 8.4.1958, "How should we view the difference in 
living standards between workers and peasants?" TOP
29.10.1957, "Thank you comrade", Kung Jen Jih Pao, 
(Peking), 6,8.1957. Fang Fu An, "Rickshaws in China", 
The Chinese Economic journal, July 1930,,pp. 796-80®.
g. The only data on stevedore employment are for 1950 
and these include the unemployed. One possible guide 
to employment would be any indication of changes in the 
volume of foreign trade which passed through Shanghai.
We have found two references which claim substantial 
increases in trade but both of them use 1950 as their 
base year - a year in which stringent foreign trade 
controls markedly reduced activity and lead to the 
unemployment of a third of the stevedores. Trade 
certainly rose sharply in 1956 and 1957 but the evidence
— 111-
suggests that it did not prove easy, (especially in 
1956) , to increase the number of skilled stevadores.
We have therefore assumed no net increase in the 
number of stevadores. See, A Year of Shanghai’s 
Liberation, loo.oit, Sun Ohing Ghih and others, An 
Economic Geography of East China, Chapter 5. "Fully 
use (Shanghai’s) existing dock facilities”, OFJP
11.8.1956.
h. Data in, "National (Survey) of the numbers, structure 
and distribution of vvorkers and staff in 1955”, loo, pit. 
note f. "Concerning the reform of private commerce and 
supply work", CFJP 17.8.1956 and HWF 18.1.1957.
i. HWP 15.8,1956
71- 00 0
j. The figure of 42.000 is derived from data in, "500.000 
Shanghai women participate in construction", TOP 8.3.1957. 
The 1955 survey (loc.cit, note h), reported 42.000 in the 
public sector of education, (10.000 of which were in 
higher education). Since a source for 1950 reports that
30.000 were employed in private sector education in that
year, it would seem that employment in this sector re­
mained constant until the socialization of 1956. For
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the 1950 figure see, A Year of Shanghai’s Liberation, 
loc.cit.
k. Derived from TOP 8.3.1957, loe.oit. above.
1. The figure of 25.000 is that for 1950. Conflicting 
forces would have influenced the net change in employment 
in this sector up to 1957. On the one hand the take­
over of the private Banking sector at the end of 1950 
would unquestionable have been accompanied by pressure 
for rationalization which would have reduced employment. 
However, in late 1952 Government policy was to make 
enterprises retain redundant personnel until alternative 
employment could be found. Later in the 1950’s employ­
ment in Banking on a national scale increased markedly. 
(See Emerson, Nonagricultural employment, Table I)• We 
have assumed therefore that by 1957 the numbers employed 
in the banking system were as great as in 1950. This 
may even be an underestimate. For 1950 see, A Tear of 
Shanghai’s Liberation loc.cit.
m. This is a residual figure which should be treated 
with the reserve appropriate to all residues. The only
-113-
information on employment in Government and Mass 
Organizations known to us is of an indirect character. 
This is a report which estimated that the total number
p n
* of cadres and non-productives in 1957 was 470.000.
(This was the number of persons liable to be sent to
the countryside or demoted to productive work in the
Hsia Fang campaign of that year). If we deduct our
estimate of 282.000 from this figpre we are left with 
. 00 0
248-^Q-QQ cadres and non-productives. This would have 
represented about 10$ of the work force - a reasonable 
figure since we know that this was almost exactly the 
proportion of cadres and non productives in industry 
alone.
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Table 19, The structure of employment in Shanghai by 
main sectors in 1957
%
Sector
aAgriculture 6*2
Factory production 29#8
Traditional production 16,2
b
Tx’ansport and Communications 8*1
Construction 1*2
Commerce SO *7
Food and services 1.9
Education, wealth, banking 15*9
100
Sources:
a. This assumes that 40?£ of the rural population were 
wholly engaged in agricultural work*
b. includes stevadores 
Other data as Table 18#
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Table 21. The structure of nonagricultural employment 
in Greater Shanghai in 1950 contrasted with 
data for 1957.
Sector 1950 fo 1957 fo
Production 56.7 49.1.
Commerce 19.7 22.0
Education, health,
Ranking and Government 9.9 16.9
Other 55.7 12.0
Total 1CL0* 100*
Sources: for 1950, Statistics of Shanghai* Table 6.
For 1957, as Table 18.
The growth and structural change of the Shanghai labour 
force: conclusions.11 i — i ii mmmm h —
The materials presented above are sufficient to
give a fairly clear picture of employment trends in
Shanghai in the period 1949-1957, and in some respects
it is possible to make interesting comparisons with
(24)
the early 1930Ts
Total employment as a percentage of population 
is estimated to have declined over the whole period.
For 1950, employment is estimated to have been 50% to 
60% of population. By 1949 we estimate that it had 
fallen to 45.2% and by 1957 to 55.8%. These data
(24) In this summary data for 1930-1933 are from 
D.K,Liu, The Growth and Industrialisation of Shanghai 
and H.D.Lamson, "The PeopleTs Livelihood as revealed 
by family budget studies", Chinese Economic Journal,
May 1931, Data for 1949 are in, A Year of Shanghaifs 
Liberation, pp.80-81. Data for 1957 as Table 18.
-118-
include rural population and agricultural work force 
although by 1957 these were both comparatively 
insignificant.
On the supply side we estimate that the labour 
supply grew at an average of 1*9# per annum and our 
data enable us to bre&tf this down in some detail. The 
relative share of the natural and migrant sources of 
supply suggest that the migrant share was somewhat 
lower than might have been expected. Migrants account­
ed for only 17.3$ of total labour supply which may be 
compared with a figure of 44.Jiff suggested by Umerson 
in his use of Sung P'ing's data. In Shanghai the key 
to this matter is the large difference between gross 
and net immigration; so that the low share of migrants 
in the growth of the labour force over the whole period 
is likely toffee a reflection of the periodic success of 
the Shanghai authorities in persuading peasants to 
return to the rural areas.
In the longer run, the growth of the indigenous 
labour force will be determined by the natural population 
growth rates. During our period this was 5.4$ per assum. 
On the demand side we estimate that nonagricultural
-Un­
employment grew at 1.3$ per annum in 1949-1957 compared 
with 1.3$ in the period 1930-1949. Relating demand and 
supply we find that the increase in nonagricultural 
employment was only sufficient to absorb 44$ of the 
natural increase in the labour force. This together 
with evidence of net immigration explains our estimate 
of a substantial increase in unemployment. By 1957 
we estimate that unemployment ammountedto 30.8$ of the 
labour force.
For projection into the post 1957 period the 
employment growth rate of 1.3$ should be compared with 
the natural population growth rate of 3.4$. This 
comparison suggests that unless radical changes took 
place, intensification of the unemployment problem in 
Shanghai must have occurred in the 1960* s.
The data on the structure of the labour force are 
interesting because they suggest that by 1957 Shanghai 
had a high proportion of its labour force in production 
of all kinds and that this sector has been a dynamic 
one over the period 1930-1957. As a proportion of 
total employment, employment in production rose in this 
pei’iod from 56.7$ to 49.1$.
-120-
During these years employment%industry grew very 
fast. Between 1931 and 1949 the growth rate was 5#6$ 
per annum and between 1949 and 1957 it was 4.4%.
The other dynamic sector after 1949 was that 
comprising the modern Government and services sectors 
(i.e. Government, health, education and banking). The 
share of this sector rose from 7.8% of total population 
in 1949 to 16.9% in 1957. This required an annual 
growth rate of 11.6% almost two and a half times that 
achieved by industrial employment.
On the basis of data on sectoral employment change 
and the balance sheet in Table 17, we estimate that the 
Government and industrial sectors accounted for 93% of 
all new jobs in Shanghai in the period 1949-1957. This 
implies decline and stagnation in the other sectors, a 
conclusion which is substantiated by a mass of fragmentary 
evidence. We would estimate that there was probably a 
slight increase in handicraft employment but a decrease 
in the traditional commerce sector.
— 1 Stk—
Part 5. Data for other cities.
It has not been possible to collect data from 
other cities as comprehensive as those constructed for 
Shanghai. However some was found and a summary of 
urban population growth rates and a crude measure of 
employment change in thirteen cities is shown in Table 
22. Shanghai and national data are included for 
comparison.
The variety of population experience is clearly 
visible in the table. The employment indicator consists 
of an estimate of annual population growth/divided by 
the average number of persons whose employment problem 
was said to have been ffsolvedff. Both these types of 
data are available for the thirteen cities for various 
periods in the 1950Ts and annual averages were taken 
from the most comprehensive group of years available 
up to 1957. Most of the employment data west published 
in 1957 and was frequently part of a defence of the 
economic achievements of the regime. It is certain 
therefore that the data would try to show the employment 
improvement in the best possible light.
The phrase usually used to describe employment 
growth is that x persons were "placed", (an shu) .
-122-.*
Bxamination of this term in a fairly large number of 
contexts has lead us to the view that this includes all 
persons who, (a) were found jobs by the Labour Bureau, 
(b) found jobs themselves of which the Bureau was 
informed and (c) persons who were given assistance to 
return to the countryside excepting those that who were 
moved back in the mass migrations of 1950, 1955 and 
1957. It is important to note therefore that these 
figures do not give a direct indication of the employ­
ment generated within the individual cities because 
category a. includes persons directed to jobs in other 
cities* Comparison of the different ways of describing 
the Shanghai employment performance brings out the 
exact significance of this distinction.
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Sources for Table
Amoy* (Province of Fukfen, 1957 pop# 224,000). Gols. a-f.
Morris B.Ullman, Cities of Mainland China 1953 and 1958.
Table 3, page 35, (Hereafter referred to as Ullman)♦
Oo1* B > Ullman and, "No unemployment in Amoy and Changchou", 
Fu Feng, (Fukien), 17,10,1958. (U.R.l. File No.14132),
Anshan. (Province of Liaoning, 1953 pop, 549,000).
Ullman op.cit. and "The whole city basically elminites 
unemployment", JMJP 14,8.1956.
Canton. (Province of Kwan tung, 1953 pop, 1.693). Cols.
Ullman op.cit. Col.g, Data is for 1950-1956, in 
"Canton City’s population 1.780.000”, TKF {Hong Kong),
5.11.1957. "Canton City’s population 1.650.000", f£KP 
(Hong Kong) 1.1,1957#
Employment data in NPUP 29,11.1956.
Qhangchun. (Province of ’ftlrin, 1953 pop. 855.000).
Cols a-f, Ullman op.cit.
Ghengtu. (Province of Szechuan, 1953 pop. 857.000).
Cols, a-f Ullman op.cit. Col.g. data for 1949-1956.
See, "Brilliant and rapid achievements in urban
-126-
construction”, Chengtu Uih Pao (Chengtu Daily) 12.9.1957.
”The municipal and provincial labour departments
7
investigate the employment problem”, Qhengtu Jih Pao 23.5.195
Chungking. (Province of Szechuan, 1953 pop. 1.772.000).
Gols. a-f, Tillman op.cit. Employment data in, ”See the 
improvement in the people*s livelihood from the increase 
in employment and wages”, Chungking Jih Pao (Chungking 
Daily) 12.8.1957.
Fatshan. (Kwantung Province, 1953 pop. 122.000). Cols, 
a-f Ullman op.cit* Employment data in, ”In the past year 
4.000 persons got employment in Foshan”, NPJP 3.2.1957.
Foochow. (Fukien Province, 1953 pop. ■553). Cols, a-f 
Ullman op.cit. Employment data for 1952-1956 in, ”There 
are many ways of solving the unemployment problem”,
Chekiang Jih Pao (Cheifci&ng Daily) 27.9.1957.
Hangchow. (Che#lang Province, 1953 pop. 647.000). Cols 
a-f Ullman op.cit. Employment data in a cartoon,
”80.383 men get work”, Hangchow Jih Pao (Hangchow Daily)
27.9.1957.
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Harbin, (Heilung Kiang Province), 1953 pop. 1.163.000) 
Gols a-f Oilman op.cit. Employment data is for the 
growth in the numbers of workers and staff between 1952- 
1956. This category would seem to be more representative 
of the total working population than would be the ease in 
say Shanghai; workers and staff and their families in 
Harbin accounted for nearly 80% of the population.
Data in, ”The budget out-turn for 1955 and the budget for 
1956”, Heilungolaiang Jih Pao (Heilungchiang Daily) 
18.12.1956.
Lanchow. (Kansu Province, 1953 pop. 397.000). Ullman
Nanking. (Kiangsu Province, 1953 pop. 398.000). Ools.
a-f Ullman op.cit. Population data for 1950 is from 
The Newspaper Headers Handbook, 1950. Other data in the 
Provincial Labour Beport for Anhui, ^Anhui Jih Pao (Anhui 
Daily) 30.9.1957.
Paotow. (Suiyuan Province, 1953 pop. 149.000). Ullman
op.cit.
Peking. (Hopeh Province, 1953 pop. 2.768.000). Cols a-f
Ullman op.cit. In Col.g. Population growth is for 1949- 
1956 and employment growth for 1950-1957, See, ”The 
urban population must be controlled”, JMJP 27.11.1957
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§na “Little statistics”, JMJF 19.8.1957.
Shanghai. (Kiangsa Province, 1953 pop. 6.204.000).
Cols a-f Ullman op.cit. (Except for the 1948 population 
figure for which we have used a figure given in Sian 
Ching Ghih, An Economic Geography of East China op.cit. 
page 44,
Shenyang. (Liaoning Province, 1953 pop. 2.300.000)#
Gols a-f Ullman op.cit# Col.g. “The Newspaper Header*s 
Handbook loc.cit. and “The number who got employment 
in 1956 was twelve times the number who got employment 
in 1955”, Shenyang Jih Pao (Shanyang Daily) 2.8.1957.
Sian. (Shensi Province, 1953 pop. 787.000). Ullman 
op.cit.
Tsinan. (Shantung Province, 1953 pop. 680.000}. Cols, 
a-f Ullman op.cit. Employment data in, “From the Tsi^fnan 
employment situation refute rightist lies”, Ta Chung Jih 
Pao, (Tsinan) (Masses Daily) 16.7,1957.
National data from Tables 23 and 24*
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Part Four. National Data.
In this last section we present a brief survey of 
data on urban employment growth, the demand and supply for 
employment and the extent of unemployment.
Urban Population.
Table 25. Urban population 1949-1957. 000Ts
1949 1950 1951 1952 1955 1954 1955
57,650 61.690 66.320 71.630 77.670 81.550 82.850
1956 1957
89.150 99,500
Source: “Statistical materials on our country*s population
1949-1956. TQKT 1957 No.11 14.6.1957. The figure for 
1957 is derived from information in, ”A tentative dis­
cussion of the relationship between socialist urban 
population increase and the development of agricultural 
and industrial production”. Kuang Ming Jih Pao (The 
Enlightenment Daily), 7.10.1963.
These data represent an annual compound rate of
growth of 7.1%. Intermediate rates for 1949-1952 and
1953-1957 are 7.4% and 6.8% respectively. Total growth 
of 41,000.000 for the whole period is indicated, of
-130-
which 27,870,000 was within the First Five Year Plan
period. Of this latter total, an important article by
Sung Pfing suggested that migration to urban areas
(25)
accounted for 8,000,000 ,
The supply and demand for urban employment
Comprehensive national data for the whole period 
are not available. For the period of the First Plan 
however, Emerson has used sung P*ing*s data. Sung P*ing 
estimated that the indigenous increase to the labour 
force during the Plan was 1,000,000 persons per year, 
Emerson combines this figure with the figure of
8.000,000 rural-urban migrants (using the assumption 
that 50% of migrants were job seekers), to produce an 
annual addition to the urban labour force of 1.800*000# 
On the demand side we present first Emerson*s 
estimates for all non-agricultural employment, and an 
index based upon them.
(25) Sung P'ing, HH 1957 No.12 op.cit.
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Using this basic series, Emerson estimates the supply of 
urban employment during the First Plan period at 1.400*000 
annually. This approach to the supply of employment is 
certainly of interest but it cannot be considered 
satisfactory. First, on the supply side, Sung PfingTs 
data on indigenous urban labour supply are a net figure 
which appear to imply that workers retired at 60 accord­
ing to the insurance regulations. But there is abundant 
evidence that many did not and in estimating net 
employment change in Shanghai we assumed that only 55$ 
retired according to the regulations. Also on the supply 
side, there can be no question but that Sung PTingfs 
migration data are extremely crude. On the demand side 
Bmersonfs estimate is unsatisfactory because it equates 
employment of workers and staff with total employment 
when on his own data, workers and staff only account for 
62$ of all nonagricultural employment. Incorrect results 
can obviously follow from this latter procedure since 
not only are the two totals found to be different in urban 
areas, but they may even have moved in opposite direct­
ions. For example we estimate that this happened in 
Shanghai in 1957 when total employment rose slightly,
while employment of workers and staff is estimated
(£6)
to have declined •
The Measurement of Unemployment.
Official estimates of urban unemployment have 
never been published on a consistent and regular basis. 
There are scattered official data for years between 1949 
and 1957 and these appear to be either figures for the 
total number of registered unemployed or to be more 
broadly based estimates of all categories of urban 
unemployment in the main cities. Data of the latter 
kind claimed a total of urban unemployment of about
3.000.000 in the early 1950*s and 1.000.000 in early 
1956^S7  ^.
(26) The increase was in small scale production, 
commerce and possibly transportation. The decrease con­
sisted of 6,000 cadres sent to rural areas and Hsia 
Fanged peasants.
(87} A figure for 1949 is in, ”The Hoad to employment 
is a broad one”, JMJP 19.8.1957. A 1956 figure is in, 
Liao Lu Yen, ”An explanation of the National Plan for 
Agricultural Development 1956-1967” reprinted in, 1956 
Nien Tao 1967 Nien Chfuan Kuo^Nung Yeh Fa Phan Kang Vao 
(Tsao An) (The National Plan for Agricultural Develop­
ment 1956 to 1967, Draft) (Peking, 1956),
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Fmerson has made an attempt to estimate the 
growth of urban unemployment during the First Plan 
period by the method discussed in the previous section - 
that is by deducting the average annual addition to the 
numbers of urban workers and staff from Sung PiTng 
estimates of total urban labour supply. This may be 
described as a flow approach to unemployment measure­
ment, and "Emerson* s result is an estimate that urban 
unemployment grew by ”st least 400,000” per annum. 
Interesting as this estimate is, we cannot accept it 
for the same reasons that we could not accept his 
estimates of labour supply and employment growth.
Liu and Yeh have followed a stock approach to the 
(28)
problem . They start by estimating nonagricultural 
population which is done by deducting an estimate of 
agricultural population from total population. An 
estimate of the male nonagricultural labour force is 
then derived from nonagricultural population, and an 
estimate of nonagricultural employment deducted from 
this. This yields a figure for total nonagricultural 
unemployment which Liu and Yeh then distribute between 
rural and urban areas.
(28) Liu and Yeh pp. 102-103,
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Table so
Population, Labour force and Unemployment 195S ;
1957 (Millions)
195S 1957
Total population 569 637
Agricultural population 550 381
Nonagricultural population S19 256
rural 150 167
urban 69 89
Nonagricultural population
age IS-64 144 168
rural 99 110
urban 45 58
Nonagricultural istudents
age IS and over 3 7
rural 1 3
urban S 4
Nonagricultural labour 
force 141 161
rural 98 107
urban 43 54
male 73 84
feiEale 68 77
Nonagricultural workers 59 64
male 48 52
female 11 IS
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Table 26 (Gont’d) (Millions)
1952 1957
Unemployed male
nonagricultural workers 27 32
rur al 18 21
urban 9 11
Source: Liu and Yeh, page 102
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There are four important possible objections to 
this calculation, first, unemployment is calculated 
as a residual figure which in relation to the starting 
point of total population is minute. A slight error 
in reaching the residual would therefore make a very 
substantial difference to the final result. Second, 
the estimate of nonagricultural population depends 
directly on the assumption that labour productivity in 
agriculture remained constant over a twenty five year 
period during which there was substantial technical 
and institutional change. This assumption is unaccept­
able without evidence of a more concrete character than 
that offered. Third, the Liu-Yeh estimate of urban 
unemployment depends on the correctness of the assumption 
^st the rate of unemployment is the same in urban and 
rural areas. Not even intuitive evidence is offered for 
this supposition, finally, the LiufMTeh stock approach 
has the important disadvantage that it cannot make any 
distinction between women of working age who wish to 
enter the labour force and are unable to do so (who may 
therefore be considered unemployed) and those women who 
are satisfied to remain engaged in domestic activities*
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Since, in the post 1949 period we know that there were 
many females willing but unable to enter the laoour 
force, the inability to handle female unemployment must 
he considered unsatisfactory*
Bmerson has no final totals for unemployment so 
that we cannot make a direct comparison between his 
results and those of Liu and Yeh. However, we can 
compare their estimates of the increase on unemployment 
during the First Five Year Plan period. Liu and Yeh 
are the more pessimistic. They suggest an increase in 
male unemployment in the urban areas of 4 millions 
which may be compared with Emerson1s figure of 2 millions 
for the same period.
The growth and structure of the urban labour force in 
all urban areas: conclusions.
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that 
there is not a great deal that can be said about 
employment change in all urban areas - the data too
inadequate. All the estimates agree that structural 
unemployment was growing between 1949 and 1957, but the 
details of the supply side are too imprecise to make 
satisfactory quantification possible.
Within total urban employment growth, industrial 
employment was olearly a dynamic sector since it grew 
at 12.6$ per annum compared to a growth rate of 5.5$ per 
annum of total nonagricultural employment (an indicator 
of total urban employment growth). But although 
industrial employment grew rapidly, the small initial 
size of the industrial base meant that this growth did 
not have a large effect on the total employment situation, 
as a proportion of urban population, industrial employment 
rose only from 5.3$ to 8.0$ in this period.
Traditional sector employment appears to have been 
fairly stagnant although within this sector there was 
probably a slight absolute rise in handicraft employment 
and a decline in commerce.
In conclusion, it should be noted that both non­
agricultural employment and industrial employment growth 
slowed markedly after 1955. The former rate dropped 
from 11.9$ to 1.6$ and the latter from 19,j8$ to 8.5$,
Now that we have established as far as possible the 
statistical dimensions of employment change in China's 
cities, we can turn to the analysis of the determinants 
of this change and its significance for the organisation 
of the urban labour market.
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Chapter Three
The problem of structural unemployment 
The demand for labour
In the last chapter we discussed the problems of 
measuring urban employment change and presented some 
estimates of unemployment for all urban areas together 
with data for Shanghai. Both local and national data 
leave much to be desired but they all confirm the 
structural charactex* of the unemployment problem and 
suggest that by 1957 unemployment had reached high 
levels.
The main difficulty In making unemployment est­
imates was found to be the construction of satisfact­
ory estimates of labour supply. The data on the 
demand side were more firmly based and all these all 
confirm slow rates of ovex^all employment growth, 
particularly after 1952, How can we explain this 
slow rate of labour absorption between 1949 and 1957? 
On the demand side three factors seem important: the
size and structure of the investment programme in the 
modern sector; the growth of labour productivity; 
and the performance of the traditional sector. Let us
— 14S-*
consider these in turn#
The size of the modern sector investment pro­
gramme was important because other things being equal 
this determined the growth of modern sector employment# 
The structure of the programme was relevant not only 
because of the employment implications of alternative 
inter-sectoral strategies, but also because choice of 
projects involved determining average capital intensity 
and gestation periods#
Up to the end of 1951, lack of rigid ideas about 
the structure of industrial growth, and the availability 
of excess and slightly damaged capacity, enabled the 
Government to keep investment costs low and gestation 
periods short. The result was high rates of growth of 
output and employment in the industrial sector, to 
which were added the employment effects of a lenient 
policy toward the private sector and traditional sectors- 
prior to mid 1953* Bmerson*s data for industrial 
employment show that it grew at 28*6*fo between 1949 and 
1958 and the Shanghai data also show 1949 and 1951 as 
years of fairly high absorption. (See Table 16,
Chapter Two},
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The first three years of the First Plan however, 
were marked by a sharp decline in absorption rates 
which contributed to a series of upheavals between 
1956 and 1958. This decline was partly due to special 
factors which depressed activity but was also related 
to the adoption of an investment strategy which al­
though ambitions in terms of the target rate of growth, 
involved concentration in sectors and projects where 
capital intensity was high and growing and where gest­
ation periods were relatively l o n g ^  • We are not
(1) The employment expectations of the First Plan are 
discussed further in Chapter Five. In 1958 capital 
intensity in the light and heavy sectors of industry 
was approximately the same. By 1955 one set of figures 
suggested that capital intensity in the eight main 
heavy sectors had increased by over 50$ whereas the 
increase in the paper and cotton industries (taken as 
representatives of light industry), was only 7$. See, 
"The technical level of our country*s industrial out­
put", HHPTK 1957, No.12, page 115. Gestation periods 
in light industry were much shorter than in the heavy
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concerned with the detailed argument behind this strat­
egy here, but the maim determinants of It were the 
character of the Sino-Bussian economic aid agreement; 
the economic implications of the drive for autarchy and 
military strength; the rationality of a policy which 
minimised indigenous skilled labour and management re­
quirements and a general drive for modernity and large 
scale operation. These factors are an adequate explan­
ation of the choice of strategy in 1953, although 
simply listing them evades the issue of- their relative 
importance. Our view is that the managerial and skill­
ed labour shortage was probably a good deal more 
important in determining the actual outcome than it has
(1) (Cont* d}
sector. Typical heavy sector projects were estimated 
to have gestation periods of three to four years com­
pared to between one and two years for light industry 
investments, For heavy sector data see, "Livelihood 
must be subordinated to the development of production", 
TOP 17.12.1953. For light industry see, Hu Ming, "Dig 
out the potential in light industry", OH GO 1956, No*5, 
23.5,1956.
been given credit for. For it is worth noting that 
although the industrialization debates of 1958-1953 
determined the plans for those years and the general 
character of the Plan for 1953-1957, there was an 
area outside and supplementary to the main, "key 
point", projects where the usual explanation of capital 
intensity were not necessarily applicable. Yet even in 
these areas the drive to capital intensity is visible,
An interesting example of this is the construction 
industry, in which capital intensity doubled between 1953 
and 1955 while numbers employed declined absolutely - 
leading to Identifiable unemployment about which the 
authorities were very concerned. Yet this increase in 
capital intensity cannot be wholly explained in terms 
of Soviet influence, technological standards set in the 
defence sector, inflexible complementarities etc.
Indeed, construction is an industry where the possibil­
ities for varying capital intensity are considerable, 
and since unemployment was a problem of particular 
seriousness during 1954-1955, the policy of capital 
substitution seems extraordinary. It is possible that 
humanitarian factors entered into it, since some 
construction tasks are extremely unpleasant without a
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degree of mechanisation, hut we think that the main 
drive for mechanisation came from management cadres 
in the industry. These cadres were faced with skill 
shortages and labour management problems of peculiar 
difficulty and in the context of these, capital 
substitution makes sensed).
{2} See, fffhe basic situation of our country’s 
construction industry1*, TCKT No,24, December 1956, 
"Strive to do labour assignment work well in 1955**,
LT 1955, No,l, and "Important tasks In current labour 
assignment work", LT 1955 No#8. The pi^oblems of 
labour management in the construction industry are 
discussed in Chapters Four to Six.
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Although the First Plan investment strategy had 
to be basically adhered to, in the latter part of the 
Plan period it was subject to two important modificat­
ions of relevance to employment. First, in 1956 there 
was a revision of the inter-sectoral investment alloc­
ation in favour of light industry which, since capital 
intensitynin this sector was lower and gestation per­
iods shorter than in heavy iindustry, had favourable 
implications for employment absorption. Second, in 
1957, the investment plan for that year laid new 
emphasis on the importance of diverting resources to 
labour intensive techniques of production even if this 
involved loss of quality of output, loss of face for 
cadres managing enterprises which did not meet the full 
requirements of modernity, and also, by implication, 
loss of re-investible surplus per unit of capital. The 
1957 Plan was therefore the first occasion on which the 
investment plan for the modern sector was explicitly 
modified for employment reasons.
Let us now consider the effects of productivity 
growth on employment absorption. Productivity is 
closely related to Capital intensity and the relationship
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between industrial output, labour, capital and pro­
ductivity at the national and Shanghai levels during 
the First Five Tear Plan period is set out below in 
Tables 27 and 28, In Table 27 the data take the form 
of indexes and in Table 28, the indexes of output, 
labour and capital are converted into growth rates and 
two estimates are made of the productivity residual by 
using two alternative weightings for capital and labour. 
Table 27. Industrial output, capital and labour 
1952-1957 (National and Shanghai)
1952 = 100National Shanghai
Output 209.6 194
Labour . 149.5 151
Gapit al 251.9 104
Capital per head 155.1 69
Output per head 140.2 129
Output per unit
of capital 90.5 185
Sources: National data are from, Michael Field,
"Labor productivity in industry", in Fclcstein, 
Galenson ant3- ^iu Economic Trends in Oomiaunist China.
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Table 27 (Cont’d)
Tables 3 and 7. Shanghai data are from "Total out­
put doubled in five years", HWP 28.12.1957*
Table 28. Growth rates of output, labour, capital 
and •productivity, 1952-1957 (National and Shanghai)
National Shanghai
Output (growth
rate) 16.eo7* 14.17 #
Labour 8.45#( .7} (.487) * 8.59#(.7) (.487)
Capital 18.33#(.3) (.513) . 79#(. 3) (.513)
L and C 11.42# 6.25#
Besidual 4*58# or 2.49# 7*92# or 9.58#
The two labour weightings used here are (a) the 
"arbitrary" weighting used by T.C.Liu to estimate the 
Domestic Product productivity residual and (b) 
Eckstein's estimate of the proportion which the indus­
trial wage bill bears to the net product of industry. 
This latter seems the more logical weight and is in 
line with the S.R,Denison1s technique for estimating 
the sources of American and European growth. It may 
also be noted that LiuTs chosen residual may not be
150-
At the national level, output growth is seen to 
be the result of capital, labour and productivity 
growth (as measured by the residual). Capital inten­
sity and output per man are shown to have risen, while 
output per unit of capital fell slightly. For our 
purposes, the main implication of these data is that 
during the First Plan period productivity increase had 
an adverse effect on employment absorption, although 
from the planners point of view this may have been 
perfectly rational when the cost of additional employ­
ment and the relationship between this and the savings 
generated in the industrial sector were taken into
Table 28 (Cont*d)
so arbitrary after all, since it is fairly close to 
the labour share of the American and European nat­
ional incomes. See, I.C.Liu in, The Profile, op.cit. 
pp. 62-63. Alexander Eckstein, The National Income 
of Communist China. (New York, 1961) page 79.
Edward F.Denison, Why Growth Bates Differ: Post-war
experience in Nine Western Countries. (Brookings
Institution 1967).
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aocount. For, if we suppose that for given rates of 
output and capital growth, there is some feasible 
area of choice between additional employment and add­
itional productivity, the planners will choose that 
combination of the two which equalises their valuation 
of the savings made possible by additional productivity 
and the social benefits of the additional employment 
generated. In terms of employment this involves a choice 
between the present and the future; for the more employ­
ment is increased immediately, the less savings there 
will be to increase future employment through capital 
formation. In general the Chinese planners seem to 
have had a preference for productivity over employment 
and the long run over the short.
Examination of the Shanghai data provides a number 
of instructive contrasts with the national data. Basic­
ally, it can be seen that in Shanghai we have a process 
which may be described as growth without investment; 
in this process the sources of increased output are 
labour and productivity. The increase in the latter 
was so great, that although Shanghai had virtually no 
increase in capital (while the national stock doubled)
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the city achieved a growth rate at least two thirds 
as large as the national average with an employment 
increase about the same as the national average. How 
was this done? How was it possible to add increasing 
quantities of labour to a fixed capital stock and 
simultaneously achieve an astonishing growth of pro­
ductivity? Our view is that it was done in three 
ways. First, by increasing the utilisation of capacity 
through the extension of shift work and similar devices; 
second, by increasing work intensity; and third, by 
improving the rationality of labour utilisation.
Two important conclusions can be drawn from this* 
First, the extreme contrast between the Shanghai and 
national data underline*the importance of geographical 
disaggregation for the analysis of problems such as the 
kind we have been discussing. For, since the proportion 
of national industrial output produced in Shanghai and 
similar cities is substantial, it is apparent that the 
data (and consequently the problems) in cities where 
capital accumulation was taking place, must, by compar­
ison with the national data, appear as abnormal as those 
for Shanghai. In a sense therefore, the national data 
are a fiction. For example, the productivity residual
residual in cities where capital was growing must (if 
the national and Shanghai data are correct) have been 
very low, possibly even negative. If this was so, it 
would bring part of Chinese experience back in line 
with that of the Soviet Union, where during the First 
Plan output, capital and employment increased very 
rapidly, while output per head declined. This simil/ar- 
ity could not be appreciated from inspection of the 
national data*
The second point to notice is that growth of the 
Shanghai variety Is not self sustaining; for without 
additional investment there will come a point when out­
put . and even more^ employment growth, will slow dramat­
ically. Output growth will slow when the possibilities 
for increasing the utilisation of plant through shift 
work are exhausted and again if diminishing x^eturns to 
campaigns to increase labour productivity begin to set 
in* Employment growth is also bound to be checked when 
the limits of plant utilisation have been reached, since 
beyond this point, it is probable that further employ­
ment absorption will only be possible at the expense of 
productivity - increases of which we have already 
suggested the Chinese planners tend to value highly#
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One last question which we have to ask is whether the 
demand for labour was wage elastic. Was capital in­
tensity a response to high and rising wage rates? This 
is an extremely difficult question to which we can only 
suggest a preliminary answer. Our view would be that 
in the modern sector, wages were not a factor determin­
ing employment, other than in the sense that the total 
wage bill and coneommitant costs limited investment and 
the cumulative growth of employment. However, in the 
traditional sector wages were of x^elevance. The modern 
sector tended to set standards for wages and non-wage 
benefits which small scale enterprises could not always 
match, but which workers and the Labour Bureaux often 
expected them to treat as norms. Thi® must have limited 
employment absorption even though other factors govern­
ing the general level of activity in the small scale 
sector were of much greater employment significance.
We now have to consider the extent to which the 
employment problems implied by the plan strategy for 
the modern industrial sector were understood and allev­
iated by measures to support employment in the non­
industrial sectors, i.e. the traditional, small scale
-155-
production and commerce sectors and the Government 
sector. The data suggest that of these, only the 
G-overnment sector showed any sign of significant ex- 
pansion' . The failure of the traditional sectors 
to grow was probably due both to an innate hostility 
to private and small scale activity of any kind and to 
the fact that expansion of small scale activities lead
(3) Emerson* s national data show a modest rise of 
employment in the Government and Mass Organizations 
sector between 1952 and 1957* Our figure of 252.000 
for Government sector employees in Shanghai in 1957, 
compares with a figure of 75.000 for employees in the 
Gity Government and Organs in 1950* Even allowing 
for the probability that our residual figure includes 
persons not in the Government sector, and that the 
1950 figure is probably an underestimate, substantial 
expansion seems to have taken place. The probability 
of such expansion is increased by the fact that there 
were periodic attempts to absorb surplus urban labour 
into the Government sector. See, ftThe striking 
achievements of labour employment (work) in East China*1, 
CEJP 10.9.1952.
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to general loss of control and the diversion of 
resources from investment and the public sector to 
consumption and the private sector. During the First 
Plan period, the fulfillment of the plan for the 
public sector was given absolute priority irrespective 
of the implications of this for the traditional and 
small scale sector and for consumption and urban 
employment.
The importance of the traditional sector for 
urban employment can be seen in quantitative terms 
by looking at data on the structure of employment.
At the national level, the problem can only be 
approached by looking at the relative insignificance 
of employment in industry. The national data show 
that such employment amounted to only of total 
urban population in 1 9 57 ^ .
(4) Emerson, Nonagricultural Employment, Table 1, 
page 128. Urban population Table 23, Chapter Two#
W© have no detailed estimates of the structure of 
employment in all urban areas. This is one of the 
basic deficiencies of the existing national employment 
estimates. Emerson*s figures for all handicraft, trade 
food and drink industries show a stagnant employment 
situation.
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A comparison of Shanghai and national data shows 
that factory employment as a percentage of population 
in Shanghai was above the national average for all 
urban areas and this is in line with other indicators 
of the city*a relative economic maturity. The impli­
cation of this is that in many other cities the import­
ance of the traditional sectors must have been even 
greater. Fragments of evidence for Peking and Ganton
/ 5)
confirm this* * In Ganton in 1954, factory employ­
ment amounted to only 6% of the population and in Peking 
in 1949, it accounted for only 10% of all employment and 
only 5.4% of the total population. Thfee data 4KSL summar­
ized in the Table below.
(5) Bata for Ganton are in, HffJP IB.12.1955. For
Peking, see, !fAn announcement of the Peking City
*
Governmentn, JMJP 17.11.1949.
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Table 29. Factory employment as a % of total employ­
ment and of population in urban areas. 
as a jo of population 1951 1949 1954 1957
National - 5.3% - 8%
Shanghai 7% 10% 11%
Ganton - 6% -
Peking - 3.4%
as a % of employment
Shanghai 14% 23% - 32%
Peking - 10%
This evidence, fragmentary as it is, does indicate 
the importance of the non-industrial sectors for employ­
ment. Comprehensive evidence of employment change in the 
traditional sector is urban areas is not available. But 
as described in Ghapter Two, such evidence as we have 
nearly all suggests decline or at best stagnation of 
employment between 1949 and 1957. There were increses 
in employment in 1951 and 1953, a sharp decline in 
1954 and 1955, followed by a revival in some traditional 
sectors in 1956 and 1957, This revival itself being 
partly motivated by employment considerations^).
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(6) Data on fluctuations are discussed in the next 
Chapter. Data on trends in traditional employment in­
clude information on, handicrafts, services, commerce 
and transport, For Shanghai we have an employment 
series for services in the private sector which shows a 
decline from a peak of 40.950 in 1950 to 29.580 on the 
even of socialisation inrTL955. See, Szu Ting Shang Yeh 
Ti She Hui Ghu I Kai Tsao, (Tzu Liao) , (The Socialist) 
Reform of Private Commerce. (Materials), (Peking 1963), 
page 323. The trend of individual handicraft employ­
ment in Shanghai between 1950 and 1954 is not discern­
ible from the data shown in the 1954 Handicrafts Survey. 
However, our figure of 258.000 in 1957 is far below a 
figure of 600.000 workers which official sources quote 
for 1937. See, P Teng Tse I, Qhung Kuo Chin Tai Shou
I IftO
ICung Yeh Shih Tzu (Shanghai) 1962. (Materials on
the Modern History of 0hina*s Handicraft Industry)*
Data on employment in traditional transportation and 
commerce in Shanghai is scarce. But we pointed out in 
Table 18 note f, that the number of pedicab men in 1958 
appears to have been less than the number of rickshawmen 
in the late 1920*s, and the fact that there was a policy
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(6) (GontTd)
of transferring transport workers to the countryside 
and into other urban occupation in the mid 1950*s 
indicates a decline of employment in this sector be­
tween 1949-1957. Changes in the commerce sector are 
even harder to quantify, but the employment crisis in 
this sector in 1954 and 1955 suggests that a net increase 
in employment was most unlikely and a decline probable. 
The severity of the crisis is illustrated by the fact 
that during the Shanghai reform of wholesale commerce 
between 1954 and 1955, of the 44.183 persons involved, 
19.324 ?;ere neither absorbed into the reformed commerce 
system, nor found alternative employment, nor given any 
sort of re-training. See, The Socialist Reform of 
Private Commerce, loc.cit. page 144* We also know that 
employment considerations were the prime factor in 
dictating the tactics of the socialization of retail 
commerce in Shanghai. It was argued that, **to allow 
the continued private management of private retail 
commerce is very beneficial for the maintainence of 
employment”, see, tfWhy (it is necessary) to adopt 
different measures when implementing the socialist.
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Stagnation of employment growth in the tradit­
ional sector was certainly an important factor in the 
growth of structural unemployment in the urban areas. 
Another effect of the pressures which limited expans­
ion of this sector must have been an increase in 
frictional unemployment since the traditional sector 
(particularly commerce), has long acted in China as a 
mechanism for equilibrating labour market pressures 
in the rural and urban sectors. The slight capital 
requirements required to participate in traditional 
occupations have always made entry and exit easy for 
those able to alternate between agricultural and non- 
agricultural occupations. Such alternation might or 
might not require physical migration and employment 
switching of this kind could be motivated either by 
boom conditions in the nonagrieultural sector or by 
natural or economic catastrophes in agriculture. In 
the latter case, employment switching offered an
(6) (Cont fd)
reform of private wholesale and retail commerce11,
CFUP 24.3.1955.
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efficient way of minimising unemployment and sharing 
available urban income. When conditions changed, 
occupations could be reversed. This sort of process 
was certainly known in the nineteenth century, can be 
observed in the 1930Ts and was still in evidence in 
the 1950fs ^ .  Of course occupation switching was
(7) It was said in the mid-nineteenth century that, 
”when the profits of commerce are small, those who 
plough and weave will be numerous”, Mary Wright, The 
Last Stand of Chinese Conservatism: The T*ung Ohih
Restoration, 1862-1874, (Stanford 1957) page 156.
There is a vivid account of occupation switching in 
the Hangchow area in 1951 in, Hangchow Shih Ching Ohi 
Tiao QhTa, (1952). (An Economic Survey of Hangchow). 
This report described how bankruptcy and natural dis­
asters forced many peasants into the city where they 
participated in rickshaw and construction work and also 
in the commerce sector. The report mentioned that in 
the latter there were problems arising from the fact 
that the numbers employed in the sector were increasing 
without being any increase of trade to justify them.
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sometimes a purely seasonal phenomenism, but this was 
by no means always the case*
The other aspect of traditional employment which 
would have been affected by stagnant conditions was its 
intermediary function in the process of labour transfer 
from the rural to urban sector# Evidence from the war 
years indicates that rural migrants did not usually
(7) (Cont'd)
An instructive account of the role of the handi­
craft industry in a small town is, nAn introduction to, 
and some view* on the handicraft industry in O'Cheng*1 
(Hepeh). LT 1954 No#3. This report described the way 
in which the handicraft labour force fluctuated in 
response to the agricultural cycle# Over half of the 
labour force owned land and almost all the rest assisted 
in agricultural work whenever labour requirements were 
especially high# The writer went on to show how lack 
of working capital from public sources and rigid em­
ployment administration were hampering handicraft em­
ployment which was vital to local Incomes.
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enter factory employment directly* They first entered 
the urban labour force through the traditional sector, 
acquired elementary skills; became acclimatised to 
urban life and then progressed to factory or other 
modern sector employment where minimum standards of 
skill and commitment were h i g h e r ^ *
The Supply of Labour: participation rates
In this section we analyse the factors which 
determined the supply of job seekers in the urban 
labour market* The two factors of particular importance 
are participation rates and migration* Population
(8) See, Kuo Heng-Shih, China inters the Machine Age, 
(Harvard 1944) pp.56-37. This is a sociologist’s study 
of labour conditions in Kunming during th<£ Sino- 
Japanese war* In the factory studied, of the 38 local 
farmers in the labour force, 17 had been through non­
industrial occupations before entering the factory as 
unskilled or semi-skilled workers.
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changes due to changes in vital rates are not relevant 
here since the size of the indigenous entry into the 
urban labour force between 1949 and 1957 was determined 
by the size and age structure of the population as it 
existed in 1949. The population acceleration of the 
1950* s was only of direct significance for labour supply 
In the I9601s, although it was indirectly relevant to 
employment in the 1950?s through Its effect on urban 
costs.
The three principal aspects of participation are: 
time worked; age limits;and the degree of female part­
icipation in the labour force. The data on these sub­
jects are incomplete but there is sufficient to indic­
ate that radical changes In participation took place 
between 1931 and 1957*
■ By comparison with the pre-war period, hours worked 
were certainly reduced in the 1950* s. . A survey of 
factories in Shanghai in 1930 showed that on average, 
workers were employed for ten hours a day. Although in 
1950 it was said that an eight hour day was not an 
immediately practical possibility, by the mid 1950*s 
such a day was normal in the modern sector. The effect
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of this reduction in hours was to reduce participation 
for individuals but at the same time increase opportun­
ity for participation for the labour force at large#^ 
National data on the age composition of the urban 
labour force 4r& only available in the 1955 State Stat­
istical Bureau survey of workers and staff in public 
sector industry and construction. The results of this 
survey are in Table 30 below and they imply that in 
these sectors the effective participation rate was 18 
to 60 years.
(9) See Statistics of Shanghai* Table 3, Page 3, and 
further discussion of this in Chapter Five.
16 7-
Table 30. Workers and employees in public sector 
industry and capital construction: age structure,
1955.
Percentage
under 18 years 1
18-25 years 38.3
36-55 years 35.9
36-45 years 17.1
46-50 years 4.3
51-55 years 3.2
56-60 years ,9
over 50  ^ .3
Total,...* 100$
Source: tfThe number, structure, and distribution of
workers and staff in the whole country in 1955tf,
TOKT 1956 No#23, 14,12*1956 pp*28-30.
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We think that this has to be subject to some modific­
ation. at both ends before it can be applied to all 
urban employment. We have already shown that there 
is evidence of failure to retire in some industries, 
although it must be added that this evidence was quot­
ed at the time of a vigorous campaign to enforce the 
retirement rules. In the traditional and small scale 
sectors where the Insurance regulations did not have 
the force of law, it seems probable that the upper 
limit of the official participation rate was in practice 
very flexible. At the lower end, there is no evidence 
that those who failed to move into the senior stream of 
the middle school system at sixteen were debarred from 
employment when they could obtain it. But it is clear 
from the evidence of the Table that up to 1955, only a 
small proportion of the younger age group managed to get 
into the public sector labour force. This is not surpris 
ing, since competition to get into the public sector was 
very fieree, and in most branches of it preference would 
have been given to persons with some skill or experience.
Female participation at the national level for all 
nonagricultural occupations, was reported to have risen
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from 7.5$ in 1949 to 15.4$ in 1957. In industry alone
the figure for 1957 was 17.5$. (In the cotton Industry
(10)
the figure was 60$) ,
Age data for the Shanghai labour force after 1949 
<3«s§L-not available. The only fragment of information on 
this subject that we have found confirms the view that 
the Shanghai industrial labour force probably had an 
average age higher than the national a v e r a g e ^ . This 
would be expected in view of the fact that the rapidly 
growing labour force in the North East and North West 
would consist of predominantly younger men.
(10) See, J. P.Emerson, Sex, Age and level of skill of 
the Nonagrlcultural labour force of Mainland China, 
(Washington, 1965) , Tables 1 and S.
(11) A survey of Shanghai cigarette factories found 
that the average worker was over 40. See, fTThe key 
to fulfilling the 1957 Labour Plan”, LT 1957 No.3.
-170
Bata on female ]® rticipation rates for Shanghai 
however, are available and can be compared with 
national data.
Table 31. Females as a percentage of the total 
employed labour force (Shanghai).
1931 1949/1950 1957
n#a. n.a. 21
Source: ftHalf a million Shanghai women and girls
participate in construction", TOP 8,5.1957#
Table 52. Females and children as a p  rcentage of 
the factory labour force (shanghai).
1951 1957
Females 51a 45^
Children 10
Sources: (a) O.K. Li ml* The Growth and Hindus trializ- 
ation of Shanghai, page 228#
(b) ff Childbirth must be planned0, HWP
5,1.1957.
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Female participation was much higher in Shanghai thah 
elsewhere as can he seen by comparing the Shanghai data 
with the national figures quoted above, and this remains 
true even after deduction of the figures for the cotton 
industry which had an exceptional proportion of women 
in its labour force and which was heavily concentrated 
in Shanghai*
There are no satisfactory pre-war data on the 
national age or female participation rates. But there 
are Shanghai materials and these suggest that important 
structural changes in both the age and sex structure of 
the city's industrial work force took place between the 
1930 *s and 1957* The key to this transformation was 
the elimination of children from the labour fore© and 
the limitation of female participation*
An extreme example of the age structure in the pre­
war industrial labour force is that shown in Table 55. 
This shows in that in a sample textile mill, 83.155 of 
the labour force was under the age of sixteen and very 
nearly 80$ was under twenty five* This may be compared 
with the 1955 age structure, in which under 4-0$ were 
under twenty five*
Table 55* Age structure of workers in a Shanghai 
Textile Mill in the late 1980*s.
Percentage 
#05 
83*08 
36*17 
19*93 
18*11 
7*8 
1*15 
.37
Total 100*0
Source; H.D.Fong, Cotton Industry and Trade in China 
(Hankai Institute of Economics, Tientsin, Industry Ser. 
Bull* Ho.4* 19385 , page 116.
Age 
10 
11—15 
16-80 
81-85 
86-30 
31-40 
41-50 
51-55
-173-
Table 38 shows that for all Shanghai factory 
industry in 1931, women and children counted for 61$ 
of the labour force leaving adult men to account for 
the other 39$. Yet by 1957, 55$ of a much enlarged 
labour force were adult men* The pre-war proportion 
of women in the total active labour force is not known, 
but it must certainly have been higher than the 81$ 
estimated for 1957.
The significance of these materials on particip­
ation is that they show that by shortening hours, ab­
olishing child labour and limiting female participation 
to to a lower share of employment than in the pre-war 
period, the labour administrators were able to substant­
ially mitigate the effects of low employment absorption 
rates on open male unemployment although in the nature 
of the case this was largely a once for all process.
Finally, the one other factor bearing upon effect­
ive participation in the Labour Jforce is the education­
al retention. The impact of this in the case of 
Shanghai was estimated in Chapter 2, and in the process 
of making this estimate we also made estimatesnfor all 
urban areas. These show that during the First Plan
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period, the annual net inflow into the educational 
system was 808.000 per annum which is equal to1 80.1$ 
of the total annual flow of indigenous labour into the 
urban labour market as estimated by Sung P*ing. The 
problem was that the favourable impair of the educat­
ional system on the size labour force could only last 
as long as the educational system was expanding^clearly 
there were limits to this, and they were reached in 
1957(1^)#
The Supply of Labour: Migration
Migration between rural and urban areas in China 
has had a long history and its characteristics have 
been very variable. The first variable to be consid­
ered is the distance involved in migration. This 
could be very great; thus in 1957 (when migration 
reached a peak} it was reported that some groups of 
people were moving from one end of China to the other. 
But the more characteristic migration was probably 
that which involved movement between urban areas and 
their immediate hinterland. (Thus, most migrants to
(12) National data as note 16 in Chapter 8*
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Shanghai for example, came from the Provinces of 
East China). It should be noted moreover, that 
at the borderline, the distinction between the rural 
and the urban area has been administrative rather 
than real in any other sense. In the urban suburbs, 
factories are placed in the middle of paddy fields and 
urban workers have small plots on which they cultivate 
vegetables. Thus peasants may participate in 
construction work and workers engage in cultivation 
without any necessity for physical migration; and 
frequently, prior to 1956, families divided their 
labour between agricultural and nonagricultural 
occupations. This interpanetration of the rural and 
urban areas caused many peculiar problems in city 
administration, notably in the implementation of the 
land reform and in considering the problems of 
controlling population and labour force movements it 
has always to be borne in mind^3^.
(13) The phenomena** of families dividing their labour 
between sectors was known in the pre-war period in 
Shanghai. Young girls often walked up to two hours a 
day between their family homes in the suburbs and the
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A second point worth remembering when analysing 
the migrations of the 1950*3, is that seasonal migrat­
ion and movement in response to agricultural catastrophe 
had a long history in traditional China, and that there 
was a precedent for economically motivated, long term 
migration on a massive scale in the period between 1912 
and 1949. During this period, although fear of banditry 
and the consequences of war were important motives for 
movement, the economic attractions of Manchuria and the 
Treaty Port towns were increasingly making themselves
(13) (Cont’d)
cotton mills. See, H.B.Lamson, "The effect of 
industrialization upon village livelihood'1, Chinese 
Economic Journal. October 1931. For the Shanghai 
land reform see, "The Shanghai City Government methods 
for implementing land reform in the Shanghai suburbs", 
in Hua Tung Ohu Tsai Oheng Ohing Ghi Pa Ling Hui Pien. 
(Compendium of Economic and Financial Regulations for 
the East China Beaion), (Shanghai^1951), pp.2008-2015.
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felt (1^ ) ♦
(14) The Talping rebellion was responsible for a 
sharp jump in the Chinese population of fee-ci-ty 
in the minineteenth century, and the doubling of 
the city's population which occurred in the 1920's 
owed much to political instability in the rural areas 
©f East China' in that period. The immediate impact 
of the outbreak of the Sino-Japanese war was to 
accelerate migration into Shanghai, but subsequently 
many moved out again. Population data in, Rhoads 
Murphy, Shanghai Key to Modern China, 1953, Chapter 
Two. See also, Robert W.Barnett, Economic Shanghai: 
Hostage to Politics 1937-1941 (New York, 1941),
Chapter II. The final stage of the civil war also 
lead to a general migration into the cities. See,
Jean Chesneaux, "Notes sur L'evolution recent^/de 
1'habitat urbaine en Asie", L*information 
Geographique, 13, (1949), pp. 169-175 and 14, (1950), 
pp. 1-8. A good account of the character of migration 
to Manchuria in the 1920's is in, The Manchuria Year! 
Book, 1932/1933, pp. 439-463. Also, George Babcock
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The effects of these migrations were particularly 
visible in pre-war Manchuria and in Shanghai, in 
Shanghai, surveys condueted in the late 1920fs and 
1930?s all showed that the city’s population and 
labour force were predominantly non-Shangha1ese in 
origin and that migration was increasingly motivated 
by economic considerations. After 1937 however, the 
Sino-Japanese war became the major influence on 
migration and many Shanghai workers moved out either 
to the Communist areas in the North or to the 
Nationalist areas in the West^i5 .^
(14) (Gont’d)
Gressey, Chinafs G-eographic foundations. (New York, 
1934) pp. 222-226. After 1932 the Japanese began 
to limit immigration to the urban areas, see, F.G* 
Jones, Manchuria Since 1931, (London, 1949), Chapter 
IX. The best source of Manchurian data for the 
whole period is Waller Wynne Jr. The Population of 
Manchuria. (Washington 1958) Table IIIC, page 20.
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(15)
erginat-ed f rom--out sid e of the city, See-?- Mao Ch-i
-Qlm a -r iiTho— iuaemployment problem cipa-l-lty
of-Gr-eater Shanghai n, Chinese TSooHoml-e-^a^aal,
&-
Movember 19 38* In 1930, another survey showed that 
only 26$ of the total population had been born in 
the city and that of the rest, 40$ had come from 
Kiangsu and 20$ from Chekiang, Statistics of Shanghai, 
1933, loc.cit. Table 5, page 4. In Kuo Heng Shihfs 
factory in Kunming, 30 out of 63 skilled workers had 
come from Shanghai. China Enters the Machine Age, 
loc.cit. page 7.
The scale of migration after 1949
Let us now consider the scale on which migrations 
took place after 1949 and their impact on population 
and labour force changes in urban areas. The only 
national data available state that net rural-urban 
migration during the First Plan period accounted for
8,000.OoG persons which.accounts for 29$ of total
/ n /♦ \
urban population growth during that period' .
Emerson then used this figure tonestimate that 
migration accounted for 44$ of the net addition to 
the urban labour force.
The local data are more specific and interesting 
than this. We estimated in Chapter 2 that in Shanghai 
net migration accounted for 33.6$ of population growth 
between 1949 and 1957 and 17.3$ of the addition to 
the supply of job seekers in the same period. We also 
have data for Canton and Peking. In Canton, migration 
was reported to have accounted for 43$ of total 
population growth and in Peking migrants accounted for
(16} Sung P Ting "Lets discuss the problem of 
employment", op* cit *
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70$ of population growth between 1949 and 1957 
which illustrates our point about the variety of 
China1 s demographic experienced?) „
It seems likely that migrants also played an import­
ant role in the population growth of those cities in 
the North West such as Sian and Lanchow, where popu­
lation growth was particularly rapid.
(17) Estimates for Canton from, "Kwai^ung’s population 
has increased by 31$ in the past seven years", WHF
5.4.1957. Ganton establishes an$ office", WHF 
(Hong Kong), 9.12.1958. "This year 100.000 surplus 
population to be mobilised to return to rural pro­
duction", KOJP 15.2.1958. Peking data from, "The 
urban population must be controlled”, Jlvl’JF 27.11.1957.
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Two features of the data on migration stand out 
as of particular interest. The first, is that although 
the problems of controlling migration received most 
publicity in the years 1955-1957, it was in the period 
1948-1953 that population growth (and probably migration) 
were in fact most rapid d8). The second point arises 
from examination of the Shanghai data. These reveal the 
extent to which net migration flows were the outcome of 
massive gross flows in both directions. For in Shanghai, 
gross immigration was nearly two and a half times as 
great as the final net figure; and the gross addition 
to the labour force was more than four times greater 
than the net addition. This picture of tremendous 
population mobility is confirmed by a remarkable survey 
of population change in three sample residential 
districts in Shanghai in 1954 and 195sd9). This
(18) See column f in Table 22 in Chapter Two,
(19) "Experience and a simple example of the analysis 
of fluctuating population birth rates", TCKT 1957,
No.6, 29.3.1957,
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sux'vey showed that in these two years, 35$ and 43$ 
respectively of the total population were involved 
in migration of some sort. In one area, in 1955, the 
figure was 74$, It Is true that some of this migrat­
ion must have been intra-city movement, but w© can 
surmise from other materials that a great deal of it 
must have involved movement to or from rural areas.
Two conclusions appear warranted by this. First, 
despite the formal imposition of severe restrictions 
on movement, population mobility was probably as high 
in the mid 1950?s ‘as it had been in the Greater 
Shanghai and in the early 1930* Second, if the
authorities had not been able to reverse rural-urban 
flows to the extent that they did, the unemployment 
problem would have been very much more serious than was 
actually the case. In Shanghai it might have been as
(20) For example in 1932 the total number of 
migrations in and out of Greater Shanghai was 672.000 
in a population of 1.580.000, Statistics of 
Shanghai, loc.cit. Table I, page 1 and Table 7, 
page 6,
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high as 1*325*000 whereas in fsot it was only 
estimated to have been 655*000#
The motives for migration
The basic pattern of motivation behind the 
migrations of the 1950Ts was similar to that which 
had operated in the pre-1949 period, except perhaps, 
that the upheavals of rural reorganisation replaced 
war and banditry as the most important non-economic 
factor in the migration decision. Up to 1957, 
seasonal migrations based on the agricultural cycle 
of work and the requirements of the construction and 
other industries, continued as they had always done^-^*
(21) A report fron Anshan in January 1953 indicated 
that the huge migration then taking place was in fact 
an intensification of customary, slack season migrat­
ion, See, ”The PeopleTs Government in Pei Tung county 
should persuade peasants that they ought not to blinglyp 
migrate to the towns”, JMJP 30,1.1953. See also,
”Stop blind migration to the towns”, Fukien Jih Pao 
(Fukien Daily) 24.3#1957, in which the problem of 
stopjoing long established seasonal migrations is 
dis.cussed.
v
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Natural disasters also continued to stimulate movement 
to the urban areas. For example, the influxes of 1954/ 
1955 and 1957, were all related to natural disasters, 
although these combined with other factors toremake 
migrations exceptionally large. One difference between 
migration in response to disasters in the pro and post 
1949 periods, may have been that in the latter, migrations 
initially prompted by disaster, may often have been 
irreversible whereas traditionally, peasants returned 
to the countryside after the catastrophe had subsided^*^.
(22| See, "Concerning the continuance of implementing 
the directive "persuade and prevent blind migration by 
peasants into the cities””, HBFTK 1954 No.4 and "Mobil­
ise peasants from outside to return to the countryside 
and participate in spring ploughing”, CFJT 10.3.1957,
This last article also brings out the way in which nat­
ural disasters, the collectivisation and the income 
attraction of cities could combine to bring about a 
migration decision.
The structural demographic and economic forces 
which encouraged long term migration to the cities 
also showed considerable continuity with those oper­
ating in the 1920Ts and 1950Ts. The problem of 
population pressure on limited supplies of land was 
intensified as health improvements and the limitation 
of infanticide le-a-d to an acceleration of population 
growth. Population growth moreover, not only Ire^ rd to 
pressure on land in rural areas, for there were also 
problems arising out of urban expansion which led$ to 
shortages of agricultural land in the urban suburbs^23 .^
{25} See Table 22 for urban population growth rates. 
Migration was not the only explanation of the high 
rates of urban population growth. Increases in natural 
rates also played an important part in accelerating 
overall rates. The acceleration of natural^in the mid 
1950*s can be seen for example in data for Canton, 
where in 1948, birth and death rates were 2.66$ and 
i5$3$ respectively giving a net growth of 1.15$. For 
the years 1953 to 1956, the figures were 4.1$* #79$ 
and 5.31$ respectively. In Harbin it was reported that
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(23) (ContTd)
the birth rate jumped from 3.5$ to 5.8$ between 1952 
and 1956 and a 1957 survey of cities in Liaoning re­
ported average natural growth rates of 5$. Pre-war 
vital rates are scarce and hard to handle. However 
we do have some data for Manchuria which can be com­
pared with the rates given above. These suggest 
natural rates of about 1$ and 3$ for the periods 
1910-1940 and 1940-1953 respectively. See for Canton, 
"Canton establishes an office”, loc.cit. note 17 and, 
"Last year Canton's population increased by 79.000", 
WHP (Hong Kong) 8.3.1958. For Harbin see, Harbin Jih 
Pao (Harbin naily) 28.12.1956 Manchurian growth rates 
in, Waller Wynne J"r. The Population of Manchuria, op. 
cit. pp. 18-23. Data on Liaoning cities are in, 
"Yiews on some problems in urban const ruction^,! 
Liaoning lih Pao (Liaoning Daily) 7.5.1957.
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A striking example of the effects of urban growth is 
provided by the experience of the city of Foochow.
In the Foochow suburbs at the time of the land reform, 
a population of 115.000 peasants worked 7.040 hectares 
of land. By 1956, the rural population had grown by 
25$ while the arable area had shrunk by 7$ under the 
due to absorption of land for .industrial and residen­
tial use^ 4^ . The data for Shanghai are difficult to 
interpret but the evidence suggests that population 
density in the suburbs more than doubled between 1949 
and 1957. See Table 34- below*
(84) "Develop production and arrange employmentft, 
Fukien Jih Pao 85.5.1957#
1S9-?
Table 54. Land area and -population in. Shanghai 
1949/1950 and 1957
1949/1950 1957
Total land area (hectares) 89.300 65*400
Urban area ” 8.000 11*600
Hural area ” 81*300 53*800
Total nomtlation 5.407*000 7*300*000
Urban population 5*163.000 6.800.000
•Rural “population 345.000 400.000
Overall population
density (men(per hectare) 60 110
Urban population
ea)
density (men/vper hectare) 656 586
Rural population density
Oj)a^ iv\^ hb>s)
(men^per hectare) 3.5 7.4
Sources: Population as Table 11 in Chapter Two. Total
land area in 1949 is from 1949 Shou Ts*e (Handbook for 
1949) (Hong Kong, 1949) , page 6. Other data on areas 
from, Ohang Jui, ”Some views on Shanghaifs population 
and area”, TOP 11*2,1957. *The urban area of Shanghai 
enlarged byhalf”, HWP 8.8.1957.
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The pressure on land was at least «*^partial 
explanation of the increase in landlessness which as 
motive for migration was reported to have been except­
ionally important after the land reform and as a result
of land sales and the general polarisation of wealth
(25)
in rural areas in 1954 and 1955 . It must also have
(25) The effect of the land reform on employment is 
mentioned in the Government tf Decisions on Employment” 
in 1952 (See Chapter Five). The problems of wealth 
polarisation are vividly described by Mao in his report 
on, The Question of Agricultural Collectivisation, re­
printed in Robert R.Bowie and John IC# Fairbank eds. 
Communist China 1955-1959: FQlicy Documents with
Analysis, (Harvard, 1962}, page 103. See also, ftThe 
hungry peasants of Tung Pei and Hua Pei infiltrate the 
cities in search of livelihood”, Tien Wen T fai Pao
hft£K\
(Hong Kong), 19.12.1955. Landlessness found
to be a key to migration in many developing countries, 
see, Wilbert B.Moore, Industrialization and Labour: 
Social Aspects of bJconomic Development, (Cornell) (1951) 
and L.G#Reynolds and P.Gregory, Wages, Productivity and 
Industrialization in Puerto Rico, (Homewood, 1965}*
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Contributed to pressure on rural employment, food and 
income, each of which played an identifiable part in 
pushing peasants towards the cities.
The problems of rural employment require deep and 
separate investigation which we have not been able to 
give them. The evidence for rural unemployment prior 
to 1956, at least of a seasonal variety, is however 
very strong(s^ !, This is not to say that such un­
employment was in any sense inevitable or that the 
unemployed could not have been found productive work.
The opposite was often the case. But prior to 1956, the 
search for employment was one of the most frequently 
given reasons for the rural urban migrations. One
(26) Examples of Analyses of rural employment in 
areas of Horth and South China are, ”Ying Kou County, 
Sung Ktiang District solves the problem of surplus 
labour in agricultural co-operatives”, and- Liaoning 
Jlh Pao 20.11.1954, and ”Where is the outlet for 
surplus labour power”?, NFJP 19.11.1956.
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interesting aspect of this, is that it appears that
attempts at agricultural reorganisation in the early
and mid-1950’s tended to aggravate the problem for we
often find it said that the generation of unemployment
by Mutual Aid Teams and Low Level Cooperatives was one
of the main causes of their instability, and not infre-
{ 27)quently of their total collapse^ '* The problem of
(27} See, ft0vereome the difficulty of grain shortage; 
rationally use surplus labour within the Mutual Aid 
Teams”, Fukien Jih Pao 24.6.1952. ”Chang Chih in Shansi 
uses surplus labour to advance the development of 
agricultural and secondary industry output” CFJP 20.8.1951. 
Articles in Fukien Jih Pao, 26.4.1952 and 23.5,1952.
”Take rural surplus labour and use it for land improve- 
ment ”, Chunking Hsln Ilua Jih Pao (Chunking New China 
Daily), 26,10,1952. ”Seriously regard tad solve the 
problem of surplus labour within the Mutual aid Team”,
Hsin Hunan Pao (New Hunan Daily) 16.4.1954, and ”Stop 
peasants blindly infiltrating cities”, Swatow Jih Pao 
(Swatow Daily) 22.1,1957#
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raecesX unemployment seems to have been particularly 
intractable in the densely populated region of Bast 
China. The Foochow material referred to earlier for 
example, states that some cooperatives in the Foochow 
suburbs had less than *0067 of a hectare per head, with 
the result that the demand for work, (and thereby in­
come) , required an elaborate arrangement for rotation 
of tasks and led to violence among the peasantry*
The role of food and income in stimulating migration 
is predictable. For although there are substantial 
variations in agricultural income in the different 
regions, in many areas, notably the north China plain 
and parts of Bast China, the structural deficiencies 
of agriculture were inevitably refleeted in low incomes 
which were further attenuated by taxation. Apart from 
low incomes, the other factor influencing migration was 
economic uncertainty. Uncertainty id unavoidable in an 
unmechanized agriculture in a country where natural 
catastrophes occur with regularity, but it was accent­
uated in the 1 9 5 0 rs both by variations in taxation 
policy and by collectivisation drives of unpredictable 
outcome.
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Finally, one point that is often overlooked in 
discussion of the material incentives for migration, 
is that income changes, actual and promised, were 
effective causes of both urban immigration and 
emigration. This was particularly the case in the 
years 1955-1957 which we will be examining in more detail 
later. It is certainly noticeable in Shanghai, that 
the good harvest of 1955 and the promise of high 
incomes after the ”High Tide of Collectivisation”, 
greatly facilitated the return of 500.000 peasants 
to the rural areas in mid 1955. Conversely, it was 
the failure of agricultural incomes tonsatisfy the 
expectations of the newly cooperativised peasants 
which in late 1956 and 1957 lead to an uncontrollable 
return to the c i ty^^ ,
(28) In 1955, incomes in Shanghai’s agricultural 
suburbs reportedly rose 56$> on the 1954 levels. At 
the same time large cash and grain incomes were prom­
ised for the post collectivisation period. See, 
Agricultural cooperatives in the City’s suburbs com­
pletely demonstrate their superiority”, HWP 17.1.1957.
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The material push from the rural areas a M  the 
real and apparent economic attractions of the cities 
were by no means the only influences on migration in 
the 19501 s. We have to make allowance also for the 
tremendous impact, particularly on the young, of the 
vision of China*s future which was propagated in the 
early 1950fs, This vision was dominated by the related 
concepts of the Party, the industrial worker and the 
city, and in some ways it confirsted prejudices against 
rural life inherited from the intelligentsia of 
traditional China. By the mid-1950?s the inapprop- 
riateness of this philosophy was realised and the whole
(SB) (Cont*d|
"Letters from peasants who have returned to the 
countryside reporting rural conditions", Lao Tung 
Pao, 10.10.1955, "The new life of the pedicab men",
HWP SO.4.1956. The key role of food availability 
is described in, "In P*eng Lai District more than 
400 unemployed (workers) have returned to rural 
production", HWP 10.8.1955,
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machinery of education and propaganda was mobilised 
to pi’oduee a new and more attractive image of the 
peasant and his role in a transformed rural enviro- 
ment. By this time however, millions had enjoyed 
for themselves the working and recreational amenities 
of urban life and even if their migration could not 
be judged successful by strict economic cx^xteria, 
many perhaps, retained hope of improvement and in­
dulged in self deceptions of a type impossible to 
those subjected to the hax’sh facts of village life, 
but which once expex^ienced in the city, are not easily 
foregone,
The mechanisms of migration
The mechanisms of migrations fall into two 
groups - those pertaining to urban immigration ,and those 
to emigration* The immigration mechanism is the more 
difficult to unravel. The first point to establish is 
that the legal rights of migrants were for most of. our 
period ambiguous. On the one hand there was a clear 
statement in the Constitution of 1954, that citizens 
had the right to choose their place of residence and 
work. This might be called the higher law. Below this
however, residence and employment were subject to a 
mass of specific directives and regulations aimed at 
preventing unwanted migration* This conflict was 
never properly resolved although on many occasions 
would-be migrants appealed against the administrative 
rules whieh impeded their movement, to the higher law 
of the Constitution in which they claimed their freedom 
of movement was guaranteed( *  The answer to such 
appeals, (where one was given), was usually in terms of 
the necessity of constricting lesser freedoms in order 
to protect the higher freedoms of full employment etc*
The administrative rules by which the Government 
tried to stop urban immigration fell into three main 
categories, Ifirst, there were the hu teng ohi
regulations, which, required the population to carry a 
form of identity card which had to be checked and 
approved as part of the procedure for legitimate 
movement* Second, there were the regulations governing
(29) See for example, ,!Is it contrary to the 
Constitution to refuse permission to the rural population 
to come and take up residence in the towns?11 HFJT
28,10.1957, and, nls this lack of freedom of residence?11, 
Rung Jen Jih Pao £6.9*1957*
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changes in employment. And third, by the mid 1950Ts 
there were regulations governing the control of primary 
foodstuffs in the urban areas which were also an 
explicit part of the population control apparatus.
None of these controls could be said to have been 
effective prior to 1958, although it would be incorrect 
to describe them as totally inoperative. The hu kTon 
regulations failed at the rural end because prior to 
1956, cadres were frequently glad to be rid of surplus 
labour and were therefore willing to facilitate migrat­
ion by giving migrants proper papers(^0} when the 
migrant arrived in the city, with or without papers, a 
variety of alternatives were open to him. If he had 
no papers there was a black market in them. Alternative­
ly, an employer or illicit labour broker who was anxious
for labour would either ignore the irregularity or
(31)possibly indulge in falsification himself' } * Failing
(50) This was particularly the case after the rounds of 
agricultural reorganisation prior to 1955.
(31} ^Gheck up and deal with units and personnel who 
privately (illicitly) , hire temporary workers11, Tsi ng 
tao Jih: Pao (Tsing tao Daily) 6.12.1957. Bee also an 
experience described in, Suzanne Labin, La Condition 
Humaine en Chine Qommnniste, 1959, Chapter 12.
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Failing these possibilities, a migrant might remain 
without papers by working for an illicit firm or by 
working on his own account in small scale production 
or services. In the last resort, our migrant might 
simply remain unemployed and live with relatives. The 
tentacles of kinship still stretched far in the 1950*s 
and there is evidence that this was a crucial factor in 
enabling migrants to evade the formalities designed to 
exclude them from the urban areas^^1.
(52) For example surveys of migrants in Harbin, 
Tientsin and Shanghai all showed that the majority 
of migrants were staying in cities with the assistance 
of relatives, (who were often cadres). See, tfThose who 
have come from the country should go back*1, .JH3T
22,5,1957. "Tens of thousands of peasants infiltrate 
the city*11 TKP (Peking) , 5.6,1957. "Stop outsiders 
infiltrating into Shanghai", TOP 21.12.1957.
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The relationship between hu k*ou control and
employment was a close one and the implication of
what we have said above is that there were in urban
areas throughout the 1950*s what may be termed free
and black labour markets. By free, we mean that the
employer had the right to hire without recourse to
the Labour Bureau. By black we mean that even when
this right was theoretically non-existent, employers
were still in fact able to circumvent the official
(33)
hiring procedures. The motive for such hiring was 
that illicitly hired labour was both cheaper and 
more easily dispensed with than labour acquired through 
the offices of the Labour Bureau. Obviously illicit
(33) The official data show an increase of non­
agricult ural employment of 16.000.000 between 1949 and 
1957, of which only 4.000.000 passed through the Labour 
Bureau* Machinery. What proportion of the other
12,000.000 were hired through the free and black markets 
respectively we have no way of knowing. See, "The 
gateway to employment is broad", 3MJP 19*8.1957.
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hiring was particularly easy for firms which had no 
official existence and the problem did not arise in 
the case of illicit self employment - which many 
migrants resorted to. The evidence for labour markets 
of this kind is abundant and is discussed more fully
(34) The sectors where migrant labour entry through 
illicit and free markets were most important, were the 
private sector, illicit small scale manufacturing and 
commerce, transport and the construction industry. See 
for example, "Determined to return to the countryside 
and do agricultural work well", HWP 12.8.1955. "In 
Canton private commerce (enterprises) privately hire 
peasants contrary to government regulations", NPJP 
11.7.1954. In this case employers sacked regular 
workers and replaced them with peasants. "The blind 
peasant infiltration into the cities severely affects 
spring ploughing", JMJP 26.4.1957. "Continue mobilis­
ing blind migrants to Shanghai to return to the 
countryside", HWP 23.7.1957#
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Finally we have to ask: why food control was an
ineffective instrument of population control. We have
to note first that food control was not introduced
until late 1955, and is not therefore relevant to the
migration before that date. After this migrants were
either able to obtain official grain as a result of
lax and liberal grain administration or they circumvented
(55)food control by recourse to free and black markets •
(55) The relationship between food administration and 
migration control was fully recognised. See for example, 
*/Surplus labour in Canton should return to the country­
side", NFJP 5.12.1956. "Mobilise peasant infiltrators 
in the city to return to rural production", JMJP
16.12.1957. An example of grain regulation specifically 
directed against infiltrators is, "Stop completely the 
giving of grain cards to (members of the) rural 
population who have infiltrated into the towns and 
cities", Shansi Jih Pao (Shansi Daily) 28.7.1957.
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The free markets consisted of (a) the markets in
secondary foodstuffs and (b) food sold in restaurants
and canteens where ration coupons were not usually 
{36)required # The black market consisted of foodstuffs 
illicitly marketed by the peasants or by workers and 
staff with rations sufficiently liberal to give them
( g»7 \
a marketable surplus'
(36} This type of food constituted a leakage of 
considerable importance. In Changchun for example,
ISfo of the cityTs grain supply went through restaurants 
and canteens and attempts to control this met with 
resistance. See, "Readjust the work of planned grain 
supply as quickly as possible", Changchun Jih Pao 
(Changchun Daily) 11.1.1957*
(37) Many urban residents,also got hold of grain 
surpluses by fraudulent registration etc.w See,
"(The people of the city) voluntarily reduce their 
grain rations by more than 30.000 chin", Amoy Jih 
Pao (Amoy Daily) 13.1,1957*
** S04-*
Our conclusion is -therefore, that up to 1958 
migration was greatly facilitated by liberal grain 
administration and a group of licit and illicit free 
markets which hung together, and reinforced each other 
in ways that enabled migrants to evade every aspect of 
the Government’s population control endeavour*
Most emigration was the result of official pressure 
and the emigration mechanism was altogether less complex 
as long as the object of emigration was an illicit 
migrant. It usually involved a combination of rigorous 
police check ups; ncampaigns” and propaganda; the 
provision of transport or fares; and liaison work with 
rural authorities to ensure that the prodigal migrant 
was warmly received to his return. The latter problem 
of reintegrating migrants into the rural community was 
a very serious one. In the early 1950Ts migrants were 
often given a little working capital in cash and kind 
but this usually proved an inadequate resource base 
from which to establish economic viability; taking 
these experiences into account, we are convinced that 
the problems of rural repatriation were an important 
factor in explaining the character of the regulations
rt*. 'k-
for Higher Level) Cooperatives. For by comparison with
205-
the regulations for Lower Cooperatives, 4n strict 
limitation of rewards for initial contributions of 
land and capital, greatly facilitated the return to 
the countryside of poor and landless peasants and 
others who the authorities were anxious to clear 
out from the cities^38). It was no accident that 
the High Tide of Collectivisation followed shortly 
after the most massive hsia fang movement of the period 
under study.
(38) The regulations for both higher and lower 
cooperatives stipulate that ex-servicemen, handicraftsmen 
etc. should be admitted. However, the elimination of 
rent payment in the higher stage cooperative was the key 
to making such entry a workable proposition. The Lower 
Stage regulations are in, Chung Hua Jen Min Kung Ho Kuo 
Fa Kuei Hui Fien, (Compendium of Laws and Regulations 
of the Chinese People’s Republic), 1955, No.2, July- 
Dee ember (Peking 1956) pp. 624— 659. The Higher stage 
regulations are in the same series No.5 1956, January 
to June, pp. 292-314.
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The problem of moving bona fide and long standing 
residents out of the cities was difficult because it 
called for a persuasive rather than coercive approach. 
However, persuasion was rarely successful on its own 
and the Government had to rely heavily on campaigns 
for emigration conducted at times when the political 
temperature was high, and people were therefore re­
luctant to lay themselves open to charges of political 
deviation^89). Moreover there is no question that 
in the last resort the authorities were prepared to use 
force to ensure that volunteers for emigration were 
forthcoming(^0).
(39) The 1955 emigration was conducted under the shadow 
of a virulent suppression of reactionaries and coincided 
exactly with the campaign against Hu Feng. The 195?/ 
1958 emigration was conducted in conjunction with the 
rectification campaign which followed the "Hundred 
Flowers*1 movement.
(40) See for example, an extremely frank account of the 
hsia fang movement in the public security department in 
Hunan. Here ffnot a few resisted being moved", and in
-207-
(40) (Cont’d)
one case, "on account of severe revolutionary discip­
line, the Hunan public security office had no altern­
ative but to decide to throw him out", (i.e. the 
recalcitrant lost his job); otherwise, it was report­
ed, "after the organisation of patient persuasion and 
education, they all submitted to assignment", see, "Be 
content with work at the basic levels", JMJP 30.3.1957. 
It should be noted that government persuasion was not 
only applied in cases of urban emigration. In the 
early 1950Ts, in the North Hast, the problem was to 
get skilled workers back from their land into the 
factories. To this end the authorities had to allow 
dispensations to the Land Reform Law which allowed 
enabled factory workers to retain land ownership, 
see, "An enormous increase in the numbers employed in 
the North Hast Region", NFJP 25.9.1952.
Migration and the supply of labour: conclusions
Our main conclusion must be that migration to the 
urban areas intensified structural unemployment. The 
degree to which this was the case can be estimated from 
the Shanghai data, where we suggested that the net 
migrant addition to the supply of job seekers was 220.000 
about 20$ of the total. If we assume for a moment that 
the labour supply was homogenous, we can say that without 
migration, open unemployment would have been more than 
halved.
Apart from open unemployment, migration must also 
be associated with over-manning, or what has been aptly 
named "supply induced employment1 (41) ^ attitude
of the Government to this phenomenon was schizophrenic. 
For, as we shall see later, at times it was encouraged on 
the ground that it alleviated open unemployment, but at 
other times it was condemned because it was said, and 
rightly, that unproductive employees wasted the invest­
ment surplus and thus prejudiced the cumulative growth 
of future
(41) D.C.Mead, Growth and Structural Change in the 
Egyptian Economy, (Yale, 1967), Chapter 6.
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employment . Government campaigns against over-manning 
had considerable short term success, notably in 1950, 
1955 and 1957. But these successes were undermined by 
excessive hiring at other times and it could not be 
said that they solved the proble. By 1958, it was 
realised that a solution would involve far-reaching 
administrative and economic changes as well as a 
reversal of the general preference for urban life.
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Chapter ffour
Employment control in a context of fluctuations
In the last chapter we considered the structural 
determinants of employment. In this, we consider the 
importance of the fact that the context of urban employ­
ment control was one of violent fluctuation.
In Chapter One we outlined urban economic fluctuations 
and’ offered some analysis of them. As we saw, fluctuat­
ions in output were associated with employment change 
and loss of control over the labour market. At that 
stage we emphasized the problem of, control at the peaks 
of activity, and this was the most serious problem. In 
this chapter however, we will also show that control in 
the troughs was not easy either, and in our conclusion, 
we will argue that the consequences of the overall 
failure to control employment were aggravation of 
structural unemployment and the phenomena** of over­
manning.
Letius briefly consider the data of employment 
fluctuations again. At the national level, we have no 
Index of fluctuations of the total urban employment. 
However, the data in Table 55 do offer some indication
-311-
of the intensity of urban employment fluctuation.
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At the national level the series for industrial 
employment is fairly volatile; while construction 
employment fluctuates wildly. .At the local level 
the Shanghai estimate for total employment suggest 
that fluctuations of total employment were much 
weaker than those for industry and construction; 
considered separately*
Apart from Shanghai, we have series indicating 
fluctuations in employment absorption during the 
19501s for the cities of Tientsin and Shenyang. The 
latter series is particularly interesting since it 
shows that fluctuations in employment in Shanghai 
followed a similar course to those in a Manchurian 
city, which in contrast to Shanghai, was za nkey 
pointM city with rapid industrial expansion*
All these seizes generally confirm our view that
(1)
the peaks of urban activity were 1951, 1953 and 1956
(1) It will be noted that Emerson1 s nonagricultural 
employment series does not exactly confirm our view of 
which were the peak years. In particular, the 1956 
estimate of a 1 fo increase in employment bears little
-215-
(1} (GontTd)
relation to the detailed picture of employment change 
in that year which can be constructed from the local 
data. The key to explaining the differences between 
nonagricultural employment and urban employment in 
1956 is in the performance of the traditional non- 
agricultural sectors after the rural and urban collect­
ivisations. In the rural areas, collectivisation ’f&eU 
to curtailment of handicraft activity becattfe the cadres 
in charge of collectives were concerned with increasing 
agricultural output. As one of them pithily put it to 
workers in the handicraft paper industry, "you eat what 
you sow; and if you do not sow grain you will eat 
paper". In the urban areas however the pressure of 
demand for consumer goods generated by high overall 
levels of activity and the wage reform, allowed the 
traditional sector to expand. Moreover, the tradition­
al sector in urban areas benefitted from the partial 
collapse of the rural handicraft sector which had pre­
viously been a competitor. See, "Why has output of 
locally produced paper declined?”, JMJP 11.11.1956. 
"Increase and utilise the output of locally produced
216-
And the data for individual cities further suggest 
that 1956 was a year of altogether extraordinary 
employment absorption, and this is confirmed by
( 2)quantitative and qualitative data for other cities' .
(1) (Oont*d)
iron", TKP (Peking), 31.12.1956. "Some problems 
hindering the development of rural handicrafts",
Tsinghai (Tsinahai Daily) Jih Pao 17.1.1957.
(2) In Anshan, a key. point city, additional employment 
in 1956 accounted for nearly half of total additional 
employment between 1949-1956. In Tsinan, employment 
growth in 1956 was fourteen times that of 1955* In 
Changchun, employment growth in 1956 was twice as high 
as the previous highest year (1955)* See, "The whole 
city basically eliminates unemployment", JMJP 14*8.1956. 
"In Tsinan city 16.000 get employment", LT 1957 No.3.
"In the past year nearly 20*000 people got employment", 
Changchun Jih Pao. 3.1.1957.
-217-
Apart from these series we have a mass of data and 
information which confirm that the years 1951, 1953 and 
1956 were years of urban labour shortage. In 1951, 
skilled and experienced labour was in particularly short 
supply and Shanghai reports also show that shortages ex­
tended well down the skill scale and that the Labour 
Bureau was unable to satisfy employers demands for labour 
of all types Further indications of the tightening
of the labour situation consist of reports of longer 
working hours and increasing work intensity^. In 1953,
(3) The Shanghai Labour Bureau reported that between 
August 1950 and September 1951 they had been able to 
supply less than half of all requests for workers and 
staff of all types. Of this demand, 53% were requests 
for skilled labour. By January 1952, total registered 
unemployment was reported to have fallen to 40.000, 
which compares with a figure of 170.000 in July 1950.
See, "In the last two years (The Labour Bureau) has help­
ed 20.000 workers and staff to find employment", GFJF 
8.11.1951. And, "100.000 unemployed find work", OFJP 
8.1.1952.
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In 1953, employment increased sharply again and there 
is abundant evidence of shortages of skilled and con­
struction labour^. The latter it should be noted,
(4) See for example, "Private clothing factories in 
Wuhan violate labour policy and neglect workers health",
Oh*ana Ohiang Jih Pao 14.11.1951 (SOMP Ho.228). This 
article reported that days of 14-18 hours were being 
worked and that sickness rates etc. were increasing.
(5) For examples of acute shortages of skilled and con­
struction labour in Shanghai, Anshan and Shenyang see,
"The centrally controlled enterprises of the Fir st 
Machinery industry in Shanghai chaotically takes on 
skilled workers in opposition to arrangements for the 
unified distribution (of skilled workers)", CFJP 14.1.1953. 
"The Anshan Labour Bureaux does some research into re­
cruitment work", Tuagnei Jih Pao (North Bast Daily) 
15.3.1953. "Keep in close touch with work areas and 
solve the problem of manpower shortages in basic con­
struction", LT 1953 No.10.
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required physical strength but not necessarily any
previous experience or skill. In 1956, evidence of
labour market tensions overwhelming. The towns
and cities of Shanghai, Harbin, Paotou, Ching Te Chen,
Lanchow, Manpfing, Swatow, Chan Chiang, and the
Provinces of Heilungkiang, Shantung and Chekiang, all
(61reported "full employment"v . Our information on
(6) "The situation in wage and labour work", QFJP
18.8.1956. "The cityTs wage reform work can be basic­
ally completed by the end of the month", Harbin Jlh 
Pao 25.10.1956. "Paotou eliminates unemployment",
Nei Mengku Jih Pao (Inner Mongolia Daily) 26.10.1956 
(SCMP 1434.). "The unemployment phenomenon has been 
basically eliminated in Ching Te Ohen "Kiangsi Jih
Pao (Kiangsi Daily) 31.12.1956. "Lanchow has basically 
eliminated unemployment", Chung Kuo ChT ing Nien Pao
2.8.1956. "The unemployment phenomenon in Nan PTing 
has been basically eliminated", Fukien Jih Pao 9.8.1956. 
"The unemployed of Swatow are now all in employment", 
NFJP 4.9.1956. "All the unemployed in Chan Chiang now 
in employment", NFJP 20.7.1956. "Actively solve and
Shanghai confirms that this demand extended through
every dimension of the urban economy, encompassing the
entire skill range and all the main industrial and
(7)transportation sectors' .
(6) (Cont,d)
correctly understand some remaining workers livelihood 
problems", Heilunaohiang Jih Pao 15.11.1956. "The 
unemployed in shantung all get employment", Kuna Jen 
Jih Fao 13.9.1956. "No unemployment in Ghekiang",
if"
NONA 27.7.1956 (SCMF 13$L).
(7) Labour shortages were reported in the heavy, text­
ile, construction and transport industries* See, 
’report on the implementation of the National Five Year 
Flan in Shanghai”, CffJ? 11*8.193$* "Some views on 
local heavy industry work:”, CffJF 12.8.1956. "Develop 
the potential of Shanghaifs textile industry”, QFJP 
13*8.1956. fhere was also a national shortage of high 
school graduates. Only 30$ of requests by departments 
for graduates could be met in 1956, see "Contradiction 
in the supply and demand for university graduates”,
CFJP 2.6*1957* It should be emphasized that labour 
shortages in 1956 extended right through the skill as
-221-
The evidence suggests that throughout the,1950*s 
these fluctuations were an important factor in under- 
mining the formal hiring mechanism and making employ­
ment control impossible, although we must qualify this 
immediately by saying that official procedures were 
themselves in a constant state of flux, so that what 
was violated was not so much a fixed set of rules, as 
the Labour Bureaux1 ideal of a labour market in which 
all hiring was either arranged through the Bureaux, or 
at least subject to approval and knowledge^  •
(7) (Gont1dj
well as the industry spectrum. For example, the 
situation in transport was so desperate that it was 
reported that boys were being hired to pull carts.
See, HWP 1G.8.19S6.
(8) The evolution of the official hiring mechanism 
is described in Chapters Five and Six.
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Prior to 1958, this proved impossible* Throughout 
the whole of our period, hiring eontinued without Labour 
Bureaux approval or knowledge^). Mechanisms for such 
hiring were described briefly in the last Chapter 
licit and illicit free labour markets* It is possible 
however, even within these categories to differentiate 
many different types of hiring; since any act of hir­
ing had four elements* These were, (a) the status of 
the hix^ ed person (i#e* whether he was a legitimate 
urban resident with proper employment papers or not}
(b) the status of the hiring employer (i.e. whether 
the hirer was a legitimate enterprise or not) (cj; the 
status of the hired man after hiring (i.e. whether or 
not he was made a permanent or temporary member of the 
labour force and whether, if his initial status was 
questionable, he was !tlegitimisedn) and (d) the role 
of the Labour Bureau in the act of hiring* In addition 
to the permutations made possible by these distinctions,
(9) Although employment surveys enabled the authorities 
to catch up with the situation from time to time.
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there was the additional possibility of self-employed 
persons entering (and leaving) the urban labour force*
For our purposes however there were three crucial dis­
tinctions in hiring. First there was hiring in which 
the Bureau acted as an intermediary;-er second there was 
hiring specifically tolerated by the Bureau and third 
there was hiring of which the Bureau knew nothing, and 
of which had it known, it would have disapproved. The 
latter would usually have been illegal in the strict 
sense^^. Types (b) and (c) correspond to the free
(10) The status of the hired and hirer is crucial to 
the distinction between free and black hiring. Black 
market hiring involved either an illicit enterprise or 
an employee who had left his previous employment without 
permission or who was an illegal migrant. Only on com­
paratively rare occasions was hiring of legitimate 
workers by legitimate enterprises contrary to regulations. 
It may have been contrary to the wishes of the Labour 
Bureau, but in practice official tolerance of a degree 
of freedom in the labour market left loopholes. The main 
problem from the Bureau*s point of view was that freedom-
— 22 4—
and black markets respectively* The relative importance 
of these types of hiring is difficult to ascertain* 
However, we do know that of the additional 16.000*000 
persons who were reported to have entered the non- 
agricultural labour force between 1949 and 1957, only 
4.000*000 went directly through the Labour Bureau. The 
share of the free and black markets respectively is hard 
to judge^1^* But we do know that the black markets, 
often supplied by migrants, were particularly
(10) (Oont1d)
designed to facilitate absorption of urban unemployed 
was often used to hire peasant migrants, on occasions 
illegal hirers were severly punished in the Courts, see 
for example, ^Illegal capitalists Yin Ghih Hsien and Ku 
Wei Jen are given prison sentences”, CFJ3? 24*11.1954*
(11) See, rtThe way to employment is broad”, JMJP 
19*8.1957. For Shanghai we estimate that over half of 
the gross addition to employment passed through the 
Labour Bureau* See Information in the city report for
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important in the private sector, construct! on, trans-
port and small scale production and commerce^3*2) #
(11) (Gont*d)
1958, WHP 14.6.1959* It is difficult to estimate 
free and black market shares of the remainder# But 
the black market was substantial.
(12) The role of capitalists in the black market was 
particularly important in 1954 and 1955. See, "An 
illegal capitalist severly contravenes labour policy”,
LT 1955 No.10. (Among other crimes this man gave peas­
ants false documents). Also, "Implement the labour employ­
ment policy of combining official placing with finding 
jobs by onefs own efforts", CffJP 28*6.1954. (SQMP 984). 
This article stated that capitalists were "exploiting the 
suitably reduced scope of unified labour distribution". 
After the socialization in 1956, smaller scale auton­
omous enterprises replaced capitalists as dealers in 
black market labour.
Please turn over... -226-
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The implication of black and licit free markets 
in labour is that the formal planning machinery for 
labour was at least partially inoperative - and a basic 
reason for this, was toleration of a planning system in 
which centrally managed enterprises, locally managed 
enterprises and the private sector in effect competed 
among themselves in localised labour markets without 
being subject to any effective supervision. In theory, 
this supervision was the responsibility of the Labour 
Bureaux which had been set up in 1950 with elaborate 
administrative structures and detailed specification 
of tasks. But in practice, lack of information, the 
failure to demarcate areas of authority and the except­
ionally inadequate provision of administrative resources 
to labour work limited the effectiveness of the formal 
system^13). Thus even in Shanghai, where labour planning
(13) The classic account of the deficiencies of labour 
administration is, "A summary of the experience of 1956; 
reform labour and wage work", GHOQ No.8. 1957. This 
article explained how the planned increase of 840.000 
workers and staff had become an actual increase of 
2.300.000. The main point being that labour planning
-228'
was relatively advanced, in 1957 less than 4Q# of the 
labour force came within the City's Labour HLaa^*^ *
(IS) (Oont’d)
machinery had never been set up in many towns and 
enterprises. Lven where there was machinery, as we 
saw in Shanghai, it could not cope with such a fast 
moving situation as existed in 1956. Other evidence 
confirms that even where labour cadres were appointed 
in enterprises, they were often of a low ealibre or 
lacking in experience. See for example the case of 
the cadre who worked in eleven different occupations 
in five years before finally moving in to labour work* 
"Don't make us like ball bearings", LT 1956 No*10. 
Also, "How to make a realistic labour plan", LT 1953 
NO.12*
(14) Of the rest we estimate that not more than 15# 
would have been covered by plans for the central min­
istries. This is based on the assumption that 50# of 
the public sector in 1955 was centrally controlled and 
remained so until August 1957. If anything this is an
-229-
aiven this administrative weakness it is not 
surprising that under the pressure of sharp fluctu­
ations, the Labour Bureaux control over hiring was 
always weak and periodically collapsed altogether*
And indeed, the evidence shows the connection between 
the two phenomena quite clearly* When the economy 
was expanding rapidly, the Labour Bureaux were unable 
to meet demand for labour and the problems of control­
ling even limited sections of the labour market 
multiplied as alternative employment opportunities 
opened in every direction. The result was that illicit 
hiring accelerated^) ♦
(14) (Cont'd)
over estimate. See, "Report on the 1956 Budget out­
turn in Shanghai and the draft estimates for 1957",
HWP 28.8.1957 and the State Statistical Bureau 1955 
Survey of workers and staff in 1955, in HBFIK 1957 
No.2* pp. 87-89*
(15) For 1951 see, "Recruitment of workers and job 
jumping are serious problems in Shanghai", QFJP 11.10.1951
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But in 1956, the Shanghai Bureau at least accepted the 
inevitable;1* actually relaxed hiring procedures and 
allowed workers and hie ers to act freely in the labour
(15) (Oontfd)
(SGMF 212). For 1953, "The phenomena** of wild hiring 
and the blind enlargement of the labour force is deve­
loping", QFJP 24.1*1953. Many similar articles appeared 
in the press from January 1953 onwards. The volume of 
free and black market hiring in 1956 can be judged from 
the excess recruitment in that year. See above note 13* 
Illicit hiring by autonomous enterprises was already 
accelerating by late 1956, A very interesting survey 
of the origins of the labour force in a sample of illicit 
enterprises is, "See the problems of individual handi­
craft development from (the experience of) a few cities", 
TKP (Peking), 16*2.1956. This showed that 18.4# of the 
labour force were peasants, 39# were women and other of 
no previous occupation, 25# were persons left unemployed 
after the socialization of commerce and industry, 15# 
were unemployed workers and other minor categories acc­
ounted for the remainder.
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market Other factors which contributed to the
breakdown of labour administration in the booms were 
the existence of high levels of demand for consumption 
good*-which made entry into small scale activity easy and
(16) in 1951, labour planning was so primitive that 
the control effort consisted of trying to stop unauth­
orised movement between Cities, provinces and the 
Greater Administrative Areas. See, "The temporary 
regulation of the Labour Bureau of the Central People1s 
Government concerning the hiring of workers and staff in 
all areas1*, LT No# 11 1951. In 1953, the major effort 
was to control of hiring, but apart from construction 
the results were not very good. in 1956, the relaxation 
of hiring rules was announced by the Shanghai Labour 
Bureau chief in August. See, QFJP 18.8.1956. The 
difficulty of controlling even part of the labour force 
in a context of full employment is described in, 
"Employment must gradually be solved according to the 
needs of the country", CFJF 28.10.1956. The most 
spectacular example of private hiring in 1956 which we 
have found is the experience of Szechuan Province, where
-* 2 32-
prof it able; and also the fact that private sector bouy- 
anoy often enable capitalists to attract workers from 
the public sector with high wages#
The failure to control hiring was not confined to 
the boom years. It was also noticeable in 1954/1955 
and in 1957* There are two explanations for this.
First, when economic activity was depressed,
(particularly 1954 and 1955), the Labour Bureaux found 
themselves saddled with administrative responsibility 
for an unemployment problem which they could really do 
nothing to alleviate. No possible change in labour 
administration could affect the demand for labour, 
and the administrative machinery for finding work for the 
unemployed was not very effective in periods when jobs 
were hard to find. Therefore the Bureaux1 reaction was 
to retain, and indeed tighten, control over key 
sectors of the labour force (skilled and construction
(16) (Conttd)
in six months 311.142 persons were illicitly hired.
See, "The phenomenon of private hiring and snatching 
in Szechuan is very serious", LT 1956 No.12.
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workers) while at the same time tolerating a substant­
ial degree of freedom, in the labour market. In other 
words the Bureaux encouraged the growth of a lioit
(17)
free labour market . Illicit labour markets were
also important in years of depression, and they
appear to have been highly organized on the demand 
(18)side . The evident ability of illegal labour
(17) See the revised regulations for hiring discussed
ci'in (Five* In 1957 a degree of freedom, in the labour 
market was a concomitant of allowing a limited free 
market in products. It should be noted however, that 
official toleration of free labour markets did not 
legalise black ones. 'Even the most liberal relaxation 
of free markets scarcely ever allowed the hiring of 
pea sants.
(18) The scale of the black market in 1955 is indic­
ated in an article which described the activities of a 
labour broker who hired 3.200 workers to go to Wuhan, 
drawing on such diverse areas as Shanghai, Honan, Hunan 
and Sichuan. See, “Correct the phenomenum of chaotic 
hiring of personnel”, LT 1955 No. 12. Brokers and 
enterprises were reported to be very active again in
brokers and unscrupulous enterprises to operate on a 
big scale is probably explained by the fact that they 
were dealing in a buyers’ market. Lack of employment 
absorption in the slack years must have made workers 
willing to take risks (and if necessary lower wages), 
in the illicit labour market rather than remain unem­
ployed. On the employers’ side, the motive for hiring 
illicitly was that labour acquired this way was dis- 
pensible, and cheap^1^ *
(18) (Contfd)
1957. For example 17.000 peasants were illicitly hired 
by brokers from sixteen countries in Anhui after the 
publication of the new ruling prohibiting such reg­
ulations. See, "Take severe measure to prevent 
private hiring of temporary workers*, Anhui Jih Fao 
18.12.1957. In Tsinan there was a regular market 
at 6 a.m. every morning on the outskirts of the city,
a T u k \
where to the/invitat-i-on of the urban unemployed, 
enterprises recruited up to 500 peasants a day* See, 
*The free market in labour must be eliminated*, Tsinan 
ffth Fao (Tsinan Daily) 9.1*1958.
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To summarize, our argument is that acute fluct­
uations in the urban economy were a crucial factor in 
the inability of the Labour Bureaux to control or even 
keep informed of, hiring in the labour market. For 
neither at the peaks or troughs could the Bureaux 
perform their functions effectively. At the peaks they 
could not satisfy demand for labour rapidly enough, and 
in the troughs, they did not constitute an efficient 
mechanism for distributing unemployed job seekers 
among such opportunities as were available#
Violent fluctuations of employment and the failure 
of the Labour Bureaux to control hiring had serious 
consequences for overmanning and structural employment# 
During periods of economic upsurge, the labour force 
expanded to a size greater than could be justified by 
the short term growth prospects of the urban economy; 
so that when the growth rate subsided again a high 
proportion of the additional workers and staff were found
(19) Wage costs were not necessarily lower but the 
savings on labour insurance and amenities could be 
substantial*
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to be unnecessary# This problem was aggravated by the 
extraordinary speed of the upsurges because this lead 
to the phenomenon of quantity/quality substitution in 
the labour force. When labour requireaients increased 
very rapidly, there were shortages not only of highly 
skilled labour, but of labour with any experience at 
all# Such shortages could often be ameliorated by 
substituting for the skilled workers and staff, large 
numbers of less skilled personnel. The evidence for 
this sort of process is substantial. But of course, 
within quite short periods of time the j&ill level of 
the new recruits rose, which, combined with a slacken­
ing of the growth rate of the urban economy, resulted 
in redundancies. If it had been possible to sustain 
the rate of growth achieved in the good years, the 
problem of overmanning would not have arisen; there 
would simply have been a continuous flow of raw re­
cruits as in the early "Russian plans. But in a 
context of fluctuation, the quantity/quality substit­
ution mechanism was bound to lead to periodic crises of 
o v e r m a n n i n g .
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(20) The pressure on the traditional, intermediary 
sectors must have accentuated the rawness of the 
recruits absorbed into industry and construction in 
the pe ak years. Examples of the use of disproport­
ionate numbers of low skilled workers and cadres and 
consequent declines in productivity are, "Some views 
on solving the problem of skilled labour shortage”,
LT 1954 No.II# "Report on the Shanghai budget out­
turns for 1956 and the draft estimates for 1957",
HWP 28.8.1957. This report particularly mentioned the 
lowering of productivity in the textile industry. 
Depressed levels of activity in this sector prior to 
1956, had resulted in failure to recruit new workers 
for training. So that in the upsurge of 1956 thousands 
of totally inexperienced workers had to be taken on 
to complete tasks. It is significant that a survey of 
Shanghai industrial enterprises showed that on average, 
employment increased in 1956 by 24.6$. But the increase 
in skilled workers was only 17.36$ compared with a 
257.83$ increase in apprentices. See, "Some problems in 
the increase of workers and staff in ShanghaiTs indust­
rial enterprises in 1956", TGKT 1957 No.15. At the 
level of administration the quantity/quality mechanism 
was equally important. As some cadres put it, "The
*258-
Had tHe excessive intakes of labour in 1951, 1955 
and 1956, been easily reversible, the problem would not 
have been so serious but they were not. It is true 
that temporary staff could be got rid of; some new 
female participants in the labour force be persuaded to 
go back to their homes; and migrants in illicit employ­
ment could be rounded up and returned to the country­
side^)# But apart from these groups, there were large
(20) (Gontfd)
skill level of our cadres is very low, therefore it is 
always good to have large numbers of them”. See, 
"Conscientiously do the work of reorganisation and the 
setting up of a simplified administrative structure”,
(Peoplefs Baily editorial), CffJF 18.4.1955. Growth of 
skill in the construction labour force and its employ­
ment consequences in the bad years of 1954 and 1955 is 
discussed in, ”We must understand the changing labour 
situation in the light of production requirements”,
LT 1955 No*8.
(21) The role of temporaries in the labour force was 
of some importance. Employers liked them because they
4numbers taken on as permanent employees or converted 
from temperary to permanent status who could not be 
removed except by extra legal measures^22^*
(21) (Cont*d)
were often Inexpensive and could be dispensed with if 
necessary* The temporary workers themselves were 
bitterly hostile to employers, who often, even after 
years of temporary work would not make them permanent♦ 
See, "From where do temporary workers get supplementary 
grain?* Shenyang Jih Fao 18*2,1957. "Critizise the 
thought and practice of discriminating against temporary 
workers", Changsha Jih Pao (Changsha Bally) 18*5.1957# 
^The views of a temporary transport worker", Kiangsi 
Jih Pao 3,8.1956, "Temporary workers should not be 
discriminated against", Kung Jen Jih Fao 15.8,1956.
(B2| In 1956, labour shortage had resulted in 840.COG 
workers being made permanent for employers found that 
their temporaries would go elsewhere if they were not 
made up. The authorities showed awareness of the 
dangers of this trend and tried to halt it, but without
i
success. See, "Hew workers become permanent very
**34Q**
Persuasion could be tried but was naturally resisted, 
not only by the workers, but often by managements who 
were anxious to hold reserves of trained labour against 
the day when the authorities might again place enormous 
and sudden demands upon them^^*
(33) (Gont* d)
quickly”, QFJP 14*9.1956f and ”Xt is not possible to 
make all temporaries into permanent workers”, Changchun 
Jih Pao 33,1(*1957*
(23) For example, in mid-1955, shanghai managers 
resisted the transference of workers to other cities. 
See, ”Send even more workers to participate in key 
point construction on a basis of rotation”, JMJP 
4.5*1955*
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The effect of fluctuations on structural unemploy­
ment was also serious, since the upswings implied urban 
employment opportunities, licit and illicit, for the 
rural work force. The upswing of 1953 for example, ledl* 
directly to an acceleration of rural-urban migration and 
in 1956, the city authorities were themselves urgently 
recruiting temporary labour in the rural areas. When 
the booijis subsided many of these workers found themselves 
unemployed, but were reluctant to return to the rural 
areas. They therefore lingered on in the city as un­
productive additions to urban costs.
So far, our analysis has largely been in terms of 
the urban labour force as a whole. In conclusion how­
ever, it is worthwhile pointing out the special import­
ance of the construction industry in these problems, 
since as we shall see later, the attempts to control the 
labour force of this industry were to have far reaching 
consequences for all labour planning.
The construction labour force was reported to have 
grown from 200.000 in 1949 to 1.900.000 in 1957; its 
average size in these years was 1.479.000 and it reached 
a peak in 1956, when the force totalled 2.951.OQO^^).
- 24:2-
rhis does not reprosent a large construction force for 
w country the size of Ohina undergoing rapid growth 
and in absolute terms, it is not much larger than the 
force of 1.000.000 full time construction workers est­
imated to have been working in China in the 19th 
{S5)Century . However, the strategic role of construct­
ion in the economic plans of the 1950?s and the special
(24) The measurement of the construction labour 
force presents very difficult problems# See Emerson* 
Nonagricultural Employment* pp# 149-150#
(25) Ohung-Iii Qhang, The Income of the Chinese Gentry# 
(Seattle 1962) page 314n. The rapid growth of the 
construction industry labour force in Ghina paralleled 
that of the USSR during its First Plan. However, the 
size of the Ghinese force, relative to total population, 
was considerably smaller. Soviet data for 1929, 1952 
and 1937 appear in Harry Schwartz, Russia*s soviet 
Economy« 1954, page 521.
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problems found to be associated with construction 
fluctuations, gave management of the construction 
labour force a very important place in labour admin­
istration.
The severity of the employment fluctuations in 
construction can be judged from the series in Table 
55. And when considering this and its implications, 
it has to be remembered that these annual fluctuations 
overlaid, and on occasion intensified^ the seasonal 
fluctuations dictated by the character of construction 
work. For example, in Fukien, construction workers 
were normally active on wwmfp 160 days of the year and 
since most of these days fell in the second half of 
the year, during the first half there tended to be a 
labour excess compared with labour shortage in the 
second .
(26) See, ,TDevelop production and arrange employment11, 
Fukien ,Tih Pao, 25.5.1957. A national survey suggested 
that average utilisation of the construction labour 
force was 69$. See, LT 1955 No.8 op.cit note 20. See 
also, ^Construction work in danger of delay difficultiesn 
CFJP 22.3.1953.
24 : 4: * *
This context of fluctuation set up tremendous 
tension in labour force management. On the one hand 
there was pressure on enterprises to minimise their 
labour costs, and given a fluctuating volume of work, 
this was most easily done by maintaining a high labour 
turnover and a high proportion of temporaries in the 
labour force. This in turn, /Nthis reliance on workers 
with sources of income other than construction work 
usually from agriculture.^*7  ^ On the other hand, the 
long term strategy of the Labour Ministry was to build
(87) In Ghangcjiun for example, where 70$ of the basic 
construction labour force were temporaries, 30$ of 
these also worked in agriculture and a further 30$ had 
other sources of income, see Changchun Jih Pao 83.10*1957* 
In Hangchow in 1955, 70$ of the construction force was 
reported to own land, See, '’Important work in labour 
assignment”, LT 1955 No*8*
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up a stable construction work force which would have
rising skill levels. Such a labour force would have
no place for temporary workers from agriculture and
would not therefore constitute a direct and easy road
(28)
for illicit rural-urban labour transfer  ^ * How
this conflict developed and was handled will be dis­
cussed in the next Chapter,
(28) A survey in Tientsin for example, showed that 
nearly half of the temporary construction work force 
were illicit migrants. LT 1955, o.p. cit# note 20#
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CHAPTER FIVE
Employment Policy and Administration: Part I 1949-1955
Introduction
In this chapter and the next we shall analyse 
the development of employment policy and administrat­
ion between 1949 and 1957. This is best done by the 
historical method, since there is no other way in 
which it is possible to bring out the interactions 
between the basic problems of urban labour absorption 
and control and the policies and institutions designed 
to solve them. These interactions were complex and in 
following them through one comes to appreciate th&t ;■ 
prior to 1957 at least, not only is it difficult to 
identify with certainty the official regulations and 
administrative practices governing the labour market 
at any one point in time, but it is also impossible 
to consider Chinese labour laws and practices as con­
stituting a stable or coherent system; for as we 
shall see, the search for solutions to basic problems 
led to continuous change in policies and institutional 
rules, which changes themselves led to new problems 
(or put old ones in new forms), thus stimulating
further thinking and rule change etc. The fact that 
there is a limit to the number of feasible variations 
in most of the rules governing labour market adminis­
tration explains the circularity which is evident in 
the process of institutional evolution which we shall 
be examining.
Our analysis will be concerned with employment 
work at two levels. The first is that of overall 
policy making and the second, that of labour adminis­
tration at the local level. This latter is largely 
the work of the Labour Bureaux, but also includes the 
work of other departments concerned with economic 
administration and population control. The context of 
overall employment policy was analysed in Chapter One 
and the specific context of labour administration - 
structural unemployment and violent fluctuation, was 
analysed in Chapters Three and Pour.
It is hoped that although our method is historical, 
our results will be of more than historical interest.
Por what we are analysing is the way in which pursuit of 
basic economic objectives, ImoU the Chinese from toler­
ance of a virtually free labour market, through a series 
of policy cycles to the establishment of a group of
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institutions designed to give the state complete and 
direct control over population movement and employment 
decisions. When one considers the scale of China’s 
urban labour market; the paucity of the resources 
available to administer it; and the precedent of 
Russian failures in labour control, the bid to achieve 
total control seems extraordinarily ambitious. In 
these chapters we shall try and explain why it was that 
by the end of 1957, there seemed to be no alternative 
to this which was both economically reasonable and 
politically acceptaole#
1949-1958: The underlying view; The establishment of
the Labour Bureaux; The immediate problems.
On April the 84th 1945, Mao addressed the Seventh 
Party Congress on the question of "Coalition Government,f. 
This was a crucial moment for the Party which was then 
exploring the possibility of post war collaboration with 
the Kuomintang, and in his opening address, Mao spelt 
out his ideas for the development of China after the 
conclusion of the civil war. The speech is unusual in 
Chinese communist literature in that it is focussed 
neither on immediate issues nor on eschatological visions 
of the remote future. Power was approaching and what was
needed was a working view of the medium term. This 
Mao provided* We are concerned herewwithone small 
section of the speech, that dealing with the agrarian 
question. In this section Mao said, "The peasants are 
the future industrial workers of China and tens of 
millions of them will go into the cities. For if 
China wants to construct large scale, indigenous indust­
ry and to huild a great number of large, modern cities: 
then sh<s will have to undergo a long process of transform­
ation in which the rural population become residents 
of the cities". There is much in this speech which 
might be interpreted as tactical, but one can see no 
reason for thinking that this applies to the sentence 
quoted above* On the contrary, it seems to us to 
express MaoTs genuine conviction and to be the key to 
an understanding of employment policy in the early 
1950Ts. For it was this expectation that industrial 
growth and the development of socialist Institutions 
would combine to eliminate unemployment and secure 
continuous rural-urban labour transfer, that underlay 
employment policy up to mid-1955^#
(1) Mao Tse Tung, Hsuan Qhi (Collected Works) (Peking,
^250^
The directives on the establishment of the Labour
Ministry and its network of subsidiary Bureaux were
published in May 1950, although in Shanghai at least,
prior to that date labour work had been done by the
old Kuomihtang Labour Office which had been taken over
(2)and allowed to continue operation' ♦ The directive 
gave detailed instructions on the administrative 
structure of the Ministry at the Provincial, Municipal 
and lower levels and some account of its functions and
(1) (Gont'd)
1964), page 1078. It is interesting to note that in 
1949 it was even being said that mechanisation with 
publicly owned means of production could not lead to 
unemployment; the argument being that with state 
control, mechanisation could simply be used to reduce 
hours worked. See, A Hundred Questions About The 
Labour Movement. (In Chinese), 2nd. ed., (Peking, 1950) 
page 69.
(2) CffJP 15.12.1949.
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powers, These were further elaborated in a speech
by the Minister of Labour, Li Li San, in a speech
(5)to the heads of the new Labour Bureaux' .
The main work: of the Bureaux, as defined in the 
directives, was: (a) to oversee the implementation
of labour policy and administrative laws; (b) arbitrate 
disputes; (c) participate in the drafting of 
collective contracts (which governed wages, conditions 
etc,); (d) assist in the implementation of wage policy
(3) The directives and Li Li SanTs speech are in, 
Economic Regulations for Bast China, op.cit, Vol.2, 
pp. 1678-1689. Li Li San was the author of the famous 
f!Li Li San line" who was removed from the Party leader­
ship in 1930. He was Minister of Labour until 1954 
when Ma Wen Jui took over. Ma appears to have dis­
appeared in the Cultural Revolution. See, Donald Klein, 
"The State Council and the Cultural Revolution", The 
China Quarterly No.35, July-September, 1968, page 82.
It is a reflection on the status of labour work that 
both Ministers have been politically insignificant.
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and (e) do insurance, safety, education and unemployment 
work. Departments and committees relevant to these 
operations were to be set up and the Bureaux were to 
work in the private as well as the public sector.
Although the Bureaux’ functions were comprehensively 
defined, their powers seem to have been more limited and 
indeed, it is hard to define exactly what they were.
This lack of clearly defined authority was to be of 
great practical consequence in our period since it was 
one of the prime causes of the Bureaux’ ineffectiveness. 
In theory the Bureaux were given three main powers.
These were powers to inspect all aspects of labour ad­
ministration; to obtain statistics relevant to labour 
matters and third; to make "proposals". Any proposals 
made were to be treated with "serious consideration" 
by managements and "where possible", implemented. The 
phrase "where possible" of course, takes much of mean­
ing out of the other rights of intervention and in the 
event of outright refusal by managements to implement 
suggestions, the directive simply stated that the matter 
should be referred to higher (unspecified) levels.
Li Li San’s speech is useful because it gives an 
indication of the intentions that lay behind the bare
rules of administrative law. He brought out two 
fundamental points. The first was that the Ministry’s 
tasks were primarily concerned with workers welfare*
He emphasized that the transformation of the economic 
status and welfare of the Chinese workers would take a 
long time and that it would be the duty of the Labour 
Bureaux to supervise the details of this gradual chaimge.
In particular, the Bureaux had to watch the behaviour 
of capitalists and their managers to ensure that the 
limits of exploitation, which was technically still to 
be tolerated (with the toleration of the private sector) , 
were carefully controlled. The second point of emphasis 
In Li Li San’s speech was the importance of the work of 
mediation. Immediately after the Liberation in 1949, 
workers behaviour verged 0 1 1 anarchy and this decline in 
labour discipline had serious consequences for output 
and price stability. In particular the attack on 
capitalists (which had union backing) was a major factor 
in the collapse of the private sector. Li Li San stated 
that it was the Bureaux’ job to mediate in these conflicts 
between Labour and Capital, which in the context of 1950, 
implied that the Bureaux were to come to the defence of
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the capitalists . Mediation was nd>t confined to 
work in the private sector. In the public sector the 
Bureaux were to mediate between workers and management; 
and in practice it would seem that the role assigned to 
them in the public sector was almost exactly the same 
as that assigned by Lenin to the Trade Unions in Russia 
They were to be a bulwark against the Inroads of an 
inefficient and unjust bureaucracy(.
(4) Mediation work had previously been done by the 
Unions; but the impartiality which the work required 
lead to worker dissatisfaction which undermined the 
usefullness of the Unions as Mass Organizations. See, 
"The Report of the Ministry of Labour of the Central 
People’s Government", LTNo.3, duly 1950.
(5) Isaac Deutscher, The Soviet Trade Unions,
(London, 1950), Chapter 2.
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The main point to notice in ail this is that 
nowhere does Li Li San or the directives emphasize 
that the Labour Bureaux would be expected to engage 
in labour planning and control; although even prior 
to their formal establishment, they were in fact ad­
ministering a directive on the hiring of temporary 
workers, and in Manchuria, were involved in manpower 
planning^}. Of course the general terms of reference 
were very broad and the definition of the Bureaux wage 
function implied some form of planning; but basically, 
control of employment was only introduced through the 
back door of unemployment administration - which itself 
was considered an aspect of welfare work.
(6) The Shanghai variant of the regulation is in 
Economic Regulations for 'East China Vol. 2. op. pit. 
pp. 1717-1718* Details of the 1950 and 1951 plans in 
Manchuria are in LT, January 1951 No.6. These plans 
were drafted in consultation with the North Bast 
Regional Government’s Ministry for Industry and it is 
probable that the latter provided most of the expertise.
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Unemployment was in fact one of the immediate 
tasks facing the Bureaux, for in early 1950 unemploy­
ment rose sharply under the impact of drastic budgetary 
measures. These measures included a programme of man­
power "simplification" in public sector industry and 
government organs which added to the unemployment 
effects of the squeeze on the private sector^. The
seriousness of the problem was recognised and reflected 
in speeches by Mao, Chou and Chen Tun. In Shanghai., 
where the situation was aggravated by renewed hostilities 
the labour situation was described as "tense* and mayor 
Chen Ti said that he regarded unemployment as "the most 
serious problem at present confronting the People’s 
G o v e r n m e n t " ,
(7} The "simplification" drives were started in 1949, 
but until the budgetary cuts were made in early 1950 they 
were probably not very effective. See, "Rely on the 
workers to simplify structure", QffJP 29*,7*1949 and 
"Develop the simplification movement", OFJP 12*8.1949.
(8) Mao Tse Tung Wei Cheng Gh’u Kuo Ohia Ts’ai Oheng Ching 
Ghi Ghi Pen Hao Pien Brh Tou Oheng (struggle for a Basic
*' 257"*
At the level of general policy, the Government 
attempted to relieve the situation by slackening the 
budgetary-squeeze and by specific measures to encourage 
the expansion of the private sector* The Government 
also affirmed its decision to keep on in employment 
3 millions persons in public administration and 
education, even where there was no work for them and 
not to demobilise the Kuomin-Tang armies. Underlying 
these measures there was $he confidence that employment 
difficulties were a short term, transitional problem 
which would disappear under the impact of general 
economic advance and we find that theorists at this 
time were still arguing that one of the main purposes 
of the Land Reform was to release rural labour for the
(8) (Gont’d)
Improvement in Our National Boonomv and Finances) 
(1950)* Chou Bn Lai was responsible for the 1950 
directives published in, HHYF 1950 No#7# page 556*
Chen Yif s speech is in, OffJP 30.7.1950.
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t o w n s #
In addition to these general measures there were 
directives on unemployment. These stipulated that most 
of the relief grain was to be given in the form of wages 
for public works and capital for the establishment of 
small scale producing and service units to be staffed by 
the unemployed. Other assistance was to be given to 
enable peasants to return to their villages and in the 
last resort, as pure relief. These forms of relief 
recur regularly during the 1950*s, and for convenience 
we shall refer to them as ”The Four Ways”. The criteria 
for receiving relief of any kind were however fairly 
strict. Only those who had lost employment since 1949
(9) For details of employment policy in late 1949 see, 
Ghen Yun, OFJP 5.12.1949. A good example of the 
optimistic view of employment prospects is, ”The 
problem of unemployed workers”, Shanghai Kung Shang 
Tzu Liao, (Materials on Shanghai Industry and Commerce}1 
4.2,1950. The note on Land Reform is, ”Why is Land 
Reform a pre-requisite for industrialization”, HH 
Ser, I No.6, 25.2.1950, page 15.
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and who had no work or supplementary form of income 
of any kind were to benefit* As far as possible re­
lief funds were to be raised by levies on enterprises 
and by workers in employment contributing a dayTs pay 
to the fund*
The administration of unemployment relief was in 
the hands of special committees under the Regional 
Military Governments and in practice, the Labour Bureaux# 
The Bureaux also alleviated unemployment by the establish­
ment of special offices to register and find work for 
unemployed skilled workers, teachers and intellectuals^^^ *
(10) The Central Government and Shanghai directives 
on unemployment are in, Economic Regulations for Bast 
China, Vol.3, op* cit. pp# 1799-1827. Although the 
Central Government directives were not issued until 
June, the Shanghai Military Government had introduced 
relief measures in May which anticipated (or influenced) 
the Central directives* Relief measures for students, 
teachers and intellectuals were introduced after the 
main directives had been announced. For a retrospective 
view of these see, Lan Ghih PTa ffMy country’s unemploy­
ment relief and employment, CCQP No#21. 29.5*1954, 
pp.1-7*
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The reports of the Labour Ministry for 1949 and 
1950 confirm that the Bureaux main work in these years 
was mediation and unemployment. These issues were in 
practice closely related since one of the key areas of 
dispute, particularly in the private sector, was the 
issue of hiring and firing. This problem raised an 
awkward dilemma, for on the one hand the Government knew 
that capitalists had to keep costs under control to 
remain viable and that toleration of private enterprise 
implied some toleration of freedom in labour matters, 
yet on the other hand, unemployment had to be controlled 
as far ; as possible. The job of reconciling these con­
flicting objectives constituted the main work of labour 
administration in this early period and out of this 
work, emerged the first set of rules governing the 
hiring and firing of workers
(11} In February the Labour Bureau in Shanghai affirmed 
that all sacking required Bureau agreement and after 
publication of the unemployment directives, the Bureau 
added that in principle, all hiring was to go through 
the Bureau as well. However, at the same time as the
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(11) (Qont’d)
Bureau was dealing with illegal sackings, as part of 
the campaign to revive capitalism we find Ma Gh’un Ku 
(Head of the Shanghai Labour Bureau), pointing out that 
realistic manning standards were bound to involve some 
sacking. One loophole in these early rules was toler­
ation of limited hiring of temporary workers who did 
not have to pass through any official machinery. In 
practice the regulations governing the use of these 
workers were widely ignored and in this way employers 
achieved more flexibility in labour force management 
than they would otherwise have had. See, ’’Abstract of 
the work report of the Shanghai Municipality Labour 
Bureau”, LT No.l February 1950. "Directives on un­
employment relief", GFJP 20.6.1950. "Report on present 
Labour-Capital relations in Shanghai", GFJP 19.10.1950* 
"The Labour Bureau makes a timely reversal of illicit 
sackings at the New Life Shop", GFJP 16.6.1950.
"Illegal hiring of temporary workers", GFJP 19.1.1951.
In 1951 however, the upturn of the urban eco noray 
presented the labour administrators with a new set of 
problems. Employment rose very rapidly as is indicated 
by unemployment data in Table 56. As unemployment 
decreased the tensions and social problems associated 
with unemployment began to subside - and confidence in 
the long term prospects for urban employment was renewed
(13) There is plenty of evidence that social unrest 
and disorder was related to fluctuations in employ­
ment. For example there were reports of riotous 
conditions in Canton in mid 1950 when unemployment 
became acute. However after the improvement in the 
employment situation in 1951, a sharp decrease in 
robberies was reported in Shanghai. See, "40.000 
unemployed workers in Canton ask for work without 
result", Hsing Tao Jih Pao (Hong Kong) 15.7.1950. 
"Robberies show a sharp decrease in Shanghai"
HWP 27.8.1951 (SCMP 184).
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Table 36. Numbers of registered unemployed in all 
urban areas, Rast China and Shanghai* 1950-1951
Mid 1950 Rnd 1950 Mid 1951 
000 V
All urban areas a * 1.660 610 450
Hast China b. 570 280 130
Shanghai c. 170 n.nu 46
Sources: a, A report by Ghen Yun reprinted in,
Ssu Ying Rung Shang Ye Ti She Hui Ohu Yi Kai Tsao 
Cheng Tse Pa highig Hsuan Pien (Select Compendium of 
Policy (Statements?' and Laws concerning the Socialist 
Reforms of Private Industry and Commerce!* (Peking, 
1957}.
b. TsTeng Shan ^Report on financial and economic work 
in Past China1*, OffJP 27.11,1951.
c. 11100*000 Shanghai woi’kers return to production 
posts11, CPJB 8.1,1952.
*•364?"*
Theaa result of the^/developments was that the emphasis 
in the Bureaux1 work switched from control of firing 
to control of hiring; and although the Unions were 
still formally involved, the right of employees to 
leave a job was affirmed and the right to fire was 
given a broader interpretation than had been the case 
in 195q C13)# Another effect of the increase in 
confidence was a broadening of the criteria for giving 
relief, and by December the Government was able to 
renew the programme of administrative simplification 
without tfears of serious unemployment consequences #
(15) "Recruitment of workers and job jumping serious 
problems in Shanghai", CTJP 11.10.1951 (SGMF 312).
"The establishment of New Democratic Labour-Capital 
relations and current problems", LT Ser. II No.l, 
September 1951. This article emphasized that "Unions 
and Labour Bureaux should not excessively limit sack­
ings".
(14) "Broaden the scope of unemployment relief, OFJP 
30.11.1950# "Resolutely struggle against waste and 
corruption", JMJP 25.11*1951.
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Thus the real work of the Bureaux in 1951 was to 
control the effects of a tight labour market. It was 
realised that shortages of skilled labour and the 
growth of unscrupulous hiring practices constituted a 
threat to the public sector, which in the "era of 
planning" which lay ahead, could assume serious pro­
portions. This led to the implementation of a new 
measure to control the flow of labour between the main 
administrative divisions and at the same time we begin 
tonsee demands appearing that in the long term, the 
Bureaux should aim to establish a comprehensive 
machinery for controlling all employment d e c i s i o n s ,
(15); The regulations appear in, LT No.5 December 1950 
and LT No.11 June 1951. On the case for overall 
hiring see, Ghiang To, "The theoretical basis and 
fundamental tasks of unified labour allocation work", 
GGGP Ser. 13 No.20, 15.11.1951, pp.386-387.
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In the first half of 1952 the labour market was 
again transformed} this time by the Three and Five 
Antis movements. These attacks on bureaucracy and 
capitalism were accompanied by a wave of sackings and 
the seriousness of the situation was reflected in 
repeated undertakings that workers who participated 
in the political work of the movements would be safe­
guarded from victimisation and unemployment ^.
(16) Sackings and sometimes riots were reported in 
Canton, Chungking, Swatow, Chekiang and Wuhan. See, 
^30,000 unemployed", Kung Shang Jih Pao (Hong Kong)
16.6.1952. "Two hundred unemployed Huan pottery 
workers demonstrate", Kung Shang Jih Pao 14.10.1952. 
"Correct the phenomena^ of sacking workers and staff 
in the public and private sectors", "Chungking Jih 
Pao 14.10.1952. "The city of Hangchow agrees on 
eight practical measures", Chekiang Jih Pao 5.2.1952. 
"Unemployment relief work in Wuhan city during the 
past two years", Chang Ohiang Jih Pao 29.9.1952.
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But these were largely empty promises and it is
evident that the unemployment consequences of the
Five Antis movement were a major factor in bringing
it to a half in May 1952. By this time however,
urban unemployment was again high and confidence in
the prospects for urban employment growth again 
(17)shattered • The seriousness of this collapse was 
intensified by the fact that the first round of 
agrarian cooperativisation had increased rural un­
employment and accelerated the flow of peasants to 
the cities. The situation called for radical measures, 
•and in the first instance, these took the form of the
(17) There are many reports which indicate lack of 
confidence in the GovernmentTs ability to solve urban 
unemployment problems in mid-1952. This pessimism 
was reported to be widespread within Government organs 
as well as in the among the public at large. See,
"The Tientsin branch of the All China Federation of 
Trade Unions makes its reply", Tientsin Jih Pao 
(Tientsin Daily) 2.8.1952,
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employment Decisions of 1952*
The Decisions oh Employment
These Decisions were a major document in the sense 
that they constituted the first admission that unemploy­
ment was a serious problem and would remain so in the 
medium term. The Decisions also acknowledged that 
unemployment had grown as a result of urban and rural 
economic reorganisation and was not simply a problem 
inherited from the Kuomintang. However, the Decisions 
were still basically optimistic and although they 
emphasized that unemployment arising from structural 
reorganisation would continue, they foresaw rapid 
absorption of unemployed workers when the era of 
large scale construction arrived* The Decisions 
envisaged four lines of immediate attack on the prob­
lem; the control of participation rates; a general 
ruling requiring that redundant employees be kept in 
employment; strict control of hiring and firing; and 
enlargement of the unemployment work of the Bureaux^*8) • 
Let us consider these briefly in turn.
(18) "Decisions on the problem of employment",
M J P  4*8*1952.
—2 69-
Control of participation concentrated on female 
participation and time. The question of working 
women was an extremely difficult one throughout our 
period since the demand to participate in the work 
force was considerable and the Party’s experience 
of economic administration in wartime had convinced 
it of the potential value of women workers. ¥et we 
find that whenever the urban labour market contracted, 
the whole apparatus of persuasion and propaganda had 
to be mobilised in an effort to keep women out of the 
labour force. This is what happened in 1952, al­
though it was emphasized that restriction on female 
participation was only a short term measure which
would be unnecessary when large scale construction
-! (19)beganx '.
(19) See, Mao Tse Tung, Ching Chi Wen T Ti Yu Ts’ai 
Cheng Wen TTi (Economic and Financial Problems) 
(3rd.ed. Hong Kong, 1949) passim for appreciation of 
the value of female labour. After the directive had 
been published the All China Women’s Federation was 
mobilised to support the new limitations on female 
participation In the labour force. See, "The All
•*270**
Control <£ working hours was not an entirely new 
departure* An eight hour day was stated by Li Li San 
in 1950 to be the long tern objective, although immed­
iate implementation was thought at that time to be 
impraetible. By 1952, it was appreciated that employ­
ment considerations reinforced this long term, humanit­
arian view and a rigorous campaigm was started to 
initiate two and three shift systems, each shift being 
a maximum of eight hours The Journal of the Labour
Ministry, Lao Tung (Labour), devoted an entire issue
(19) (Gontfd)
China Women1 s Federation notifies all levels of the 
Federation to cooperate in the implementation of the 
Central Feoplets Government, State Council*s decis^ 
ions of employment", 3MJP 10*8*1952*
(20) It was claimed that even prior to August 1952, 
the Party organisation had been fighting managers and 
capitalists to get multiple shift working introduced.
See, "(The Party) cares for workers welfare; settles 
a thousand unemployed in work", NFJP 1*5*1952.
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to this topic and quoted with approval an example 
of a factory where shift reform had resulted in a 
74$ increase in the labour force(£l).
The third aspe ct of participation, age, is one 
we know little about. It seems probable however, 
that age participation was also subject to further 
restriction around this time. For we know that, 
whereas Li Li San was saying that in 1950 premature 
enforcement of restriction on child labour would be 
wrong, by 1955 a survey of the labour force in the 
public sector showed very small numbers of employees 
under the age of sixteen#
Oontrol of redundancy unemployment had been start­
ed in 1949, relaxed in 1951 and renewed in late 1952# 
After the 1952 directive it had two aspects. First 
there was the question of redundancies arising from 
rationalisation in all sectors. The rule here was 
that redundant workers were to be kept on the pay
(21) LT Vol. 11 Ho#5, November, 1952*
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roll until alternative work could be found^*^ •
Second there was the question of the private sector, 
where the task of the Bureaux was much more delicate 
for their task was to try to reverse the whole trend 
of sackings and encourage capitalists to begin hiring 
again.
These policies implied the renewal of the attempt 
to control both hiring and firing. The latter was 
particularly important since the Bureaux1 power in this 
respect had suffered some attenuation in 1951, However, 
care had to be taken that the new rules were not applied 
too rigidly to the private sector, since if, in effect, 
hiring was made irreversible, this would act as powerful
(28) See, "The Decisions", op.cit. note 18. An 
interesting discussion by the Head of the Shanghai 
Bureau on the policy of retention and instructions to 
the private sector are in QFJP 87*8.1952 and QFJP 
17;8,1952. The Unions were also instructed to encourage 
private sector hiring and control time participation, 
see, OFJP 2.12.1952.
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disincentive to potential employers - particularly 
those engaged in businesses where labour requirements 
tended to fluctuate sharply^3-^.
The Decisions resulted in considerably increased 
activity in for the Bureaux and to some extent in 
increased prestige. There was certainly scope for 
improvement in the administration of unemployment 
which was thoroughly overhauled as a result of the
(23) See, "The Decisions" op.cit# Also an explan­
atory article, "Problems of employment", JMJP
16.9.1952. For an example of local application of 
the general principle of control see, "All state and 
Private enterprises must contact the Labour Introduction 
Office when Hiring", BFJP 23,9.1952 and "Fix the un­
employment training plan and settlement programme",
HFJP 18.8*1953. One extraordinarily tricky area of 
hiring control discussed in these articles was that of 
small scale firms which changed the character of their 
business. This sort of trade switching was frequently 
a device to shed unwanted employees and the Labour 
Bureaux had to keep a special eye on these situations 
and judge the employment implications of each case on 
its merits.
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(241*Decisions # The earlier unemployment directive 
had suffered from failure of the Bureaux to allocate 
administrative resources to unemployment work and it 
was also intrinsically difficult to administer#
Criteria for registration were too narrow and the 
formalities of registration were too complex# More­
over we have to realise that throughout the 1950Ts 
there was a widespread and justified fear of regist­
ration of any kind which the directive did nothing' t o
(24]' Accounts of embezzlement of unemployment funds 
and various forms of maladministration are numerous, 
see for example Tientsin Jih Pao 6#1#1952, Chungking 
Hsin Hua Jih Bao 18#4,1951, JMJT 24#3#1952, Sian OhTun 
Chung Jih Bao (Sian Masses Daily) 10.10.1952# An 
authoritative account of the confusion which arose as 
the result of the multiplication of types of registrat­
ion is, "Report on unemployment work in 1950" LT No#7, 
February 1951#
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all eviate^^ .
To overcome these problems the scope of the 
registration was broadened, formalities simplified 
and the new round of registration accompanied by a
(25) Fear of registration was based 0 1 1 the role 
played by the Public Security organs in this work.
In March 1950 the Public Security Bureau took over 
Hu KVou registration in Shanghai and we have a de­
tailed case study of the character of this work in 
Peking in 1950. It was reported in Peking that 
population registration had taken the form of a mass 
movement to "distinguish good from bad" and had yield­
ed to no less than 208 guerillas, 2676 arms caches and 
15.318 persons who had attempted to evade registration. 
See, QFJP 11.3.1950 and JMJT 4.2.1950. This general 
fear of registration was undoubtedly reflected in 
difficulties in unemployment registration. Some mis­
givings were removed in 1952 but in 1955, Shanghai 
Roman Catholics were still reported as saying that: 
"unemployment registration is a sugar coated artillery 
pill", HWP 9.9.1955, translated in, ORI Research 
Service Series, Septeoiber 27th 1955 No.4*
large scale public relations campaign^ . These
measures had some success. Indeed too much, for
they lead to a widespread exodus from undesireable
occupations in rural and urban areas by persons who
hoped that unemployment registration might prove the
most direct route to new and moi^ e attractive work
(27)in the public sector *
(26) "Methods 3br unemployment registration",
JMJP 50.8,1952,
(27) See for example, "Gradually and by plan strive 
to do employment work well", QFJP 11*9.1952. In 
Peking and Chungking it was reported that on hearing 
of the employment decisions, peasants surrendered 
their land to local peasant associations and with 
cadre assistance moved into the cities, see, QFJP
11.9,1952.
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For most of those who were put on the register 
however, the prospects remained those of the "Four 
Ways", although thesd were interpreted more liberally 
and underwritten with more substantial assistance 
than previously^®} .
There were two new developments in the Bureaux* 
work connected with the Decisions. The first was that 
unemployment work and the work of assignment and in­
troduction were linked firmly together. Efficient
unemployment procedures were seen to depend on voluntary
(29)submission to Labour Bureau job-finding procedures^ .
(^ 28) The "return to the countryside" in 1952 was not 
quite what was intended in the 1950 regulations. In 
1950 the problem had been p? imarily that of returning 
recent refugees to the countryside; in 1952, the 
emphasis was on the possibility of absorbing labour in 
rural areas by a positive policy of land reclamation.
(29) An explicit statement of the principle that 
choice of job would not be possible before full employ­
ment is in, "Questions and answers on employment", 
Tientsin Jih Pao 29,10.1952.
The other change was the reversal of LI Li San*s 
definition of the Bureaux* relations with the private 
seetoi% The key word in 1950 had been mediation.
In 1952, as a result of a bitter struggle in the Five 
Antis campaign, it was changed to partisanship; a 
change which must have hindered the Bureaux in their 
efforts to increase employment in the private sector(3
(3g) The Five Antis had a traumatic effect on the 
Labour Ministry and its Bureaux. Ho issue of the 
Ministry*s monthly Journal Lao Tung appeared between 
November 1951 and September 1952, when it re-emerged 
with the new employment Decisions, The struggle in 
the Bureaux was between three groups those who argued 
that the Bureaux should defend capitalists; those 
who argued for impartiality in the context of the 
"bloc of four classes"; and those who wanted the 
Bureaux to support the workers. See, "Correct 
rightist thought tendencies in the workers movement 
in private factories in An Tung", JMJP 7.2.1952.
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The changes in the employment situation brought 
about by the general measures to stimulate the urban 
economy in mid 1952, and by the employment Decisions, 
were all considered as short term palliatives. In 
the levfrge-r run, a programme of rapid industrialization 
was seen as the solution to urban employment problems,
Lm M PL
Moreover even the 1-arg-e-r run was only thought of as a
period of three to five years and it seems plausible
to think that the timing of the plan itself may have
been brought forward in the light of the unemployment
situation in late 1952. For there is evidence that
there were many who regarded the decision to launch
a major effort in 1953 as premature and dangerous.
Yet without such a plan in immediate prospect, the
arguments of the Decisions would largely fall to the
ground, since once the upswing had brought the economy
to full capacity in late 1952, the prospects for
(31)subsequent employment growth would be poor
(31) A period of three to five years was specifically 
mentioned for the solution of the unemployment problem 
in East China, see "Bast China holds an employment 
conference”, CFJF 16.8.1952. It is interesting to
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(33b) ( C o n t r a )
note that in mid-1950 Mao and '.others were envisaging 
a recovery period of 3-5 years. If the First Plan 
was brought forward in the light of employment con­
siderations this would constitute on a parallel with 
the Soviet Union. See, "The present financial and 
economical situation and the economic plan for 1950", 
GCOP Ser.10, No.19, 11.5.1950. Margaret Dewar,
Labour Policy in the U.S.S.R. 1917-1928, (London, 
1956) page 156 and Deutscher op.cit. pp.67-68.
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1955: The employment strategy of the First Five Year
Plan: the beginnings of manpower planning.
t t o t i w  —rtrr— -Trn° i^nn-Hi~>— T r^ iM ~ i—r~f~—t  — t  ' —  —it  n~~~T 'I ----*— -----— -----------  —u—U.U i
In the closing months of 1952 the urban economy 
began to warm up for the First Five Year Plan. We do 
not know what rate of industrial and construction 
growth had originally been planned for 1953, but since 
we know that the construction plan was cut twice early 
in the year and still achieved an increase in output 
of 6 6 the presumption must be that the earlier control 
figures were very high indeed^3^ .  Similarly, we do 
not know what rates of growth were envisaged for the 
whole of the First Plan period. The final version of 
the Plan which appeared in July 1955 had been scaled 
down in 1953 and 1955, although even this version had 
a planned rate of industrial growth of 14.8%. This 
seems to indicate that in late 1952, when plans were 
still very ambitious, it was hoped that China’s first 
plan would have output and employment growth rates of 
the order of magnitude of those in the First Russian
(32) TCKT No* 7. (October 1954) , page 3.
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Plan(33K  Such a plan could have been taken to imply 
full urban employment and net labour transfer from, 
the rural sector- Por, over the whole of the period 
covered by the First and Second "Russian Plans, indust­
rial employment had grown at 15,9%; and during the 
peak period, 1929-1932, the industrial labour force 
increased from 3,1 to 8 millions. During the first 
Russian Plan, two thirds of the entrants to the 
labour force came from the rural areas and between 1926 
and 1959, the urban population more than doubled and 
increased its share of total population from. 17.9% 
to 3S.8?^34b
(35) The planned rate of industrial growth in the 
first Russian Plan rose during the course of the Plan 
period from 21.4% to 25,2% per annum. Yiews on the 
extent to which the Plan fulfilled its aims vary, 
Hodgeman estimates that annual growth rate of industry 
between 1927/8-1933 was 11,5%. The official index 
claims a rate of 18,5%. See data in Harry Schwarz, 
RussiaTs Soviet Economy (Prentice-Hall Inc.1958), 
page 136,
(34) Data from H.Schwarz op.cit. pp. 32 and 521. 
Solomon M.Schwarz, Dabour in the soviet Union,
~283«*
Why did the Chinese think that they could emulate 
the Russian performance? first, there was the general 
notion that since before 1917, Russia like China had 
been a backward, semi-feudal, astatic country, what 
had been achieved in the one should be possible to the 
other, Second, there was the case of Manchuria, where, 
even before 1949, there had been industrial transform­
ation sufficient, at least momentarily, to produce 
net inter-sectoral labour transfer, and where by 1952, 
there were high levels of urban employment aad some 
absorption of labour from rural Manchuria as well as 
from other parts of C h i n a # for the first Plan
(34) (Cont'd)
(London, 1953) and S.Swianiewicz, forced Labour and 
Economic Development, (London, 1965) Page 150.
(35) According to Chang Ch'en fa, between 1934 and 
1944 the rural population of Manchuria declined from 
84,7% to 67*4% of the total population, see Tung Eei 
Ohing Chi (The Economy of North East China) Taipei 
1954) pp* 24-25* For a typical view of Manchurian
£04—
period, Manchuria was repeatedly described as the 
model which the rest of the economy could be expected 
to follow. What had happened in Manchuria between 1948 
and 1952 was confidently expected to be the general 
case between 1953 and 1957. A third consideration 
which could have been used to underwrite an optimistic 
view of the Planfs prospects, was the national economic 
performance between 1949 and 1952. During this period 
industrial growth had proceeded at 34#6% per annum and 
industrial employment at 1 9 . It was therefore
(35) (Cont*d)
employment experience and its relevance see, "The 
number of employed persons in the Ncr.th Bast has 
increased enormously", NffJP 25*9.1952.
(36) Emerson, Bbnagricultural Employment, Table I. 
Industrial production is the official index, Ten 
Great Tears page 87.
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tempting to think that if the limitations of existing 
capacity and other constraints could be dissolved in 
the magic of "planning" and socialization, the economy 
might be able to maintain a performance of the order 
reached in the recovery period*
The validity of this reconstruction of Chinese 
expectations in late 1952 is borne out not only by the 
specific expectations of the employment Decisions, but 
also by the literature on the population problem which 
appeared in some profusion in 1953 as a by-product of 
the first national census. We can illustrate this by 
reference to an article typical of those published at 
this time^3^ #  This article discussed the view that 
China was "over-populated" with close reference to 
employment issue* and dismissed it on several grounds* 
First, it found the static concept of a "normal" 
population inadequate in a world where production 
relations and production were dynamic. Second, it
(37} Yen Chien Yu, "From a few population questions 
discuss the great significance of the population 
census", Hsin Chien She (New instruction]! 1953 No*5.
showed that in the plan period, the Soviet Union had 
eliminated unemployment, and the article further 
quoted the radical redistribution of population which 
had taken place in the 1950fs. Third, the article 
argued for an optimistic view of employment prospects 
on the grounds that "the last three years show that 
the surplus population concept is rubbish". And 
finally, apart from industry, it was pointed out that 
there was scope for employment absorption in agriculture, 
where the cooperativisation movement would generate 
employment in secondary occupations and where there 
were further possibilities in the programme for land 
reclamation. It is worth noting, that even at this 
point, when confidence In industrial employment 
prospects was high; the agricultural cooperatives 
are already being transformed from the control mechanism 
through which labour was to be supplied to the urban 
areas, into a possible means of increasing total 
employment.
The work of the Bureaux; the beginnings of manpower 
planning.
At the national level, the work of the Labour 
Ministry in 1953 was probably very modest in scope.
For although manpower planning in Manchuria was quite 
advanced by this time, the economic reports for both 
1952 and 1953 suggest that there was no comprehensive 
national labour plan for those years. There were 
indications however, that the scope of the Ministry1s 
interests was b r o a d e n i n g ^ • The absence of
(38) The 1952 Plan was very limited in all respects.
The labour data quoted in the Plan’s out-turn were,
(a) the number of workers and staff in State Economic 
departments and (b) productivity increases in centrally 
controlled industrial enterprises. The 1953 out-turn 
included data on all workers and staff in the public 
and private sector broken down in some detail* Product­
ivity increases were given for workers in industrial 
enterprises in the public sector and wage increases were 
given for the same group in real terms. In neither of 
these two reports were the out-turn data compared with
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eomprehensive manpower planning implies that any
planning that took place must j^ ave been at the local
and ministerial levels, and that such plans as were
produced in this way were either too unreliable or
too untimely to make more ambitious planning possible*
In the absence of proper planning, the work of
the Bureaux in 1953 consisted largely of trying to
control hiring and of satisfying the demand for labour
in the public sector as it arose. Primarily, this
was a question of organising labour supply for the
departments with the fastest planned rates of growth,
(39)above all, baeic construction •
(38) (Oonttd)
any plan. See, "State Statistical Bureau Report for 
1952", KSO 1953 No.7 pp.38-42, and "State 
Statistical Bureau Report for 1953", TQKT 1954 No*7*
pp. 1-8*
(39) See, "Main tasks of the Central Government 
Ministry of Labour 1953 work plan", LT 1953 No*3.
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Basic Construction work involved training 
workers and the development of effective means of
controlling and allocating the total construction
(40)labour force. This proved extremely difficult1 * 
First, because the context of high levels of urban 
employment meant that dissatisfied workers could al­
ways escape official assignment and find alternative 
work* Second, because construction management cadres, 
faced with work loads nearly twice as high as 1952,
\?ere prepared to ignore and circumvent the planned 
assignment apparatus if it suited them and was necessary 
to ensure fulfillment of physical output targets. And 
third, because the Government had abolished the old 
work gang system (pao tTou ohih)which had the effect 
of atomising the construction labour market. This 
last point is of considerable importance. There was 
a case on both social and economic grounds for the
(40) There was a particularly severe construction 
labour crisis in the North Bast in early 1953 which 
followed the abolition of the pao tTou chih in 1952.
Seej Tung Pei Jih Pao 10.1.1953 and Tung Fei dih Pao 
13*4.1953.
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elimination of the construction Job brokers. Butrin 
the short term this made control of the work force 
extremely difficult and the whole machinery of control 
which was established in the industry between 1953 and 
1955 was in some ways a functional substitute for the 
old s y s t e m *
The main feature of the new system, following the 
Manchurian model, were rules for registration and 
introduction and the establishment of local "Labour 
Balancing Committees" in areas where the work involved 
was considered to be too great to be handled by the 
Bureaux alone* These Committees had representatives 
of all parties interested in labour supply sitting on 
them and they attempted to match local supply and 
demand of construction labour^^K
(41) The pao tTou chih was also abolished in the 
traditional transport sector. It is interesting to 
note that in this case it did not lead to any problems.
In the mid 1950Ts, unemployment was the main problem 
in this sector so that the workers were in no position
to frustrate plans made for them by labour administrators.
(42) HFJP 25.9.1952. LT 1953 Nos.2 and 10 have 
particularly relevant materials hors- on this.
- 2 9 1
In the event of net excesses, balancing Committeds 
in different areas could cooperate with each other 
to secure inter-regional balance. One over-riding 
principal in the work of the Committees was that they 
had to operate within a framework of priorities 
determined by the Government^®)#
The effective operation of the Committees (in 
which the Labour Bureaux played an important part) 
implied a continued effort to control all hiring and 
the introduction of new powers to order the transfer 
of personnel who were engaged in one enterprise but 
deemed to be more urgently required elsewhere^^) *
(43) The priorities in construction were, (1) 
defence (8) industry (3) "ordinary" (4) repair. See 
"A summary of unified allocation of construction 
workers in Tientsin", LT 1953 No.2*
(44) "The experience of the Anshan Iron and Steel 
Company in transferring cadres from the production 
department to build up the basic construction work 
force to full strength", JMJF 11.18.1958#
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We saw in Chapter Four that control of hiring in 
1953 was not very successful, but we may note that 
in embryo hiring control took a step nearer to labour 
planning in 1953 because the demands made to the 
Bureaux were so unrealistic that the Bureaux were 
forced to devise rules of thumb which could be used 
to convert work loads into labour requirements. in 
other words the Bureaux began to take an interest in 
labour work at the enterprise l e v e l ,
It is difficult to assess accurately the success 
of this work in 1953, but from what evidence we have 
it appears to have been fairly slight. One interest­
ing indication of this is a report of the out-turn 
of the labour plan of a large construction enterprise 
in Anshan. This revealed that actual labour require­
ments had been 34% higher than had been estimated; 
that the number of staff employed was 58% above that 
necessary according to normal standards and that the 
productivity plan had been under fulfilled by 34%* 
This seems to indicate that enterprise level planning 
in the construction industry was still at the
(45) CFJP 17*1.1953*
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"Bachanallian" stage(4-6) #
Closely related to the Bureaux1 work in con­
struction and employment control was a new emphasis 
on the control of general population movements. In
spring 1953, the upswing of construction in the towns 
and the general optimism surrounding the introduction 
of the Five Year Plan combined with grain shortages 
in the rural areas to stimulate a large flow of peas­
ants into the cities. The authorities attempted to 
control this influx by directives, but in Autumn, the 
poor harvest and widespread natural catastrophes, 
lead to a renewed inflow. Construction and illicit 
hiring both served to facilitate this migration and 
recognition of this was one of the motives behind the 
general tightening of employment control in late 1953^7)*
(46) "An initial analysis of management in 1953",
TGKT 1954 No*4.
(47) Directives on migration appear in LT 1953 No*4*
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Autumn 1953 to Autumn 1955
The two years between the end of the "Leap 
Forward" of 1955 and the "High Tide of Socialism" 
in the countryside in Autumn 1955 have been compar­
atively neglected by students of China's economy 
in the 195QTs. They tend either to be ignored or to 
be subsumed in an analysis of the whole First Plan 
period. This neglect is unfortunate, since it was
precisely the inability of the Government to solve 
the problems implied in the First Plan within the 
institutional framework as it operated in these years, 
that lead to the cycle of radical upheavals which 
lasted from late 1955 to the Great Leap Forward in 
1958. The reasoning behind these upheavals cannot 
be understood without reference to the problems which 
seemed insoluble within the rules of the system they 
largely destroyed. In this section we are concerned 
with one aspect of this process of evolution. But 
our analysis of the crisis in the work of the Labour 
Bureaux is probably indicative of what could be found 
for other sectors if they were examined in similar 
detail#
For employment work, the most vital feature of
this period was the slowing up of employue nt absorp­
tion. Indeed by 1955, it would appear that in some
sectors of the urban economy there was substantial 
(48)
disabsorption , These developments were contrary 
to the expectations generated by the employment dir­
ective and in all probability to those who had framed 
the early drafts of the Plan. We have therefore to 
ask why It was that two years after the implementation 
of a Plan expected to lead to the rapid elimination
of urban unemployment, unemployment was visibly Increas­
ing? The first miscalculation arose from the way in
which false analogies between China and the Soviet 
Union had been accepted. It seems probable to us that 
the planners and the Party allowed some real similar­
ities of political history and social structure to 
obscure the differences in resource endowment and the
(48) The construction labour force declined in 1954 
and 1955, In the trade and food sectors, we estimate 
a net }oss of 1.462.000 jobs between the end of 1953 
and 1955, This is based on data for the private 
sector in The Socialist Beform of Private Commerce, 
Materials, op.cit. For the public sector we have 
used Emerson, Nonagricultural Employment. Table 5.
size of the initial industrial and employment base 
which were of critical relevance to the formulation 
of economic plans. These differences made industrial 
growth rates of the order achieved by the Soviet Union 
unrealistic for the Chinese on almost any assumptions 
about the prospects for foreign assistance, and imp­
lied employment absorption of a lower order, even had 
the very high rates of industrial output growth been
achieved(^9)^
(49) The speed and character of employment re­
allocation depends on the initial structure of the 
work force and the speed at which its components
are changing. Basically, industrialisation involves 
employment in the industrial sector growing more 
rapidly than the work-force and total population* 
However, if the initial base of industrial employ­
ment is very small, even rapid growth of industrial 
employment will have to be sustained over a very 
long period before any significant transformation 
has taken place* If we take employment in industry 
as a percentage of total population as an Indicator 
of the initial base, comparison between Russia and
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The employment Implications of this were intensified 
by the fact that whereas productivity growth in the 
First Soviet Plan was not high (and substantially 
below the planned rate), in China productivity growth 
was rapid* Thus whereas in Russia the tendency to 
capital intensity was offset by slow productivity 
growth, in China it was not(5Q)#
(49) (Contfd)
China indicates how backward the latter was. In 
Russia, in 1926, (Three years before the First Plan), 
employment in large scale industry was equal to 1.9$ 
of total population; for China, in 1949, the figures 
range between *2JS and .5$ depending on oners choice 
of data. Soviet data in S.Schwarz, op.eft. Chinese 
data in Ten Great Years page 183; but see also data 
on employment in industry quoted in, Yuan Li Wu, An 
Economic Survey of Communist China. (New York, 1956) 
page 37.
(50) For Chinese data see Table 28 in Chapter Three. 
The Soviet data is in, Maum Jasny, Soviet Industral- 
ization (Chicago, 1961) pp. 104-108. According to
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The Chinese Plan as implemented in these years 
had other implications that were prejudicial to urban 
employment growth. We saw in Chapter 1 the way in 
which the rigid and over-centralised finance system 
designed to guarantee the supply of resources necess­
ary for the key point projects had a deadening effect 
on other formsnof economic activity. The consequences 
of this for employment were disproportionately severe 
because fiscal strictness bore particularly hard on 
locally managed construction and small scale activit­
ies both of which were fairly labour intensive. And 
it is notable that we have one directive whieh in­
dicates that even where mild budgetary relaxation was 
allowed, there was a specific instruction that the re­
laxation was not to be used to hire additional personnel 
in the public sector^).
(90) (Coat'd)
the latter, labour productivity in large scale in­
dustry fell 35^-40^ between 1929 and 1932 - years of 
very rapid employment growth#
(51) "C§rry through the policy of finance work being 
subordinated to production”, NPJP 24.4.1954.
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Another aspect of the concentration of resources 
in the key projects in the public sector was that it 
implied a repressive policy against the private sector, 
and the effects of such repression in 1954 and 1955 
were compounded by the effects of other unforseen 
factors such as the cessation of the Korean war. 
Lowering the level of activity in the private sector 
also had disproportionate effects on employment, 
since small scale businesses under pressure took every
opportunity to rid themselves of labour, not only 
because they were reluctant to accept long term 
obligations to their employees, in the face of un­
certain future prospects, but also because they wish­
ed, wherever possible, to avoid being classified as 
capitalists and thereby laying themselves open to 
direct political pressures of the most unpleasant 
c h a r a c t e r ^ . In urban commerce for example,
(52^ An interesting article published in 1955 stated 
that over-manning was common in private industry and 
that socialization would therefore make the labour 
market even more difficult for infiltrators from rural 
areas. The implication of this is that after social­
ization, this excess manpower would be thrown onto the
-300
enterprises with two or more employees were class­
ified as capitalist and thereby liable to reform 
rather than eooperativisation. As there were many 
enterprises near this limit, it is not surprising to 
find that the decline of hired labour in commerce 
between 1953 and 1955, took place at a mere rapid 
rate than the decline of total employment in that 
sector^ 33^•
(52) (Cont'd)
urban labour market. See, "Surplus labour in Canton 
should return to the countryside", NffJF 30.12.1955 
(SOMP 1261). Another revealing article on the handi­
craft industry in Canton stated that the handicrafts­
men "dare not hire men". See, "Strengthen the work 
of leading and helping the handicraftsmen", NFJP 
2.11.1953.
(53) This definition is in, The Socialist Reform of 
Private Commerce, op.&t. The data on the decline in 
hired men is for all areas. See, Chfien Hua et*al* 
op.oit. Table 2 page 9#
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Another aspect of the drive to reduce budgetary
expenditure in 1954 and 1955 was a renewed round of
manpower rationalisation In the public sector. This
affected all categories of employment and was a
specific reversal of the policy of the 1952 employment
decisions which had required the indefinite retention
of personnel made redundant by increased productivity.
The main drives for rationalisation were in
February 1954 and April 1955; and in July 1955, there
was an important conference of Labour Bureau chiefs
in which the role of the Bureaux in this campaign
(54)
was worked out • The main emphasis in the campaign 
was on persons not engaged directly in productive work. 
The degree of manpower excess which had built up in 
the early 1950Ts is indicated by reports that in some 
departments only ^wo thirds of the office staff had
(54) The Peoplers Daily editorials which signalled 
the start of these campaigns were published in JMJP 
24.2.1954 and JMJP 17.7.1955. The conference Is 
reported in, "(The Labour Chiefs) emphasize the import­
ance of labour management and similar problems",
JMJP 17.7.1955.
any meaningful activity and that in the Ahshan iron 
and steel complex only 52.3$ of the total labour force, 
was actually engaged in production^0^ . Although the 
measurement of productivity change is notoriously 
difficult, particularly in work outside the productive 
departments, there can be little doubt that the employ­
ment decisions and the cyclical mechanism analysed in 
Chapter 4 had resulted in substantial overmanning after 
the subsidence of the 1953 boom. In 1954 and 1955 the 
situation was further aggravated by the natural press­
ures to increase employment in the public sector to 
offset disabsorption elsewhere.
The campaign to control the growth and ultimately 
reduce the absolute size of the bureaucracy and non­
productive labour force took two forms. First there
(55) See JMJP 17.7.1955 op.cit. above. Yery interest­
ing materials on the proportion of Ttnon-productives,T 
in different types of enterprise are contained in the 
1955 Survey of the Labour Force, HHPYK 1957 Ho.2 pp. 
87-89, Data on Anshan are in, t!A serious waste of 
manpower in the Anshan Iron and Steel Company", Kung 
Jen Jih Pao 27.5,1955 (SCMP 1076) .
-303-
was an attempt to devise standard structures of work 
differentiation which could be applied throughout an 
administrative or industrial system.. The model for 
this type of work was the railway system, which had 
borrowed the personnel structure of the Soviet Rail­
way system^ 5 6 . The second foam of attack was the 
drive to enforce retirement of those rendered unfit 
for work through age or sickness. The lack of re­
tirement in accordance with the insurance regulations 
had reached serious proportions by 1955, and con­
stituted an unplanned and wholly unwelcome increase 
in the participation rate. The problem being that 
the regulations only had the force of law for a 
minority of enterprises and that the existing re­
gulations had a built in incentive for some people 
to stay in work after retirement. The Labour 
Bureuax were therefore called upon to implement new 
retirement rules for state administration organs and 
to devise alternative work and income arrangements 
sufficiently attractive and credible to make people 
willing to leave their unproductive positions in the
(56) LT 1955 Mo.6 and LT 1955 Mo.11 have particularly 
interesting materials on this work.
public sector. In 1955 this latter was virtually
■v. (57)impossible
The third aspect of this campaign was a renewed 
drive in 1955 to stop all additional hiring and to 
satisfy labour requirements in the public sector by 
re-assignment of existing workers and staff. Apart 
from specific directives on the subject, there was in 
this period the introduction of a new note of harshness 
in labour administration. In late 1953 we find the 
first important directives on the general question of 
labour discipline and in 1954, the power of manage­
ments over their workers was greatly strengthened by 
the introduction of a formalised set of rules govern­
ing intra-enterprise work o rgan i s a t i o n ^ .
(57) See note 3d Chapter Two,
(58) "Decisions on labour discipline" 26.8.1953,
HHYP Mo.47, "An outline of intra-enterprise regulat­
ions for state enterprises", Kuang Ming Jlh Pao
14. 7*-1954. The latter included the rule that employee 
could not leave their work without permission, in 1955 
an article on labour control commented that, "those who
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The effects of this campaign to control publio 
sector employment on overall urban employment must 
have been considerable, for in some areas it was re­
ported that Government organisations had cut their 
staff by It is difficult to separate out
the effect of the individual factors on employment change 
but the net effect on industrial productivity can be 
seen in Table 57.
(58) (Cont*d)
without reason refuse to submit to assignment should 
be punished*, LT 1955 No.7#
(59) An example in South China was reported in 
The Kwantung and Huangai Peasants Daily 7*7.1955*
Cuts of up to 58$ were also reported in Peking,
TKP (Tientsin) 17.8.1955.
Table 57, Index of labour productivity in i: 
1953-1957
1952 - 100
1952 1955 1954 1955 1956 1957
100 104.3 111,5 120.8 142,2 140.2
Source: Michael Field in Eckstein, ;.,GaI®nison and
Liu op.cit, page 647,
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So far we have confined ourselves to considering 
the demand for labour* In conclusion we have to note 
two spe cial factors on the supply side which accentuat­
ed the employment problem in this period. The first 
was the acceleration of migration into the towns in 
between. 1953 and 1955, This occurred in waves which 
were related to bad harvests, natural disasters, 
cooperativisation drives and the reorganisation of 
agricultural taxation. The degree of irreversibility 
in th£s£ migrations seemed to be rising all the time 
and by Spring 1955, ShanghaiTs total population reach­
ed a peak of 7,000*000, a figure which was not touched 
again until 1957. The second factor was the general - 
demobilisation of the army which took place in 1955^°) .
From this account it can be seen that the context 
of labour administration In this period was one of 
increasing unemployment and also of deepening gloom.
Let us now try to analyse the reaction of the Bureaux 
to this and the character of their work in these years*
(60) See, John Git tings, The Role of the Chinese Army 
{London, 1967) esp. pp. 96-97.
The work of The Labour Bureaux
During 1954 and most of 1955 there was still 
nothing at the national level which could be des­
cribed as overall manpower planning. This is confirmed 
by a revealing self criticism that the Labour Ministry 
made of its work in 1954. in this, the backwardness 
of labour work was contrasted with the development of 
industrial planning and the unreality of manpower 
planning at this stage was such that it was admitted 
that "we are still only at the stage of shouting, and 
even our shouting is feeble"^^ •
At the levels of the local Bureaux however, there 
was plenty of activity. The most significant feature 
of their work in these years was the continuing attempt 
to intensify hiring control in basic construction and 
the public sector. While at the same time relaxing 
control in other sectors in an attempt to relieve 
unemplosnrient. This mixed strategy was particularly in
(61) LT 1954 No.10,
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evidence in 1954, the first year of a new phase in 
employment policy* This policy was announced after a 
conference in March 1954 at which the errors of the 
1952 Decisions were discussed and publicised^®).
It was admitted that the long term character of the 
employment problem had not been appreciated and that 
the hopes of a solution to unemployment through .ex­
pansion of construction had been ill founded. The 
Conference also agreed that it had been a mistake to 
absorb unnecessary personnel into the public sector 
and that restriction on hiring in the private sector 
had been wrong. The training programme; the public 
works brigades; the relief factories and the policy 
of relating construction assignment and unemployment 
work were all subject to examination and found to 
have been unsuccessful or inefficient. A new approach 
was clearly called for* The first aspect of this was 
the decision that in future there would be no attempt
(62) Hsing Tzu Hung, ^Strive to continue implement­
ation of the New employment policy”, HHYP 1954 No.7, 
pp.141-142*
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to link unemployment work with overall control of 
hiring. Second, it was agreed that the scope of 
labour assignment should be sharply reduced and that 
the unemployed should be allowed to use their own 
initiative to find work. This implied considerable 
relaxation of hiring rules and amounted to official 
encouragement of a licit free market in labour^33).
(63) The Shanghai regulations appear in WHP 28.6.1954* 
See also articles in SGMP 984-, 22.9.1954. Although 
the regulations left some restrictions on hiring by 
economic enterprises; article 7 stated that 
"administrative organs, public organisations, schools, 
hospitals and armed forces (not including subsidiary 
business enterprises of administrative organs and 
military supplies production departments) are free 
to engage employees and workers by themselves"#
In practice the new policy lead to the abandonment 
of the whole apparatus of unemployment administration 
built up after the 1952 Decisions, and it is signif­
icant that unemployment work: did not even appear in 
the list of tasks for Labour work in 1954^6^)# There 
can be little doubt that the Bureaux were thoroughly 
glad to be rid of a problem, which within their own 
terms of reference was insoluble.
However at the same time as the Bureaux were 
relaxing control in one direction, other factors 
required that occupations and sectors still officially 
within the sphere of work assignment be subject to 
even tighter control than before. We have already 
seen that tighter control of hiring was implied by the 
new drive on waste in the public sector and the demands 
of efficiency and population control made a renewed effort 
in basic construction labour force management absolutely 
essential. The experience of 1955 had been a disaster
(64) In 1955, we have evidence that two cities stopped 
collection of the unemployment fund. See, Ohang Ghiang
Jih Pao 3.1.1955 and. Kung Jen Jih Pao (Peking)
26.5.1955.
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for the Bureaux, since they had failed completely 
to devise a control system appropriate for building 
up a stable work force which had rising efficiency 
levels and could be allocated according to the fluct­
uating demands of enterprises and the priorities of 
the Government, Instead, there had been widespread 
use of unskilled, temporary labour which had been an 
unnecessary burden on costs and facilitated illicit 
migration. Moreover, the situation was in danger 
of deterioration, because the vacuum of authority 
left by the abolition of the traditional job brokers 
was being filled by spontaneously created groups 
which threatened to complicate construction labour 
work still further!65)# As a result of all this, 
in 1954 and 1955 the Bureaux got really tough.
Construction teams were organised on a local basis; 
universal registration was enforced; and workers who 
refused to accept assignment were subject to
(65) nSome views on improving site labour
organisation*1, LT 1954 No.4.
punishments and criticism, if necessary in courts of 
* In 1955 the grip of the authorities was 
tightened even further as a result of a detailed check 
up of the work force in which the work of the Labour
Bureaux vfas actually merged with that of the Public
> . (67)Security organs^
Despite some success in the construction industry, 
the problems facing the Bureaux were becoming increas­
ingly intractable during the first eight months of 1955* 
Por on the one hand unemployment \vas increasing, yet 
on the other, the Bureaux seemed incapable of control­
ling hiring and the retirement of personnel in the
(66) See, nThe system for managing the temporary 
assignment of temporary construction workers in 
Tientsin”, LT 1954 No.10. ”Discussion on the problems 
of registering temporary const miction workers”, LT
IB54 No. 10. Also Mau Ohi Hua*s report, HDo well the 
work of allocating construction workers and subordinate 
(it) to national basic construction”, HHPTK 1954,
No.7. pp. 138-140#
(67) ^Struggle to liquidate every hidden counter 
revolutionary”, LT 1955 No.9.
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public sector The dilemma was that the two
problems were perversely related. -gome control of 
the labour force in the public sector was considered 
necessary for fulfillment of output plans and the 
control of costs. Yet one of the reasons why this 
control was so hard to achieve was that declining 
rates of urban employment absorption required toler­
ation of some flexibility in hiring procedures and 
also made control of illicit labour markets more 
difficult, and from an employment point of view, un­
desirable. What this suggests, is that however reason­
able in theory, the attempt to divide the urban labour 
market into free and controlled sectors was unworkable 
in practice. One explanation for this was the lack of 
administrative resources devoted to labour work either 
within the Bureaux or within the labour departments 
of enterprises. Another explanation was the Bureaux1 
general lack of prestige and the failure of the 1950
(68} See, !tImprove labour organisation to fulfill the 
1955 Labour Plan”, LT 1955 No.l. "Strengthen labour
force management and assignment work”, LT 1955 No.7.
directives to define more exactly the character and 
extent of their powers^69 .^ A crucial point here 
being the relationship between the Municipal level 
Labour Bureaux and the centrally controlled enter­
prises.
Mid-1955 was a turning point in Labour work as 
in economic policy in general and in the second half 
of that year we begin to see the emergence of new 
solutions to all these problems. Within the urban 
areas, the Bureaux began to press again for overall 
control of hiring, even (by implication) at the expense
(69) In the Labour MinistryTs Journal during this 
period there are some extremely funny cartoons 
illustrating disregard for the Bureaux’ hiring re­
gulations. A common theme, is a house (representing 
an enterprise) with a Labour Bureau regulation for­
bidding additional hiring pinned to a closed, front 
door; meanwhile dozens of workers and staff are pouring 
in by side entrances and through the windows.
of increased unemployment ^ ^  . For not only had the 
Bureaux come to recognise the intrinsic unworkableness 
of a partially free labour market, but at the National 
level, the Ministry of Labour, armed with the results 
of the 1955 survey of the labour force in the public 
sector, was anxious to construct more ambitious and 
comprehensive labour plans whose implementation re­
quired more comprehensive power, particularly over
f 711the private sectorv *
(70) It would appear that one means of increased 
control was to be the enlargement of the functions 
of the Labour Balancing Committees. See, LT 1955
QP* Qii note 68#
(71) See the leading articles in JMJT 17*7.1955 
and LT 1955 No*8. The latter emphasised the im­
portance of extending labour planning to include 
the private sector.
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By mid-1955 however, the urban unemployment 
problem had beconie intolerable and a downward re­
vision of public sector labour requirements for the 
second half of the year would, had other things re­
mained equal, have made it worse* But 7this was not 
to be the case, for throughout 1955 we find a new 
emphasis on the role of agriculture as a potential 
absorber of unemployed labour and surplus urban 
population and in the. summer of 1955, we have the 
first round of the hsia feng (sending down} campaign*
This campaign to return to the countryside large 
numbers of the migrants who had infiltrated the cities 
was concluded on an ambitious scale and prosecuted with 
vigour. in Shanghai for example, the original plan was 
to reduce the city’s population by 1*000.000 (14%)
(72)although the final out-turn was only half that number *
(72) See, niUi important measure in Shanghai 
Municipality", JMJP 3.5.1955 and CBJP 3.8*1955*
The latter also brings out the crucial role of
the private sector in facilitating illicit migration.
Most of those who were “sent down” were to go to the 
rural areas, although at the same time plans were made 
to send workers to other cities, Every medium of 
persuasion and a wide variety of inducements were 
utilised to make the campaign a success* The news­
papers of the period are filled with letters from 
workers already back in the rural areas, who affirmed 
the availability of food and work; appealed to the 
nostalgia of migrant peasants and described with 
optimism the present and imminent changes in rural 
life which the cooperativisation was bringing about.
But of course there was something of a paradox 
in all this, Bor how were the employment problems 
of millions of urban residents to be solved by a 
return to a coop era tivisacl countryside when nearly 
all the evidence suggested that prior to 1955, 
rural reform had not been favourable to increases 
in rural employment, but on the contrary, had tended 
to diminish it$ This consideration makes it seem 
highly probable to us that there was a close connect­
ion between the decision to launch the hsia fang 
movement and the decision to try and move the
cooperativisation movement onto a new level in late
1955 and early 1956^ level where it would bring
about a genuinely comprehensive reorganisation of
rural life and thereby make a planned expansion of
(7 1.)
rural employment more feasible.
(73) In August 1955 there was a report which described 
the growth of unemployment in the cooperatives and 
peasant demand for the development of secondary occupations. 
"The new transformations in the economic life of the 
peasants", TKP 16.8.1955.
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Ohapter Six
Employment -policy and administration Part II;
1956-1957
Employment aspects of the High Tide of Socialism
1955-1956
There can be no doubt that the agricultural 
cooperativisation in late-1955 was expected to have 
a dramatic impact on the urban economy and to re­
trieve the First Five Year Plan from the possibility 
of failure; it is however important to appreciate 
that the original plans for sharp increases in con­
struction and industrial output in 1956 did not involve 
any immediate change in the employment policies of 
1955, This view is confirmed by article 39 of the 
Twelve Year Plan for Agriculture (published in January 
1956) in which it was stated that the growth envisaged 
by the Plan would enable agriculture to absorb 
sufficient urban unemploymentto enable the urban areas 
to achieve full employment within five to seven years. 
There Is evidence that in early 1956 many cities were 
actually active in setting up agricultural cooperatives 
to absorb their unemployed manpower and surplus
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population^ . Further confirmation of the continuity 
with the policies of 1955, is in a series of revealing 
articles on the control figures for the 1956 Plan which 
were published in September 1955. Although these 
articles do not quote any figures, (since these would 
still be the subject of discussion and negotiation), 
they do make it clear that the planners were envisaging 
very large increases of output which were to be achieved 
by redistribution of the existing urban labour force 
and by a general increase in work intensity. Moreover, 
since 1956 was the first year in which there could be 
said to have been even an attempt at an overall labour 
plan, there was some reason to hope that the outcome of 
labour administration might be more predictable.than it 
had been in earlier years^.
(1) The Draft Programme for Agricultural Development
1956-19674 Bowie and Fairbank, op.cit. pp. 119-126.
An example of the hsia fang in early 1956 is, “Changchun 
city sends more than 25.000 people to participate in 
agricultural production”, Kuang Ming Jih 3?ao» 29.5.1956.
(s) CHCC 1955 i\fo.9. See especially pages 3 and 15. Only 
relief and public security enterprises were exempted from 
the obligation to make labour plans.
“*3SS"*
The continuities with 1955 extended to the rules 
of administration as well as strategy. The drive 
towards total control of hiring was continued and by 
the time that the Labour Bureau Chiefs met to finalise 
the labour assignment plan in May 1956, it was claimed 
that all hiring was being administered by the Bureaux,^ 
The urban employment experience of 1956 confounded 
expectations and although the final plan for employment 
did allow for a substantial rise, even this proved
t
unrealistic. In the event, the expansion of urban
employment was not only sufficient to absorb a high
(&>(
proportion of the unemployed, but also Jj»\®&/vto a reversal 
of participation trends. The increase in participation 
took the form of an increase in female labour and the 
absorption of many young, hitherto unemployed persons.
The increase in female participation was widely welcomed 
and taken as satisfaction of long unfulfilled promises 
such as those made at the time of the 195S employment
(3) ”The national assignment plan for 1956 settled”,
HWP 17,5.1956*
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decisions. The absorption of younger persons into
the labour force can be seen from the spectacular in­
creases in apprentices. In Shanghai for example, the 
number of apprentices absorbed in 1956 was more than
(5)twice the number absorbed in the previous five years' .
(4} See data in Chapter One which indicates the speed 
of the upsurge in 1956* For female participation see, 
"Mobilise female strength and develop its activist 
value", OFJP 12.8*1956, (This article discussed the 
importance of creches in Shanghai) . Also the Labour 
Report for 1956, OFJP 18,8,1956, Female labour was 
also much more extensively utilised in rural areas in 
1956, see, "Develop the activism and mobilise female 
strength; protect the health and safety of women and 
children", a speech by Teng Ying GhTao to the National 
PeopleTs Congress. (Teng is the wife of Chou Fn Lai 
and has had a remarkable personal career}.
(5) "The improvement in the welfare of the city's 
workers and staff", GFJP 28,9,1956 and Chiang Meng 
Oh'iang and Kao Liu Wen, "Some remaining problems in 
the increase of workers and staff in Shanghai 
industrial enterprises in 1956", TOICT 1957 No. 15, 
pip. 29-51.
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The work of the Labour Bureaux in this unexpected 
and somewhat exhilarating enviroment, was very different 
from that envisaged only a few months earlier. In the 
first place control of hiring became impossible. This 
was partly because for most of the year the Bureau 
staff were engrossed in wage reform work and partly 
because as in 1951 and 1953, the volume of work and the 
pressures to allow free hiring were too great to make 
detailed control feasible. Thus whereas in May we found 
the Labour Bureau Chiefs eongratulating themselves on 
eliminating free hiring, in August we find the Head of 
the Shanghai Bureau critisizing the rigidity and ineffic­
iency of the existing hiring procedures and agreeing to 
their relaxation^. This trend towards liberalization 
continued up to the end of 1956 because labour 
administration became involved in the wider controversy
(6) CFJP 12.8.1956. A reference to a general Ministry 
of Labour relaxation in 1956 is in, "The Labour Ministry 
holds a conference to decide on measures for solution 
of the problem of labour arrangement", NONA 23.4.1957 
(SGMP 1521). An indication of the freedom of workers 
to move in 1956 is a report that hundreds of railwaymen
(6) (Oont'd)
just walked out of their jobs in search of more 
satisfactory employment. Bee, "Why railway workers in 
North China quit their posts", JMJP 22.7.1956.
of economic decentralization. In this controvei^sy, 
supporters of decentralization argued that the 
efficiency of individual enterprises required local 
flexibility in the use of labour as well as capital, 
and indeed, at one point in late 1956, the implications 
of decentralization appeared ko extreme, that in some 
areas the Labour Bureaux were reported to be handing 
over their powers to local planning bodies and closing 
down^.
(7) "Give enterprises appropriate powers of self- 
government", HHPYK 1956 No.23 pp. 46-47. Chang Wan 
Chieh, "Concerning the problem of the sphere of duties 
of the Provincial, Municipality and Country Planning 
Committeesr labour, wage and cadre training offices", 
QHCC 1956 No. 10, pp. 24-25.
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Another reversal in the work of the Labour Burearn 
during 1956 was their new attitude to labour force 
movement between rural and urban areas. In early 1956, 
the outflow of population from Shanghai and other cities 
was continuing^0} # Part of this outflow was to the 
rural areas and part (in the case of Shanghai, Tientsin 
and other ”oldft industrial cities) was to the new, 
rapidly growing cities. In some cases the return to the 
countryside was motivated by the propaganda and promises 
surrounding the cooperativisation campaign but many 
returned simply to protect their interests as best they 
might. Also, it has to be remembered that prior to 1956, 
many families split their labour between rural and urban
(8) implement overall planning, strengthen leadership 
policy and do labour assignment and hiring work well”,
LT 1956 No#5. There is an interesting account of a 
meeting of unemployment activists who were cooperating 
in an attempt to encourage voluntary emigration from 
Shanghai in, CFJP 6,2*1956*
areas, with the men tending to work in the cities and 
the women remaining behind to do agricultural work or 
supervise rented property. i\fter cooperativisation
NOT
this type of arrangement was tolerated by the rural 
cadres, who in their quest for agricultural output were 
determined to maximise their supply of labour power and 
therefore, where necessary, resorted to intimidation to 
ensure that able bodied relatives of cooperative members 
returned to the countryside- The effect of this return 
was so serious that in Shanghai, on the eve of the urban 
leap forward, we find reports that the loss of workers 
was causing some factories to shut down completely^).
(9) Cadres in Kiangsu were said to have addressed urban 
workers in these terms: ,fYour families not participate
in the High Level Cooperatives. You (who remain) in the . 
factories affect agricultural output and must (therefore) 
immediately return home. If you do not (your families) 
will be treated as non-agricultural households and their 
land will be divided again and given to other*and (they 
will receive) no further supply of grain*1. See, "Do 
not force workers to return to rural areas”, JMJP 
19.4.1956.
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The outflow to the key point cities was a reflect­
ion of the policy of redistributing manpower resources 
on the lines laid down in the First Plan. In early 
1956, the older cities such as Shanghai were not al­
together unwilling to cooperate in this, as they:W.ere at 
that time contending with an increase of unemployment 
which had resulted from the socialization campaigns, 
particularly in commerce. But by the middle of the 
year, the problems of labour supply were so acute that 
we find the Shanghai Bureau bitterly regretting the 
contracts by which labour transfers had taken place^^). 
This situation seems to have been widespread in urban 
China in Summer 1956 as the demands of construction, 
transport and industry for labour mounted and rural 
cadres continued to recruit labour in the urban areas.
As a result of all this we find the Labour Ministry 
having to take measures to ensure that urban labour 
needs were met, and the Shanghai Bureau trying to 
renegotiate some of its inter-city and Provincial labour
(IQ)GFJF 11.8.1956
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contract s^1*^  • This latter was however no easy 
task, even though the workers involved were them­
selves very anxious to return to Shanghai* in the 
case of one big contract with the Province of Shensi, 
the best that the Shanghai Bureau could manage was 
an agreement that in the first instance it would 
attempt to recruit from workers sent back to the 
Kiangsu countryside in the 1955 hsia fang, and if it 
could not meet its requirements in this way, it could 
request the return of workers from Shensi*
Autumn 1956: the return from the countryside
By late 1956 the exceptional factors which had 
led to net emigration from Shanghai in 1955 and early 
1956 had spent their force* The harvest of 1956 was 
below expectations in the output of main crops and 
the curtailment of subsidiary activities accentuated
(11) "Strengthen labour force assignment work", LT 
1956 No.8* "Agricultural cooperatives must organise 
manpower to help industrial construction", JMJP 
9.6.1956* "Mobilise Shanghai workers to settle down 
to participating in construction in Shensi", Shensi 
Jih Pao (Shensi Baily) 9*9.1956.
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the impact of this on incomes* This set hack was 
partly due to natural factors but mismanagement of 
the cooperatives was also important. To the dis­
incentive effect of low incomes we have to add the 
fact that members of the new cooperatives were worked 
very hard(^s). We do not know of any out-turn 
figures for this, but the 1956 agricultural plan for 
the Shanghai suburbs estimated that the number of 
working days per household would be 259; which may be 
compared with 210 in 1955 and a figure of 100 which 
was mentioned for the pre-collectivisation period^13).
(12) "Struggle to enable the great majoiiity of co­
operative members to increase their incomes" HWP 
23.11*1956# "Rationally solve the unemployment 
problem" Chekiang jrih Pao 7.5.1957# "Do agricultural
production work well in the suburbs (of Shanghai) so 
that it is appropriate to the needs of the city’s 
industrial production", QFJP 12.8.1956.
(13) "Fully use agricultural manpower", WHF 21.3.1956.
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If this sort of increase did occur (and the technioal 
reforms attempted and the water and conservation work 
claimed to have been done suggest that they did) then 
it cannot be surprising that there were many migrants 
like those returning to Canton in Autumn 1956, who were 
reported as saying, "anything is better than this"^4)* 
In addition to the return of recently "hsia fanged" 
urban residents and peasants, there was also a sub­
stantial inflow of families of urban workers and staff 
who had remained in the countryside. These families 
often owned land and housing in the rural areas, and 
when the cooperatives were set up they had the choice 
of persuading their urban relations to return, or of 
moving themselves into the cities. They could not 
remain in the countryside since the inepjnes-3 allocat­
ion principle of the collectives - that income was to 
be dependant on work - implied a drastic reduction in 
their standard of living. As 1956 progressed,
(14) Tzy YU Chen Hsien (The Free Battle Front), 
(Hong Kong) 17.9.1956.
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increasing numbers of people In this position opted 
for total removal to the cities^5)*
1957: the making of a new employment strategy
In attempting to recondfcruct Chinese economic 
polioy in the 1950? s, one has constantly to avoid the 
temptation of linking together policy statements and 
administrative measures so that they have an appear­
ance of design and coherence which probably exagger­
ates the degree to which in reality they comprised an 
articulate and fully comprehended plan. This is part­
icularly the case in 1957. For this was a formative 
year during which the principles of economic polioy 
were often uncertain and the subject of acute controv­
ersy* But although this was so, we think it possible 
to trace the development of a new strategy for employ^ 
ment which had its origins in late 1956, and its 
culmination in early 1958. An4 even if in the first
(15) A very good account of this process is "(After) 
increasing output (it willbe possible) to raise the 
people's standard of living", Liaoning Jlh Pao 
24.12.1956*
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instance this strategy was not fully worked out, the 
logical and practical interdependence of its different 
aspects justifies our considering it as a whole*
The employment plan for 1957
(M
The loss of hiring control in 1956 had to
an increase in employment which almost fulfilled the
plan for the whole of the First Five Year Plan period.
Since the 1957 plans for output were very conservative,
the demand for labour from the public sector (which in
urban areas was now almost co-termlnous with the
economy} was bound to be small. In April, the annual
Labour Assignment Conference issued a gloomy communique
in which it confirmed that the 1956 labour intake was
considered to have been in excess pf 1957 requirements
and which reflected widespread fears of redundancy,
(16)
particularly in construction . In July, Po I Po 
announced the official plan figures which showed that 
although average employment of workers and staff in 
1957 was expected to be 4.7$ higher than the 1956 
level, total employment at the end of 1957 would be
(16) HWP 24.4.1957.
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marginally lower than the peak reached at the end 
of 1956*17*.
This prospect of stagnant demand for labour in 
1957 has to be matched with certain special aspects of 
the labour supply situation. For in addition to the 
natural increment to the labour force in 1957 there 
were three other elements in the supply of labour in 
that year. First there was the renewed flow of migr­
ants seeking jobs. In Shanghai for example, between 
June 1956 and September 1957 over 700*000 migrants 
moved into the city - some 300.000 more than had been 
shifted out in the hsia fang campaign of 1955^®)* 
Second there was a net outflow of manpower from the 
Army(19)#
(17) Po I Po, ♦♦Report on the out-turn of the 1956 
national economic plan and the draft plan for 1957", 
HHFYK 1957 No.14 pp. 28-39*
(18) TOP 7*8*1958#
(19) "This year’s number of demobilised soldiers is 
much greater than the number of new soldiers",
HWP 5.4.1957.
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And third, there were the problems created by the 
crisis in education*
In our estimates for Shanghai, we noted the 
employment significance of the growth of the educat­
ional retention and showed how rapid changes in the 
growth of the retention could have a very marked
effect on the problem of employment absorption*
During the first four years of the First Plan the 
educational system had bwen growing very rapidly 
indeed and the significance of this was discussed 
in Chapter Three* As we commented then, the growth 
of the educational system had limits set both by the 
cost of the educational system and by the supply of 
urban employment appropriate to the type of training 
offered by the middle schools and universities. The 
effect of these limits began to be felt in 1957* In
that year there was a sharp drop in the rate of growth
of the intake into the middle schools and an absolute 
decline in university entry which reduced it to a 
level nearly one third lower than that reached in 1956* 
The effect of this was to sharpen the educational 
pyramid and by comparison with 1953-1956, to reduce
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the net off-take from the labour market. The decline 
in university entrants meant that for the first time 
since 1953, the intake into the universities was less 
than the number of graduates from the Senior Middle 
Schools. The outcome of the position is illustrated 
in Diagram 5. This shows the inflow and outflow from 
the Higher Middle Schools from 1953 to 1957; the size 
of the net inflow is indicated by the gap between the two M  
lines. The dotted lines show what could be expected to 
happen up to 1960 on the assumption that the inflow 
remained at the 1957 level. It will be seen that in
i
1959, there was the prospect of a large net outflow 
and therefoa^e, the net outflow would be nil. 1957 
therefore, marked the beginnings of a serious crisis 
in the educational system which was to have important 
educational and political repercussions as well as 
economic ones^^.
(SO) The authoritative account of this crisis is a 
speech by Chang Hsi Jo (Minister of Education),
"Concerning the employment problems of junior and 
middle school students who cannot continue their educ­
ation and the school starting age", CFJP 17.3.1957.
See also, "This year’s higher education intake 107.000,
QFJP 27.3.1957.
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The new status given to employment questions in 
1957 rested on more than short term considerations,
For reflection on the employment experience of the 
First Five Year and tentative calculations of the 
employment implications of the second and third plans, 
brought home to the Government the structural nature 
of the problem# Sung P’ing, Li Fu Ch’un and numerous 
others demonstrated that since the maximum proposed 
increase in employment during the Second Plan was 
7 million jobs, this would imply cumulative increases 
of unemployment in the whole economy of upwards of 
5 million a year^2^J# Calculations of this sort were 
made at the local as well as the national level. In 
Shanghai, the proposed rate of growth of industry in 
the Second Plan was 9.7$ per annum (compared with an 
out-turn of 14.$ in the First Plan). But whereas in 
the First Plan there had been a net labour input of 
260,000, which accounted for 51$ of the industrial 
growth in that period; in the Second Plan, the net
(21) See, "Develop research into the population prob-
lsia,S WHP 21.2.1957 and "Birth control and my country’s 
population problem", WH£ 16.3.1957, sung P’ing op.cit. 
HH 1957 No.18.
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planned increase in employment in industry was to be 
negligble^^. This picture fits in with our analysis 
of the Shanghai growth process in Ohapter Three, where 
we observed that without additionalainvestment growth 
rates of output and employment must decline. According 
to that analysis, the data for ShanghaiTs Second Five 
Year Plan could either indicate that the opportunities 
for absorbing additional employment through increases 
in plant utilisation had all been exhausted, and that
(22) The original target rate of.growth for industry 
in Shanghai’s First Five Year Plan was 11.1# per annum* 
The Plan was reported as fulfilled in September 1956 and 
the final out-turn represented a growth rate of 14.1#, 
See *A marked increase in Shanghai’s industrial and 
agricultural output11, WHP 5.1.1957. "Shanghai industry 
contributes one fifth", HWP 30.9.1957. Targets imply-* 
ing rates of 9.7# and 8.3# were announced in August 1956 
for the Second and Third Plans. See, HWP 8.8.1956. The 
labour plan for the Second and Third Plans are in OFJP 
11.8*1956. It should be noted that the Second and Third 
Plan targets vary slightly in different texts. This is
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the planners were therefore allowing the expected rate 
of growth of productivity to determine the rate of grow­
th of output; or alternatively, it may have been that 
the desired growth of output - itself determined by the 
supply of intermediate goods or some other criterion - 
was sufficiently low for the planners to be able to 
achieve it entirely by increasing productivity. This 
latter carries the interesting implication that planners 
no longer set any value on increasing urban employment 
for its own sake. Similar estimates were made in other 
cities and all areas were required to build proposals
for solving their unemployment problem into their over-
(23)all plans for the period up to 1962 *
(22) (Cont’d)
presumably due to the fact that the planners were per­
petually re-calculating on the basis of changing out­
turns of current plans. The differences however are 
not significant.
(23) For example, The Qanton labour plan for the Second 
Plan is in, Mffjp 29.11.1956.
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The implications of these plans were discussed 
throughout 1957 and during the year a series of measures 
constituting a new employment strategy were gradually 
introduced. It was realised that there was not a great 
deal which could be done on the demand side in the urban 
areas, although as we saw earlier, the 1957 Plan did 
acknowledge the value of increasing labour intensity and 
adjusted the emphasis of the investment plan for that 
year accordingly. The main features of the new strategy 
were on the supply side and the first which we will 
consider is the action taken to try and reduce the 
participation rate.
Participation rates
We have seen how control of participation rates 
had already been used in the early 1950’s to minimise 
the unemployment consequences ot urban fluctuations and 
the strategy of the First Plan. But in 1956, the trend 
to limit participation was reversed, and equally im­
portant, high expectations of future possibilities of 
participation were aroused. In 1957 the Government were 
faced with the task of having to reverse this; having
already almost completely exhausted the possibilities of
341-*
reducing participation by eliminating child labour 
and reducing hours*
The most immediate objective was renewed limitation 
of female participation* The difficulty here was that 
no legal limitation/possible and recourse therefore had 
to be made to propaganda campaigns which emphasized that 
domestic work was as real a contribution to economic 
construction as work in a factory. From the speed with 
which this campaign was reversed in 1958, it would seem 
that it had met with little enthusiasm, even if there 
had been some acquifsenee^4^  #
Another form of participation limitation introduced 
in 1957 was the lengthening of the apprenticeship period. 
Together with other changes in apprentice arrangements, 
this change, while not limiting participation in work,
(24) "The problem of female employment can only be 
solved gradually* OFJP 13*IS.1956. See also, Important 
Documents from the National Conference Of Representatives 
Of Family Dependants Of Workers And Staff, (in Chinese), 
published by the female department of the All China 
Federation of Trade Unions (Peking, 1957).
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did have the effect of slowing down the automatic 
element in the growth of the permanent work force which 
had previously been governed by the very short apprentice 
times served prior to 1957{25).
The most important aspect of participation control 
in this period was the reform of the retirement regul­
ations, It will be recalled that there had been a 
crisis in 1955 which arose because workers had no 
incentive to retire in accordance with the insurance 
regulations, compliance with which was only mandatory 
in a small proportion of enterprises. In that year 
new regulations were introduced to govern retirement 
from state administrative and similar organs. However, 
ft up to the end of 1956, only 62.000 persons had 
retired from enterprises and only 1*000 from state 
administrative organs. An effort was made therefore 
to correct the defects in the old regulations in a new
(25) State Council Communication on lengthening the 
a tot entice time limit. HHFXK 1957, No, 11, page 121.
An important Peoplets Daily editorial on the subject 
is reported in HHFTK 1957, No.12 pp* 123-124.
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set which were published in November 1957^2^«
The population plans for the Second Plan period
Although population control was, at the national 
level, only a long term solution to employment problems, 
it undoubtably received more publicity and discussion 
than any other aspect of the labour supply question.
There were two parts to the population control policy* 
The first was the control of the natural growth rate 
of the total population; the seoond was the control of 
the size and population growth rates of the cities#
The control of the natural growth rate was linked 
throughout the 1950*s with the question of employment.
We saw how in 1953, population control was rejected on 
the grounds that the First Plan would generate sufficient
(26) State Council Draft Regulations on the management 
of retirement of workers and staff. HHFYK 1957, No,24 
pp. 89-91. This regulation cancelled the 1951, 1953 
and 1955 retirement regulations. In 1956 it was ad­
mitted that in the coal industry alone, nearly 7# of the 
workforce was due for retlrmeint. Sung Shao Wen, "Labour 
balancing and assignment work in the <*reat Leap Forward", 
0H00 1958 No.4 page 4*
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employment to utilise a large and rapidly growing 
population. In 1954, the idea of control came back 
into favour and it is possible, although not certain, 
that this may have bean a reflection of current employ­
ment difficulties as well as a new recognition of the 
dimensions of the food supply p r o b l e m ^ . In 1956 
there was some debate on the question but predictably 
enough, we find that on the whole the optimism engender­
ed by the rapid growth of employment was reflected in 
rejection of population control programmes which, it 
was argued, had been rendered obsolete by the arrival 
of socialism^®8).
(27) "A criticism of reactionary, modern Chinese 
population theories", Hsin Ohien She. 1955 No*12#
(28) See, "Unemployment disappearing in China",
TKP (Hong Kong), 16.10*1956. Also, "Qhu TeTs speech", 
CFJP 19.9.1956. But opinion was not unanimous in 1956, 
see "For the active dissemination of contraceptive 
knowledge", Kuang Ming Jih Pao 5.8.1956 (SQM? 1552).
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In 1957 the advocates of population control came 
into their own again. In the early part of the year the 
press devoted considerable space to the problem and 
special population conferences were held by the Health,
i *
rvmfVTHuS* fOQl
Labour and other interestedMai-stegifrs1^* * The debate 
was closely related to current employment issues, and 
was climaxed and concluded at the Supreme State 
Conference in February when Mao made his speech "On the 
Correct Handling of Contradictions among the People".
We do not have the original text of this speech but it 
was followed six days later by a People*s Daily editorial 
advocating bir th control and an article in the Shanghai 
press on March 14th, states uniquivocally that this 
policy had been advocated by Chairman Mao in his speeoh(30)#
(29) At least one theorist argued that employment should 
be the first criterion in considering the optimum size of 
population. See, "A discussion of optimum population 
size>", WHB 27.4.1957. At the Labour Ministry conference 
speakers included Chen Ta and Fei Hsiao Tung, "Research 
on the problems of Chinafs population", Chekiang Jdh Pao
16.3.1957.
(30) "Exercise appropriate birth control", JBJP 5.3*1957 
(SCMP 1487), and WHP 14.3.1957.
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In the urban areas in 1957, the policy of popul­
ation control was specifically related to the need to 
control the demand for land, grain and urban facilities 
as well as to the employment question; and its imple­
mentation involved renewal of forced emigration as well 
as action on the vital rates* Once again, individual 
cities made their own population plans within the frame­
work of their Seven and Five Year Plans* In Shanghai 
the first population plan was talked about in January 
1957, but the final plan was not announced until January 
1958 when it reflected the urgency of the problems which 
the renewed inflow of 1957 had created* Basically, the 
plan envisaged that the city’s population should be stab­
ilised at 7.000*000 and this was to be achieved by 
migration and reduction pf the natural growth rate from 
3.3$ to 1.3$. The reduction in the natural rate was to 
be achieved by contraception and late marriages. On 
the employment side, it was estimated that there would 
be 500.000 new entrants to the labour force, but that 
since there was to virtually no net increase in indust-* 
rial employment, only 100.000 of these could be employed 
within the city as replacements for expected retirements.
-347-.
It can be seen that these proposals had important 
implications for emigration if the population was to 
be held constant and full employment of the labour 
force to be maintained since fulfillment of these 
objectives would require that in the course of the 
Plan period up to 1 million persons would have to be 
transferred out of the city, of whom 40$ would be of 
working age. Thereafter, holding the population 
constant would require an annual emigration of slightly 
less than 100.000 a year^S1 *^
In conclusion we may note that although continued 
overall growth of population meant that absolute stab­
ility of population was an objective which could only 
be achieved in selected areas; the idea of a long term 
programme to stabilise China’s total population also 
seems to have had some currency at this time. Li Fu 
Oh’un for example, envisaged a fifteen year tapering 
off period after which the population would remain
(31) Based on data and statements in, "Mobilise surplus 
urban labour power; help socialist agricultural con­
struction", WHF 7.1.1958. "Reduce the natural population 
growth rate of Shanghai to 2$", TOP 23.1.1958. NONA
9.9.1957 (SGMP 1608).
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constant at 7 0 0 * 0 0 0 # 0 0 0 *
The Hsia Fang Movement
The employment and population plans of 1957 implied 
a renewal of the effort to reverse the rural-urban mig­
ration. This is generally known as the hsia fang move­
ment and the significance of it in 1957, was that it 
reflected final recognition not only of the fact that 
the process^rural-urban population transfers would have 
to be postponed for a generation, but also of the fact 
that much off the transfer that had taken place would 
have to be reversed. This was a break with the socialist 
pattern of development as exemplified in the Soviet Union 
and Eastern Europe and was recognised as such. As Wang 
Kuang Wei wrote in his classic article of August 1957,
"in this respect we differ from fraternal socialist 
countriesn 3^S^•
(32) WHP 14.3,1957.
(33) Wang Kuang Wei, "Views concerning the arrangement 
of the agricultural labour force", OHOC 1957 Ho#8, pp#6-9.
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Although the movement as a whole can be fitted
into the general revision of employment strategy which
took place in 1957, it is worth noting that the hsia
fang was in its origins a series of separate movements, 
which in the course of the year gradually coalesced into
a single, massive, population outflow. In the first 
place, it was one of the long series of drives to return 
migrant peasants to the countryside, starting as usual, 
in time for the spring planting^3*). The second element 
in the movement was the drive to eliminate bureaucracy 
and over-manning. In Shanghai this started in late 1956 
and continued on a national scale right up to the end of 
1957. In its early stages, it is interesting to note 
that being "sent down" did not necessarily mean being 
sent to the countryside. It often implied being trans­
ferred from administrative or office work to participate 
in practical or physical work in schools, on the shop 
floors etc. An important aspect of this was the attempt
(34) .^Shanghai mobilise^ peasants to return to the 
countryside, WHP 14*3.1957#
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to persuade cadres to work in small scale enterprises 
where the potential for increased labour intensive 
production was considerable, but unutilised for lack 
of competent m a n a g e m e n t • As time passed however, 
the cadre hsia fang movement became increasingly a 
movement to transfer cadres to the rural areas where 
the collectivisation movement was in danger of collapse, 
partly because of lack of administrative resources, and 
where a complete reorganisation of local government was 
taking place*
Another component of the hsia fang was the campaign 
to solve the problem of student unemployment. In the
(35) See, "Simplification of the structure must be 
combined with reform of the system", HHPTK 195V No.6, 
pp. 14-15. "^our hundred Shanghai administrative cadres 
transfer to work at the basic level", Tsinghai Jih Pao 
SI.1.1957 and "Go to the small factory", OFJT 18.4.1957.
A very interesting example of the sort of analysis which 
was undertaken in the "simplification" campaigns is,
"See the necessity for simplification in the grain 
ministry from statistical data", TQKT 1957 No.8 29.4.1957, 
pp. 9-12.
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context of 1957 there was no satisfactory urban solution 
to this problem. The students therefore had to join 
the exodus to the rural areas where it was hoped that 
some,:iof their skills would be of value. In order to 
facilitate this transfer the revised version of the 
12 year agricultural plan made specific provision for 
the absorption of unemployed students and by November 
the People's Daily reported that 2 million Middle and
Junior School graduates had left the cities for rural
^(36) work .
The last part of the Hsia Pang which we shall 
consider, was the return to the countryside of the 
families of workers and staff who had migrated into the 
towns in search of higher living standards than those 
offered in the rural areas. A survey published in July
(36) See the sections in eduoation in HHFYK 1957 
Nos,7,9 and 16, The revised Agricultural Plan is in 
HHFYK 1957 No, 22 and the relevant section is on page 
128. Also, "Must establish home and work in the
countryside", People's Daily editorial, HHFYK 1957 
No,23, pp,165-167.
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1957 showed that in fifteen major cities, 60$ of the 
population were classified as non-productive and that 
the rate of growth of this section of the urban pop- 
ulation was higher than that of the wproductives"(37). 
It was this group that put unexpected and severe press­
ure oSS urban food and housing supply and unless it 
could be controlled, the Government would be forced to 
make substantial reallocation of resources from pro­
ductive to infra-structural investment which would have 
undermined the investment strategy of the Second Plan, 
In order to facilitate the return of families and make 
enforced separation more humane, the Government intro­
duced new measures which were to enable workers to 
visit their families on a regular basis^38).
(57) "The non-productive population c£ the cities is 
too large and growing too fast", NONA 25,7.1957,
(38) "Workers and staff must persuade their families 
to return to the oountryside", HWF 10.4.1957. The 
regulations on holiday visiting are in HHFIK 1957 No,24 
page 95.
These then were the tributaries which •merged in 
late 1957 and early 1958 into a large scale population 
flow from the towns* Looked at overall it was a remark­
able achievement. Over 1 million people were moved 
(apart from the students) compared with 800.000 in the 
hsia fang of 1955. For the most part they were moved 
without force although it should mot be forgotten that 
the movement coincided closely with a rectification 
campaign of considerable vigour, although even this 
could not be said to have equalled the ferocity of the 
Hu Feng campaign in 195s(39). There was however one 
aspect of the 1957 hsia fang which differentiated it 
from its predecessors; this was the explicit recognit­
ion, that underlying the campaign was the power and 
right of the authorities responsible for employment 
and population, to assign individuals to their places
(39) The directive on rectification was reported in 
Shanghai on May 1st; this was followed on May 15th 
by the directive on cadre participation in physical 
labour which was a key element in the hsia fang 
campaign. HWP 1.5.1957, HWP 15.5.1957.
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pf residence and work, in our next section we shall 
consider the way in which this principle affected the 
work of the Labour Bureaux.
The Labour Bureaux reform their work: the enlargement
of the sphere of assignment.
The attention given to labour issues and population 
control in 1957 gave new stature to the Labour Bureaux 
and a new lease of life to their activities. We noted 
that in late 1956 there were some signs of disintegrat­
ion in labour administration at the local level; and 
indeed, the abandonment of hiring control and the de­
centralization movement both seemed to provide some 
rational^ for this. But by early 1957 it was apparent 
that the new employment policies, both tactical and 
strategic, required that the duties of the Bureaux be 
multiplied rather than diminished.
We have already seen that in 1952, a case for 
overall hiring control was made in relation to unemploy­
ment administration and how, in late 1955, the Bureaux 
began again to grope towards to idea of total control 
this time as a result of appreciating the difficulties 
inherent in trying to combine free and controlled labour
Please turn over.
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markets. In the course of 1957, it became clear that 
enlargement of hiring control was inescapable if the 
employment plan for the year was to be properly ful­
filled and if the various aspects of the hsia fang 
programme were to be successfully administered. More­
over, whereas in 1952 and 1955 the impetus towards 
control was mainly a by-product of the Bureaux admin­
istrative problems (which were not fully appreciated 
in high places) in 1957, it was given a now and potent 
theoretical basis by Chairman Mao in his speech on 
"Contradictions". The relevant passage is as follows;
"In drawing up plans, handling affairs or thinking 
over problems, we must proceed from the fact that China 
has a population of six hundred million people. This 
must never be forgotten.
Now why should we make a point of this? Could it 
be that there are people who still do not know that we 
have a population of six hundred million? Of course 
everyone knows this, but in actual practice some are 
apt to forget it and act as if they thought that the 
fewer people and the smaller their world the better..#
I hope these people will take a wider view and really 
recognize the fabt that we have a population of six
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hundred million, that this is an objective fact, and 
that this is our asset..# Our guiding principle (in 
resolving the contradictions inherent in a large pop­
ulation) is overall planning and all round considera­
tion, and proper arrangements. No matter whether it 
is a question of food, natural calamities, employment, 
education, the intellectuals, the United Front of all 
Patriotic Forces, the National Minorities, or any 
other question we must always proceed from the stand­
point of overall planning and all round consideration 
for the whole people".
The impact of this speech on the Labour Bureaux' 
work was immediate and throughout the year its key 
phrases were used to justify compulsory assignment of 
school and university graduates, temporary construction 
workers, excess manpower in industrial and administrative 
units, and the non-productive dependents of workers 
and staff . Control of these groups was not easily
(40) For example in November the People's Daily publish­
ed a very important editorial on labour matters entitled, 
"Proceed from 600 million", HHFYK: 1958 No#l. pp. 41-43.
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obtained; students were particularly vociferous but 
other groups also tried to resist undesireable assign­
ment with appeals to their freedoms written into the 
Constitution and adherence to what became known as 
"The Five Won't Do's"^-^#
The control of university graduates was not prim­
arily a Labour Bureau responsibility, but it is inter­
esting to see the way in which the handling of assign­
ment in this sphere ran parallel to the new trends in 
ordinary Labour Bureau work. Assignment of gratuates 
had started in 1950 and in theory had continued down 
to 1957; but in practice control of graduates was not 
easyt^ • This was particularly the case in 1956, a
(41) The five were; (1) "Leave Peking - will not do"
(2) "Not able to go home every day - will not do"
(3) "Repetitious work - will not do" (4) "Dirty work - 
will not do" and (5) "pay low - will not do"# See, 
"Thought problems in employment work must be overcome", 
TKP (Peking) 25.9.1957.
(42) For 1950 assignment see, JMJP 23.7.1950. A vivid 
personal account of graduate assignment in this early 
period is, Maria Yen, The Umbrella Garden (New York, 1954)
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year in which demand for graduates was reported as
being three times as great as supply^3). Graduate
assignment was an important issue in the Hundred Flowers,
when rightists were reported to be demanding a "free 
market for ability"(44). In 1957 therefore, it was
necessary to make further efforts to obtain voluntary 
submission to official assignment plans, and one of the 
most important measures taken, was to back the official 
plan with the sanction that graduates would not be
offered a second assignment if they refused their first 
and that any enterprises or state organ which accepted
(43) See some revealing stories, in The Place Where the 
Fatherland Needs Me (In Chinese) (1956). There is a 
striking picture in the Peking Museum of Post Revolution 
Art which shows a group of young people working in the 
mountains. The picture has the same title as the book 
mentioned above and is dated 1956. For data on the 
demand and supply of graduates in 1956 and a fascinating 
survey of assignment experience in earlier years see, 
"Contradiction between the supply and demand for 
university graduates", CFJP 2,6.1957.
(44) "University graduates determine to submit to 
(planned) distribution", HWP 27.7.1957.
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official ly assigned graduates was forbidden absolutely 
to hire any of the "free" graduates who would be looking 
for employment .
Control of rural-urban manpower movements continued 
to be an important aspeet of the Bureaux' hiring control 
work in 1957. We saw how in 1956 the establishment 
of cooperatives had complications for the labour supply 
of urban construction enterprises. In 1957, it was 
necessary to put temporary recruitment of rural labour 
onto a more reliable basis, not only to guarantee the 
adequacy of supply, but also to ensure that the construct­
ion industry did not again become the means of illicit 
population transfer. For although new Hu K'ou regulat­
ions were introduced in late 1957, the experience of the 
195Gfs showed that unless such regulations were accom­
panied by effective labour market controls, their effort 
on migration was not likely to be very great. The up­
shot of this was the introduction of a new system
(45) "Some decisions of principle concerning the work 
of distributing university graduates in summ&r 1957", 
HHFYK 1957 No.16 pp. 203-204.
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whereby temporary labour transfers were governed by 
collective eontraots between the agricultural co­
operatives and the hiring units. The terms of such 
contracts being subject to Labour Bureau approval^4:6^ * 
The administration of unemployment
Although the gravity of the urban unemployment 
crisis was leading to a radical new emphasis on the 
absorptive capacity of agriculture, even this could 
not offer an immediate and completely satisfactory 
solution to the problem, and throughout 1957, unemploy­
ment of different kinds lingered on in the cities. In 
many areas the machinery for administering relief had 
been completely dismantled by the end of 1956 and al­
though it was not formally rehabilitated in 1957, some­
thing had to be done. One reason for this was that un­
employment became an issue in the Hundred Flowers and 
Rectification campaigns and the authorities were anxious
(46) "State Council Temporary Regulations Concerning 
the Hiring By Units of Temporary Workers from the 
Countryside. JMJF 14.12.1957. See also, directives in, 
HHFYK 1958 No.2 pp. 119-121.
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to demonstrate the truth of their frequently repeated
assertion that unemployment was a phenomenon only
(47)
associated with capitalist economies. The
difficulty was that budgetary retrenchment and the 
abandonment of the unemployment levy left only minimal 
funds for unemployment relief. In these circumstances 
the Bureaux had to fall back on the policy of encourag­
ing the development of small producing and service 
units to which the authorities only contribution might 
be a small quantity of working capital. There is evid­
ence that the Bureaux found the organization of such 
units very difficult, for the work required considerable
administrative skills of which the Bureaux were usually 
in short supply; and that the cadres preferred relief 
work to take the form of simple cash or grain hand-outs. 
However, after pressure had been brought to bear in the 
Beatification campaign there is evidence that relief
(47) See "The cry of one who is unemployed", Kong Jen 
Jih Fao 16.5.1957, and "The Labour Bureau conscient­
iously deals with the views of representatives of the 
People's Congress", QFJP 5.8.1957.
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production units were started up on a wide scale^4^ .
The viability of relief units required that they 
be granted a certain degree of freedom both in factor 
and product markets and it is this that links the un­
employment problem of 1957 with the Government's de­
cision to re-open the free market in the urban areas 
for specified categories of goods and also with the 
partial relaxation of the new hiring controls 
The relationship between the free market and un­
employment was explicitly recognised, for as one 
Municipal level spokesman put it, "the opening of the
(48) "The Labour Bureau reforms its work", HWP
3.8.1957 and OFJP 3*8.1957. Ghungking and Wuhan also 
reported considerable activity in setting up relief 
production units, see "Gan urban unemployment be solved", 
Qhung Kuo Ch'ing Nien Pao 16.7.1957 and "Organise 
relief production units”, Ohang Ohiang Jih Pao 9.10.1957#
(49) See for example the Shenyang Labour Bureau Report 
for 1957, Shenyang Jih Pao 2# 8.1957. "Many methods of 
solving the unemployment problem", Ghekiang Jih Pao
14.5.1957, and "How many apprentices can handicraft 
and service trades hire?", LT 1957 No.16#
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free market (leads to) many new opportunities for 
self-found employment".
It is only in the light of this aspect of un­
employment work that we can appreciate the full irony 
of the dilemma facing the Government in its handling 
of the autonomous enterprises. We saw in Chapter One 
the way in which the Government was divided between 
desire to eliminate the autonomous enterprises in 
order to maintain control over resources use and prices, 
and the need to tolerate them for employment reasons.
But from every practical point of view there was no 
possible distinction to be made between autonomous 
enterprises and relief units. Both were capable of 
rapid growth from small beginnings and both could 
frustrate plans in the public sector; the only 
difference between them was that one was regarded as 
illicit capitalism and the other was a licit creation 
of the Labour Bureaux^50^, It would therefore have
(50) Average employment in relief units up to the end 
of 1955 was thirteen persons, See, NONA 4.2.1955. How­
ever, the classic example of a relief unit that made 
good - The Shanghai Iron Bed Vehicle Accessory Co­
oper at ive - grew from 3 to 199 persons in four years.
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(50) (Cont'd)
See "Business has endlessly enlarged in the three years 
from the establishment of the cooperative", HWP 
11.4.1954.
been absurd to eliminate the one and tolerate the other.
In our view this was the aohilles heel<f the new 
employment strategy as it emerged in 1957. For this 
strategy required full control of the urban labour 
market, and although the Bureaux succeeded in enlarging 
the sphere of their control over hiring, as long as 
small scale enterprises were allowed to flourish and 
hire freely, control could never be absolute. The 
existence of a free sector of the labour market was 
bound to undermine the ultimate sanction against those 
who resisted assignment - the threat that they would 
remain unemployed indefinitely - and bound also to 
make control of rural-urban migration difficult. %  the 
end of 1957 this point was appreciated and in mid-1958 
it was reported that in Shanghai the autonomous enter­
prises had been eliminated^3^ . The last spark of
(51) "Caution needed in absorbing autonomous enter­
prises", HWP 20.4*1958.
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capitalism had been extinguished in the flood of the 
Great Leap forward and the Labour Bureaux were, at 
least for a moment, in full control.
The Labour Bureaux and decentralization
Although significant, the problem of the relief 
units was only an aspect of the Bureaux' work. Their 
main effort in 1957 was to enlarge the range of their 
control rather than experiment in freedom. We drew 
from the experience of the early 1950's the general 
conclusion that detailed control of hiring was intrins­
ically difficult in an economy subject to fluctuations. 
The question that we must finally ask, is whether this 
experience was lost on the Chinese? Was the effort to 
enlarge hiring control simply to be another futile 
gesture as it had turned out to be before? We think 
that the answer to this is negative* For during 1957, 
the general movement for economic decentralization result­
ed in the local Labour Bureaux at last acquiring some 
clarification of their duties and an increase in powers, 
the lack of which had made their work so ineffective in 
earlier years.
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We saw how in 1955, the issue of the relationship 
between the local Bureaux and the centrally controlled 
enterprises had been raised and this remained unresolved 
in the upheavals of the following eighteen months. By 
the end of 1957, many centrally controlled enterprises
had been handed over to the local planning authorities 
and therefore fell automatically within the local labour 
plan; at the same time the authority of the Bureaux in 
relation to the remaining centrally controlled units 
seems to have been considerably strengthened as it had 
to be.if intra-city reassignment was to be an effective 
means of increasing productivity and meeting additional 
demand for labour. To some extent the local Bureaux 
had power thrust upon them as a by-product of the re­
volution which gave the local Party organisations a new 
role in economic administration, but it may also be 
argued that this larger reform was itself partly a re­
flection of a new awareness of labour problems and the 
realisation that multiple and largely independent 
systems of labour administration were incompatible with 
effective control of the total labour market
(52) Materials in, "The key to fulfillment of the 1957 
Labour Plan", LT 1957 No.3 and LT 1957 Nos. 11 and 
12 passim.
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Employment and the Great Leap Forward
The period we have been discussing lead directly 
into the Great Leap Forward of 1958, and it is to be 
hoped that what we have said throws some light on that 
tremendous upsurge. We cannot enter into this in detail 
but the most important point to be made is that the 
renewal of the hsia fang movement (and in particular 
its acceleration in early 1958) threw a tremendous burden 
on the capacity of agriculture to absorb and retain 
urban labour.
From the urban point of view, the transfer of sur­
plus population to the rural areas promised to simplify 
labour administration. But for the rural areas the 
prospect must have been appalling. First, because the 
countryside was still struggling to adjust to the 
institutional changes brought by collectivisation, and 
second because the prospects for absorbing urban un­
employment in the reclamation of new land were then being 
subject to radical revision. This latter point is of 
considerable importance. In the early 195G's there had 
been optimism about the prospects for reclamation based 
both on the existence of considerable areas of potent­
ially reolaimable land and on the success of land
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reclamation ~ in the war-time period. Unfortunately
the economic analogies with the war-time period were
largely illusory and by 1957 it was being argued that
returns to investment were higher if resources were 
used to increase output per on existing arable land
rather than extend the arable area. Moreover* of the 
three types of reclamation: the establishment of
state farms; marginal reclamation by existing cooperat­
ives; and reclamation of new areas by settlers; the 
latter was now found to be the most expensive. This 
reinforced the experience of 1956 (the peak year for 
settling urban migrants for reclamation) which had 
shown that this sort of reclamation involved formid­
able human and administrative problems. It was there­
fore decided that in the second Plan, this type rec­
lamation would play only a small role in the overall 
reclamation plan; - itself quite modest in relation 
to the expectations of the early 1950*s(5^*
(55) See, "Help settlers in production and the estab­
lishment of homes", Kuang Ming Jih Pao 10.10.1956, "Main 
tasks in settling migrants in 1957". Kuang Ming Jih Pao 
6. S.1957. "Some views on settling personnel without 
work (In Kiangsu)", IDT 1957 No. 16, and Hsiao Yu,
"Reclaim waste land; enlarge the arable area", QHCG 
1958 No.2, ppf21-24*
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The alternative to absorption of urban labour 
through reclamation was absorption into existing co­
operatives, The technical possibilities for absorp­
tion in existing communities were considerable, For 
not only was there a margin of land available for re­
clamation within these areas, but the labour require­
ments implied in the extension of double cropping and 
other technical improvements envisaged in the Twelve 
Year Agricultural Plan were very high. However the 
evidence of 1957 had shown that cooperatives were in­
clined to resist an inflow of unskilled in agricultural 
work and that the problems of organising subsidiary 
activities in units the size of cooperative were very 
g r e a t ,
The conclusion is therefore, that successful 
implementation of the new employment strategy required 
a further transformation of rural organisation which 
would enable the rural areas to absorb both the urban 
outflow planned for 1958 and a continuing outflow there­
after, Thus whether the initiative for commune organisat­
ion came from above or below does not matter, for we have
(54) See for example, ffHu Han Hsien discusses the 
problem of the arrangement of unemployed personnel11,
NFJP 14.5,1957,
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already seen that many of the ingredients of the 
Great Leap were embodied in the employment strategy 
for 1957, and once the change began, it was bound 
to find support among those who had grasped the 
magnitude of the employment problem in 1957 and the 
futility of trying to solve it within the existing 
institutional framework.
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Conclusions
The first conclusion to be drawn from this study 
is that in the period 1949-1957 structural unemployment 
was growing in urban China. As a general proposition 
this is not new, but our analysis of the data for 
Shanghai has enabled us to quantify unemployment and the 
demand and supply for labour in that city with a degree 
of detail and precision which has not previously been 
attempted. The data for Shanghai have also enabled us 
to attempt for the first time estimates of the net change 
in total urban employment, the structure of urban employ­
ment for one year and changes in the employment structure 
over the period 1931-1957. Taken together with other 
local and national data, the Shanghai materials have 
also enabled us to illustrate the way in which geographical 
disaggregation can add signifieantly to our understanding 
of ChinaTs economic experience and problems#
In Chapter Three we attempted to analyse the deter­
minants of urban unemployment and we suggested that on 
the demand side, total absorption had been limited by the 
preference for capital intensive investment in the First 
Five Year Plan; the achievement of a high rate of growth
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of productivity; and official policies which adversely 
affected the labour intensive, traditional sector.
However, this overall picture was qualified to take 
account of the distinction between "key-point" cities, 
where capital accumulation was rapid, and cities such as 
Shanghai where the capital stock only increased slightly.
In cities where accumulation was talcing place, product­
ivity growth was probably not an important factor limiting 
employment growth. In cities such as Shanghai howwep, 
employment was limited both by lack of new capital and 
by the growth of productivity.
On the labour supply side, the national data are 
so crude and unreliable as to be of little use. Our data 
for Shanghai however, enabled us to quantify the components 
of labour supply in some detail and in particular to 
make an estiamte of the contribution of net immigration 
to total unemployment.
In Chapters Five and Six we showed that the growth 
of unemployment was unexpected and leeUk to changes in 
both employment policies and the workings of the Labour 
Bureaux. The Chinese employment expectations were based 
mainly on misleading analogies with Russian experience
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and they had to be progressively adjusted to fit the 
facts as they unfolded. By the end of our period these 
adjustments had brought the Chinese to the point where 
they acknowledged that the growth of the urban economy 
would not be sufficient to justify population and employ­
ment transfers from the rural areas and the implications 
of this were that the absorptive capacity of agriculture 
would have to be increased, and that in the cities, st­
rict control would have to be maintained over all hiring.
The control of hiring was in fact the fundamental 
problem of labour market organisation in this period. The 
necessity for control arose both from the fact that mig­
ration was intensifying unemployment and from the fact 
that the urban economy was unable to absorb even the 
natural increment to the labour force. Let us consider 
the migration issue first. Had migration been well 
informed and motivated by long term, economic consider­
ations, net immigration and its impact on unemployment 
would have been smaller; for potential migrants would 
have been dissuaded from moving by the lack of urban 
employment opportunities in the modern sector (where 
some control was exercised over hiring) and by low
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incomes in the traditional sector (where entry was 
comparatively easy)* The problem was that migrants 
were influenced by non-economic considerations such 
as the apparent glamour of urban life, fear of rural 
upheavals etc. and also that where economic motivation 
was important, it was often misinformed in the sense that 
the employment prospects apparent in the periodic upswings 
of the urban economy frequently turned out to be an in­
adequate basis for permanent migration* These two 
factors resulted in an excessive growth of urban pop­
ulation and work force which, through their effects on 
urban costs, threatened to undermine the investment 
strategy of the First and Second Five Year Plans. Part 
of the solution to this problem was to put controls on 
migration and hiring, but the evidence of the 1950*3 
suggests that three conditions are necessary to make 
such control effective: first, there has either to be
effective supervision or complete abolition of private 
industrial and commercial activities; second, fluctu­
ations in the economy have to be minimal; and third, 
adequate administrative power and l^esources have to be 
allocated to the Labour Bureau, Hone of these conditions 
were fulfilled in the period up to 1957, although in
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subsequent years there is evidence of attempts to make 
control of the urban economy more effective, and of a 
new flexibility in international trade policy which 
must have enabled the planners to lessen the impact of 
agricultural fluctuations on the urban sector.
Apart from migration, the inability of the urban 
economy to absorb even the natural increment to the 
labour force had, by 1957,also lead to the necessity of 
overall hiring control. For this inability implied the 
need for continuous emigration from the cities, and the 
evidence of the 1950*s had shown that this was unlikely 
to be feasible unless the urban authorities possessed the 
sanction of ensuring that new entrants to the labour 
force who refused official assignment were forbidden 
employment of any kind. Even this sanction however was 
a necessary rather than sufficient condition for ensuring 
compliance, and in practice, in the 1960Ts, it has had 
to be supplemented by other means of social control.
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